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1 ,0	 INTRODUCTION
This report presents the unified results of Phases I, II, and III of the above-named
study,
The study effort was divided into three phases Phase I concerned itself with
the achievement of redundancy w th emphasis on the special requirements placed on redundancy
by a need for automated verification . The investigations of the first phase resulted in the
identification of those features of redundancy which are important to the purpose of verification
and the establishment of classes into which redundant situations may be placed.
While Phase I of the study developed characteristics which a redundancy design
must possess to be amenable to automated redundancy verification, Phase 11 developed tech-
niques for achieving this verification. There are two fundamental approaches which can be
taken in the clack of this problem: (a) specify in detail some relatively small number of
specific (and presumabie typical) cases and develop detailed solutions to each, or (b) address the
general problem and exploit the methodology for achieving solutions. The former attack has
the advantage of achieving immediate results for those cases selected. But what about other
cases which may be important in the future or under different circumstances? A casual
examination of the problem reveals the wide variety of conditions which can arise and which
a specific design must satisfy. How do the few selected, detailed solutions relate to solutions
under other circumstances? What problems are "typical?" What is typical today may not
be typical five years from now under the advancing state-of-the-art.
The above questions are quite pertinent and the inference which can be drawn
when attempting to answer them is equally pertinent--unless a redundancy verification
methodology is developed, each problem which arises will be an isolated caseta be solved
from the very beginning with only isolated (and usually intuitively) related experience
gained from proceeding problems. Under these circumstances, it is difficult at best to
forecast the impact of redundancy verification on a system design. For without such a forecast,
the system design must proceed virtually uninfluenced by the verification requirement until
each verification problem is solved. The end result is either that redundancy verification
design becomes an afterthought to fit as it might or else that significant (in terms of cost and
time) perturbations are introduced into the system design process as the design inevitably
folds back for reiteration.
The impact of redundancy verification on a system design is considered the most
significant and heretofore most wanting area in this field. The study team is not aware of,
or has a source been located which describes, a methodology for redundancy verification .
For these reasons, the word "techniques" was interpreted literally and the approach to the
problem was not one of detailed development of specific cases, but rather one of development
of methodology. Probably the single most important advantage of a methodology is its power
to allow inference to be drawn about a related collection of design circumstances. For it
c
is here that the similarities and differences in individual design approaches can be ascertained
and statements can be made collectively about common points i n many approaches based on the
methodology. implicit to these statements is the necessity of developing "grounds for common=-
ality," identifying pertinent characteristics which describe the problem and last but not least,
identifying the problem and its interfaces in detail. To achieve these ends, it became neces-
sary to develop the methodology from the ground up; complete with definitions and algorithms.
The end result is believed to be a comprehensive discipline and a fresh approach to an old
problem. It is not claimed that the results are the optimum solution or even that they represent
the only solution, only that they represent an acceptable solution. No apologies are made for
the lack of elegance in the development since the emphasis has been placed on a usable solution
and it is felt that this has been achieved.
The third phase addressed itself to the treatment of "unverifiable" situations. The
problem was attackec + by scrutinizing the meaning of verifiability and identifying the things
which can cause a sit^wion to become classed as "unverifiable." This having been done design
criteria were developed to aid in the avoidance of such situations and technological advances
were suggested to aid in the alteration to a verifiable form of such situations.
Considering the specific sections of this report, Section 2.0 presents a system which
was developed for the classification of redundancy and relates the redundancy verification prob-
lem of status identification.
Section 3.0 reflects on the need for automated redundancy verification and examine
the role of redundancy and its verification under varying maintenance policies and mission
profiles.
Section 4.0 presents, in do-tail , the redundancy verification methodology developed
in Phase ll.
Section 5.0 presents the design processes, guidelines, and considerations which have
been identified as being integral to the implementation of redundancy verification.
Section 6.0 outlines the development of design criteria and presents plans for the
development of technologies deemed profitable in the pursuit of expanded verification
capabilities.
Section 7.0 discusses the reasons for undertaking a case study and the nature of the
case selected for the exercise.
Section 8.0 presents conclusions and recommendations.
:appendix A is o series of discussions on the various coincidence development
techniques and enumerates the advantages and disadvantages of each.
Appendix B is a technical description of the system chosen as a case study. 	 lie
1-2
s
	
Appendix C gives the solution to the verification problem chosen as a case study.
a
Appendix D presents the design criteria of Section 6.2 in a form consiste ,it with
N H B 8040.2.
Also included is a glossary of the terms developed and employed throughout the
study.
The reader should note that this work is devoted to automated redundancy verifi-
cation. Wherever statements about redundancy verification appear, it should be understood that
functions involved are to be in an automated fashion.
i'
c
iz ,..,,
	2,0	 REDUNDANCY CLASSIFICATIONS AND THE STATUS IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM
As indicated in Section 1.0, one of the purposes of this report is to develop a
methodology for automated redundancy verification. To achieve this end, it will be necessary
to investigate the interfaces, constituents and ramifications of redundancy verification. It is
obvious that the investigation should commence by examining the concepts of redundancy. But
what is less obvious are the interrelationships bfstween redundancy, various applications and
verification techniques and their affect on the final results. Can redundancy approaches be
described independent of applications? Will the description of a redundancy approach be suf-
ficient to determine a verification technique? What features should be used to describe a
redundancy approach? Is it possible to devise a single scheme which will describe redundancy
approaches and verification techniques? These are the most pertinent questions which come to
mind on addressing the problem and each must ultimately be answered.
	
2.1
	 Classifi cations of Redundancy
Let us begin by considering redundancy concepts, but in a special light--that of
automated verification. The major considerations in a redundancy design are shown in Figure
2.1-1. On examining this figure two points immediately become obvious.
a. There are a large number of features required to describe a redundancy approach .
This quantity must, in some fashion, be reduced to a manageable size if usable
results are to be achieved.
b. A classification scheme must be developed from the features such that detailed
approaches can be described collectively based on commonality of features.
If this cannot be accomplished there will be a hopeless patchwork of descrip-
tions, terms and techniques.
There is a third consideration of importance but which is Less obvious from the figure.
This is the independence of the fault detect/recovery scheme and the complexity of redundant
equipment. 11, is not difficult to cite examples of elaborate fault detection schemes under which
redundant equipments are not independent. It is also easy to, envision complex equipments with
multiple inputs and outputs or equipments which perform multiple functions. If any headway is
to be made in determining classifications for redundancy, consideration of these complications
must be deferred until a foothold is gained on the fundamental problem. The rationale for
developing redundancy classifications is contained in the paragraphs that follow. Throughout
the discussion the following simplifying assumptions hold.
•	 Instances of redundancy are treated as entities.
0	 The operation of all (both on-line and off-line) equipments is to be verified.
•	 Equipments are considered dedicated solely to the single input-single output
operation.
2-1
REDUNDANCY Dt1CTRINE DUES THE FAILURE IIF IINF EtEMENT IN T(IE ,ET CAUSE
AN INCREASED LOAD ON IH( REMAINING ELEMENT.?.
BACK-UP CAPABILITY
III REDUNDANT ITEMS	 b, REDUNDANT ITEM(SI HAVE
HAVE SAME FUNCTIONAL	 A REDUCED BUT ACCEPTABLE
CAPABILITY AS PRIME	 FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY
ITEM,	 (FALLBACKI
LEVEL
REDUNDANCY EMPLOYED AT THE LEVEL.
a) PART	 bI UNIT	 CI SUBSYSTEM	 aI SYSTEM
LOCATION OF "TIE POINTS"
(WHERE SHOULD REDUNDANT GROUP$ BE FORMED
AND HOW MANY ITEMS SHOULD BE IN A REDUNDANT
PATH?)
DEGREE
NUMBER OF RE pUNDAN' ITEMS RECIUIK;D
REQUIRE
_)^ I	 2	 ,..	 eFSOFnFOR
REDUNDANCY VERIFICATION
VERIFICATION POLICY ^-
III CONTINUAL b) NOT CONTINUAL
(a^
i
e
OUTPUTS EFFECTS
IY
of DISTINGUISHABLE	 bl NOT
DISTINGUISHABLE
tREPAIRABILITY FAILURE DETECT SCHEME a
o) FAILED OFF-LINE III 	 FAILED OFF-LINE EOP't IDENTIFY CONDITION OF b) IDENTIFY NUMBER Ot
„
COVE Wlll BE WILL NOT BE REPAIRED SPECIFIC ELEMENTS,
E
ELEMENTS IN THE SET
WHICH AR	 PERABLEE O.REPAIRED IMMEDIATELY UNTIL SYSTEM FAILS
y
RECOVERY
ai FAUT.TS DETECTED
	 bI FAULTS DETECTED VALIDATION POLICYAND CORRECTED	 ONLY
EON-LINE
OR ONLY
	
b) MONITOR BOTH ON-LINE
FAULT CORRECTION  EQPT, AND OFF-LINE EQPT
ai SEQUENTIAL
	
III	 ITERATIVE	 RECOVERYTIME
TYPE
III STANDBY, INOPERATIVE	 III STANDBY, PARTIAL POWER 	 al ACTIVE	
I
`
I
.1
FINAL DESIGN
1IB81.8
2-2 Figure 2,1 -1.	 Redundancy Design Flow Chart
^. -
r
In classifying redundancy approaches it is necessary to consider those features which
comprise the redundancy doctrine, e.g., hardware configuration and failure recovery, and
redundancy verification, e.g., failure detection and time ct which the detection is performed.
Accordingly, this development will draw directly from the information contained in Figure 2.1-1.
Since this area of technology suffers from a terminology trauma, each of the major features
which characterize redundancy will be described before proceeding.
Redundancy Doctrine
•	 Load Sharing
Explained in the figure
•	 Back-up Capability
Do redundant items have same functional capability as the prime or do they
represent a reduced but acceptable capability (fall-back)?
•	 Level
Is the redundancy at the port, assembly, unit, etc., level?
•	 Location of Tie Points
Where should redundant sets be formed and how many items should be in a
h	 redundant set?
•	 Degree.
How many items are redundant?
•	 Outputs/Effects DiSfinguishable
Are the outputs (and inputs in some instances) of redundant items distinguishable
from each other or are they "tied" (physically) together?
•	 Repairabi Iity
Are failed off-line equipments repaired immediately after failure, schedkiled
for repair, repaired only when all redundant items in a set have failed or not
repaired at all?
•	 Recovery Policy
Are failures only detected and then manually corrected or are failures
outon atically detected and corrected?
0	 Fault Correction
If automatic failure detection and correction is used, are failures detected
and corrected for each redundant set or only detected at system output and
diagnostic routines isolate and correct failure?
a
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J
r Type
Are redundant elements active and functioning, idle and powered down or on
standby partial power.
4	 Recovery Time
How long may a redundant set be out of specification limits following the
failure of one of its elements?
Redunda ncy Verifica tion
e	 Verification Policy
Are thi elements in a redundant set checked continuously for proper operation
or checked initially or periodically?
e	 Fai lure Detect Scheme
Wham is the nature of the failure detection process's Is concern centered on
identifying r of n redundant items ore operable or with identifying which
specific item is operable?
	
r
e	 Validation Policy
if identifying the condition of specific elements, is only the on--line equipment
vaiidotod or is off-line equipment also validated?
Having answered all of the alcove questions, a redundancy design will be uniquely
identified. However, the immedia lee task is to classify redundancy with regard to verification
techniques. With this added constraint it should be possible to decrease the large number of
variables identified above. Before pursuing this task; however, it should be pointed out that
eliminating some of the variables in a classifying scheme in no way implies that approaches
classified according to this scheme are independent of these variables. Quite the contrary;
the classifications serve to group approaches which possess common features such that statermpnts
may be made about the impact of the entire, group on the remaining variables. .g ust; as we group
circuits into digital and analog, this does not imply that the circuits are independent of other
variables such as power dissipation, reliability, accuracy, drift, etc. Once a circuit is
identified as, say, digital in character, it is usually possible to attribute general features to that
circuit regarding power dissipation, accuracy, etc. And so, the analogy holds for the redun--'x
dancy classifications with regard to verification,
Let us at this point resume the task of decreasing the number of variables in our
classification. Throughout the following discussion, the theme is one of eliminating features
which do not directly describe how redundancy is verified from the standpoint of a redundancy
design * . No mention has been made of the type of signal being used to judge the operation of
* It should be pointed out that while the eliminated features may not be of first order in describing
a verification technique, they may, impact the impid entation of the technique to the extent of
making it infeasible
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equipment. Signal types will radically influence verification techniques and this subject is
discussed in Section 2.2. The immediate concern here is the classification with regard to
redundancy.
(')n examining Figure 2.1-1, a little reflection will reveal that level, degree and
load sharing do not immediately influence the verification technique. These features very
directly influence the application of redundancy, the reliability of the redundant sett and the
relative ease,, or difficulty, by which verification can be achieved. But knowing these features
tells us little about the verification technique.
The feature of backup capability has some interesting ramifications. If the off-line
equipment provides a reduced capability, it is tempting to state that the redundancy can be
verified since it is usually a simple matter to determine which capability is present. However,
there is usually no way to verify the reduced capability equipment when the prime equipment
is operating---outside those described below. Thus, the manifestations of back-up capability
can be described by other features and it will not be considered as a candidate.
To the extent that location of tie points is influenced by reliability, this feature
falls in the some category as level and degree and does not influence the description of a
verification technique. Location of tie points will affect, in general, the type signal to be
considered and will influence verification in this regard. However, these considerations are
not redundancy descriptors and so location of tie points can be deleted as a candidate.
Distinguishable outputs is the next feature of concern. Aside from a special case
to be described in the next paragraph, if the output of each redundant equipment is not in some
way distinguishable, it is not possible to verify redundancy. For by the very definition of
redundancy (assuming the redundant equipments provide equal functional capability), the output
of a set of redundant equipment must remain within a specified tolerance to prevent failure. For
this reason, distinguishable outputs is identified as a feature which characterizes redundancy.
Closely related to distinguishable outputs cued not shown on Figure 2.1-1 is a more
subtle feature which deserves attention. This is the variation of an output from a redundant
set of equipment as the number operational equipments varies. This feature would provide a
method of redundancy verification when the outputs were not distinguishable, provided the
variation was still within specified limits. it should also be pointed out that this feature will not
identify which equipment is not operating, only the quantity that are operative. This feature
is then identified for redundancy classification.
Repairability, Recovery policy and Fault Correction all relate to the circumstances
after a failure has been discovered. While these will inf!Iuence verification they do not aid in
the description of a verification technique, and will be deleted. It is interesting to note in
passing that if redundant equipments are repaired only after all equipments have failed, there is
little point in having continuous verification.
c
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Examining Type of redundancy, again we see that this adds little to the description
of a verific^rtion technique. This feature may, however, indicate that verification of redun-
doncy cannot be achieved unless the elements of a set are completely operative.
Recovery Time can a lso be de feted. This feature may we l I in fluence the type of
verification achievable but does not describe it
Considering Verification Policy, it is obvious that this feature is descriptive of
redundancy verification. Vet If fication Policy introduces the dimension of time into the
description. it will be convenient without too much loss of definition to describe this feature
by two characteristics, viz., continuous verification and noncontinuous verification.
Failure Detect Scheme is the last feature to be included in the list, for Validation
Policy is rather one sided. if we do not validate off-line equipment, we can not verify it.
Failure Detect Scheme identifies the basic principle of verification. This feature will be
described by two characteristics, viz., concern is only with whether all elements of a redundant
set are operating --with no regard to identifying which element has failed--or a specific, element
is identified as having failed.
In summary, the redundancy classification have been reduced to the following
features:	 J
•	 Distinguishable Outputs
•	 Verification Policy
•	 Failure Detect Scheme
•	 Variation of output with the number of operating equipments.
In turn, each of these features has two characteristics. If we consider the redundancy classifica-
tions to consist of exhaustive combinations of characteristics we account for a total of 24 or 16
classifications. These classifications are shown in Figure 2.1-2. Examining these results, it
should be possible to further reduce the number of classifications on the basis of incons+stoncies.
However, there is a more pronounced problem which pervades the entire discussion above. That
is, we have all but ignored the influence of application. It is somewhat surprising that the
derived features claimed to be descriptive of redundancy have little to do with what are
typically recognized as descriptors of redundancy. It is even more enlightening to realize that
redundancy verification cannot be typified on the basis of redundancy approaches alone. Of the
que;rtions asked at the outset of this section, we have answered but two--(a) the features used
to describes a redundancy approach and b) a redumlancy :approach can be described independently
of application. And these are only qualified answers since the derivation contained only
the fundamental redundancy problem.
it is obvious that a more fundamental problem will have to be addressed if additional
information is to be obtained, or indeed, if the above results are to be validated. This problem
will be that of status identification and is the subject of fhe following section.
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2, .2	 A General Look at Status Identification
it is appropriate to begin with a deceptively simple premise - one does not measure
the status of a device, one measures physical properties of input and output signals/effects and
deduces the status. It is this deductive process that is the key to status identification and the
heretofore missing link in the classification attempts. The development in Section 2.1 treated
the instances of redundancy as entities, divorced from the remainder of the system. Under these
circumstances the required deduction for status identification is trivial.* If under a given
application, the redundant sets can be treated as entities, the results of Section 2.1 would be
a good represer;tation of the situation.
Let us then address the problem of status identification. The process is depinted in
Figure 2.2. Since this figure will be the guidepost for Section 4.0 of the repot 	 'it is not the
intent at this time to discuss it in detail. Rather, the discussion will be carriec, ,+e extent
necessary to determine redundancy verification classifications and to assess the results of
Section 2.1.
Referring to f= igure 2.2, we note that status identification has been divided into two
primary areas--identification by simple see, and identification by group (see Glossary). Essen-
tially, a simple set meets the assumptions of the development in Section 2.1 above and a group is
anything that is not a simple set. One fundamental difference is that group identification is
centered about system-related schemes whereas set identification schemes are centered about
the set as an entity. The latter is exclusively redundancy verification where the former is not
nr,cessari ly so A detailed discussion of isolation by group will be deferred to Sections 3.0 and
4.0. Suffice it to say that the group problem is typically concerned with such schemes as
pattern recognition, sequential testing algorithms, etc.
The first block in Figure 2.2 under "simple set" is a rather crucial one. The branch
to the right indicates that the outputs are distinguishable by one of the methods identified in the
three blocks immediately below and in accordance with at least one of the three verification
policies, vis., continuous on-line and off--line, continuous on-line and periodic off -line or
periodic on-line and off-line. Note that the lead-in premise is applied here since we must
either know, or make provision to determine, the status of the input. The branch to the left of
this block indicates the outputs/effects are not distinguishable and passes to a second test. This
test is applied to determine if the output signal/effect varies as the number of operational
elements in the set. if the output does not, redundancy cannot be verified. If it does, then a
limited form of verification can be performed (see below).
We next pass into a test block which is concerned with the behavior of the off-line
element(s). The concern here is whether the off-line elements must operate or not. If they must
be operational, it would be desirable to verify their status on a continuous basis. It should be
noted that the questions in this block do not directly influence the status identification but they
are considered important enough to place on the diagram.
*Note ' thet the deduction is trivial.- This by no means implies that obtaining the information:
on which to base a deduction is trivial.
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Figure 2.2. Status Identification Process' Flow Chart
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The next set of blocks represents the three verification policies as described
above, While these blocks are felt to be self-explanatory, a few words regarding periodic veri-
fication are in order. By periodic verification we mean verification that is either performed
only once in the life of the equipment, or at the beginning of each mission or nt some time
interval which is large compared to timing or frequency internal to the system. in general,
periodic verification implies the requirement to terminate normal functions of the set while
status indication is being performed.
'.
	
	 Let us now consider the branch under point A. The right-hand branch considers
the characteristic of not identifying which specific element in a set is faulty but only the
quantity that are faulty. This is a subtle but rather important distinction--especially in the
area of cost. Without pursuing the details (see Section 5.0), it should be intuitively evident
that the task of simply identifying one of a group of items is not operational is easier than
identifying which specific one. From the figure it can be seen that there are two characteristics
of redundancy which will make this form of verification possible. One is a property of the
redundant set output signal which varies with the number of operational elements in the set and
the other is distinguishable outputs. We note that in the former characteristic, the outputs of
the elements do not have to be distinguishable. Considering the latter characteristic of dis-
tinguishable outputs, all that is required to meet the operations demand is that the element
outputs be compared.
If we are to indicate the status of each element in the set, the problem becomes
somewhat more involved. (See left -most branch under point A in the figure). Recalling the
premise cited at the outset of this section we must measure, on a continuous basis, a physical
property of the output signal/affact to determine the status of each element. This points directly
to the final missing ingredient in the classification scheme--the type of signal. This ingredient,
however, introduces a whole new classification problem since the signals must be classified for
the same reasons we desired to classify redundancy features. A moment's reflection will indicate
the scope of this task - and confirm the desire for classification. Since the nature of measuring
devises and schemes is highly correlated to the statistical character of the signals, it seems
reasonable to classify signals by these methods. This classification, however, will have no
immediate effect on the present development and details of the classification will be deferred
to Section 5.0.
At this point some general comments about Figure 2.2 are necessary. There is
a feasibility test after each verification selection block. An obvious inference to be drawn
here is that a verification approach may be acceptable from the redundancy features and yet
not feasible due to technology or the operations requirements. Table 2.2 lists some of the most
pertinent reasons for an approach not being feasible. A second general point of interest in the
figure is the decision block in the lower left-hand corner where the process is directed back to
another verification policy--should this be allowed by the operational constraints. The point
to be made is that the feasibility of verification is also influenced by operational considerations.
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Table 2.2.	 Reasons for an Approach Not Being Feasible
• False alarm rate too high
• Distorts through-put information
•	 loading
•	 phase shift
•	 frequency stability
•	 bandwidth
•	 error rate
•	 accuracy
•	 pressure
•	 speed
` •	 inertia
• Will not detect alll of the most probably failure modes
• Too heavy
• Spatial constraints exceeded
•	 form factor
•	 size
• Power dissipations too great
• Reliability too low
• Cost
'	 • Response time too great
• Beyond the state-of-the-art
• Cannot implement an approach due to signal restrictions
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2.3
	
Conclusions
There are several important conclusions to be drawn from the material in this
section. These conclusions will be referred to repeatedly throughout the remainder of the
report and are itemized below for easy reference.
•	 The investigation of the status identification problem corroborates the
redundancy classification results of Section 2.1. As a result of the status
identification investigation, it is possible to pare down the exhaustive
enumeration of classes depicted in Figure 2.1-2 to the eight shown in
Figure 2.3. These eight classes constitute the final catalog of redundancy
features for simple sets.
•	 The automated status determination of a redundant set is primarily contin-
gent on being able to distinguish outputs of the elements. From a practical
point of view this implies that in most cases the outputs be gated or switched
to achieve isolation. If maintenance is to be performed on a failed ele-
ment while another element in the set is continuing the on-line function,
the isolation of outputs is imperative . In addition, the gross sensitivity
of hardware failure mode distributions to manufacturing processes makes
isolation even more attractive.
• Whether a particular redundancy scheme is considered amenable to auto-
mated status verification is as much a function of operations considerations
and input/output signals (and the method in which they carry information)
as it is the redundancy design.
•	 The redundancy features identified in Section 2.1 are both necessary and
sufficient to characterize a redundancy approach relative to verification.
While redundancy features can be identified independent of signals, both
facets must be considered to classify a redundancy verification approach.
•	 While emphasis has been placed on classifying signals, in actuality eacli
failure mode of the signal properties which affect the carried information
must be considered.
0	 It is advisable to separate status identification into the two major divisions
of group and simple set. This separation provides a natural dividing line
in the overa l i process
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3.0	 WHY REDUNDANCY VERIFICATION
It is opportune at this point to ask why one should be concerned about redundancy
verification. Why should there be concern over how much redundancy is present so long as the
system is performing its function? There are several significant reasons for requiring this informa-
tion, depending on the circum-lances. Let us consider three ^f the most prominent situations
under which information about redundancy is impertant. The first situation is the most universal
since it involves redundancy in any design. Consider a system which is intended to perform a
mission of a predetermined length. The system will have an inherent probability of completing
this mission without loss of predefined functions. Should the system contain redundancy, this
probability will undoubtedly be based on the assumption that the redundancy was present at the
start of the mission. Is this a valid assumption when the system has had time logged prior to the
mission? The answer obviously depends on the amount of time logged prior to tl,e mission, the
length of the mission, the reliability of the equipment in question and the criticality of the
mission. * In any event it seems prudent to verify the existence of redundancy. It is important
to note that this some situation exists for a newly purchased one-shot system such as an ICBM
or a system which will perform many missions over its lifetime such as a fighter plane.
Consider next a system such as a spacecraft which has several distinct phases in
its mission, each representing successively greater commitments in terms of risk and fuel con-
sumption. Before commitment is made to the next phase, an appraisal is made of the likelihood
of completing that phase in terms of the present condition of the system (and its crew). If the
spacecraft contains redundancy (and the chances are slim that it doesn't), the condition or status
of this redundancy will likely be determined before further commitment is attempted. Note that
in contrast to the first situation which addressed redundancy verification at the start of the mis-
sion , this situation is concerned with verification during the mission. The two are fundamentally
different in terms of an approach to verification. In the forme instance, most of the verification
equipment could be designed as extrasystem check hardware. in the latter situation much of the
verification equipment must fly with tlia, spacecraft for be allocated telemetry channels for
remote analysis and verification). It is also worth noting that this situation might also apply to
a system that is capable of aborting its mission at any time (as contrasted to the discrete commit-
ment levels described). If this decision were based on the amount of redundancy present to allow
a "safety factor," the verification would likely be on a continuous basis.
" A.
*It should  e rioted that these comments assume only the
observable.
system output or total performance is
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As a final situation, consider a system which has, for all practical purposes, an
indefinite mission such as a communication relay link.. It is likely that MTBF would be used as
a measure of the reliability for such a system. Assume that a maintenance crew is on duty at
all times and further recognize that the system contains redundancy and redundancy verifica-
tion. Will redundancy verification, along with the possibility of maintenance, influence the
MTBF of the system? The answer is, generally, a decided, yes.* Let us examine the impact
of redundancy verification on the MTBF of a system where maintenance is performed under three
typical policies. Consider first a redundant set (see Appendix A for definition) with no redun-
dancy verification. Typically, the only time a failure will be indicated under this situation is
when all equipments in the set (elements) have failed. Only at this time will maintenance be
effected and the effort will be relatively large since all elements must be repaired. The equa-
tion for the MTBF of a redundant set with n identical elements and one of the n required for
success is,
n
Ms = Me	1	 (3.0-1)
where
Me = MTBF of an element
Ms	 MTBF of the set.
A family of curves showing Ms as a function of M for n = 2, 3, 4, 5 is shown in Figure3.0-.1. ** Note that for a set comprised of a redundant pair of elements (redundancy of degree
one) and an element MTBF of 100 hours, the set MTBF is only 150 hours.
*There are several important assumptions which must accompany this answer. These are: (a) the
failed equipment can be isolated from the on-line operation of the system, (b) the verification
indicates which equipment has failed and (c) maintenance can be performed on a noninterfer-
ing basis with operations.
**It has been assumed that no element has zero failure rate.
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Consider next a redundant set with redundancy verification employed on a con-
tinuous basis and repair of a failed element is effected as soon as the verification equipment in-
dicates this condition. The equation for the MTBF of a redundant set with n-2 identical
elements and one of the two is required for su cess is,
Mn
Ms = e	 D<<Me
D
n-I 
n
M2
MS 
_ ^----- --
2D	
, n=2	 ,	 P, 0-2)
where
Me and Ms are defined for (3.0-1)
D a mean down time of an ele, went due to unscheduled maintenance.
A form ly of curves for Ms as a function of Me for D--1/2,1,2 is shown in Figure 3.0-2 (note the
log scale on the ordinate). Under this condition, for a redundant pair with element MTBF of
100 hours and mean down time of one hour, the set MTBF is 5,000 hours. Compare this result
with that obtained above.
Consider as a last situation, a system in which redundancy verification is performed
periodically every T hours and if an element (or elements) is found failed, it is r(,)paired!.* The
only other time maintenance is initiated is when all elements in a set fail (since without verifi-
cation, this is the only recourse). The equation for the MTBF of a redundant set with n=2 iden-
tical elements and one of the two is required for success is,
P
ote that it is assumed the verification and repair times are very much less '$an the verification
interval T.
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Figure 3.0-2. Plot Of Set MTBF (Ms ) vs. Element MTBF (M e ) For Average Element
Down Time (D) = 1/2,1,2 - Redundancy With Immediate Repair
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A family of curves for Ms as a function of Me for T-50, 100, 500 is shown in Figure 3.0-3
(note the log scale on the ordinate). Here the set MTBF is 208 hours for an elemenfi MTBF of
100 hours and T=i00 hours (about every four days).
Recalling to the question asked at the outset of this section, it is recognized that
no answer has been explicitly provided but ample argument has been advanced to indicate the
importance of redundancy verification. Where redundancy is involved in a design, the verifi-
cation of that redundancy is a natural consequence. The remaining sections of this report
describe what must be considered in the design for redundancy verification under various cases
and circumstances. The reader will likely identify, in that material, some of the situations
described in this section and may find it helpful to use the situations in cementing ideas.
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4.0	 SOME GENERAL CONCEPTS
This section is intended to introduce some of the most important and basic notions
developed during the study. These notions will serve as the fo.,rndation for the detailed devel-
opments of succeeding sections. The scheme of the section is more one of appealing to the
intuition of the reader than a formal presentation of definitions and methodology.
The study has attempted, among other things, to lend a degree of formalism and
unification to the area of redundancy verification which heretofore has been virtually non-
existent. This approach has the singular advantage of allowing a monolithic treatment of the
subject but the disadvantage of requiring a vocabulary of its own to express the ideas. Accord-
ingly, it has been necessary to identify numerous terms and classifications during the study.
The classifications are a means to an end and not the end themselves. As such, they are a
convenient means of expressing notions and descriptions, and not just slots for sorting . If one
is told to design an amplifier, one has some idea of the task ahead. But if he is told it is to
be a small signal amplifier, his information is greatly increased. The specialized terms are
used to describe the nature of the redundancy verification problem and the methodology or
technique for designing redundancy verification is developed about these terms. When a
specific problem is stated in these terms, the methodology for its solution is outlined and the
information required to achieve this solution has already been spelled out. With these thoughts
in mind, let us look at a few of the concepts .
4.1
	 The implications of Redundancy Verification
The problem of redundancy verification on an automated basis is essentially one of
determining whether the equipments forming the redundant operation (called a set) are operating
in an acceptable or unacceptable manner.* The acceptability of operation of an equipment
will be called status and we may conclude that the problem is one of determining status.
It is appropriate at this point to recall a premise from Section 2.2,viz, one does
not measure the status of a device; one measures physical properties of input and output signals
and deduces the status. We have thus introduced two more steps in the verification process,
i .e ., deduction and measurement. These steps will be discussed further in the following
paragraphs but let us first direct our attention to two more obvious considerations--the influence
of the redundancy design 'itself and the signals which are being measured. Classifications of
redundancy as they described methods of achieving redundancy verification were developed in
Section 2.0. (See Figure 2.3.) These classes essentially determine whether redundancy
verification is feasible based on the redundancy design itself. If feasible, the classes establish
one of the primary considerations for verification . These considerations impose the implications
of where, when and what on the verification design . What remains is the how and this is
determined to a large degree by the statistical character of the signal being considered and the
*Here we have considered only two levels of acceptability for simplicity . In the general case
f	 there could be several levels. Note, however, that in the final analysis we must state whether
an equipment is redundant or not and this is two ievels of acceptability
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rdesired confidence in the results. Redundancy verification is then a process of deducing
status from operations performed on the system signals and, by some means, reporting this
status .
	
4.2	 Functional Descriptions of Signals
In the preceding paragraph we indicated that operations would be performed on the
system signals. However, it is important to be able to describe these signals in more detail .
We shall call the signals which exist in the system being verified, before any verification has
been introduced, tenant signals . (Where the system being verified is known as the principal
system .) I t is also possible that signals other than the tenant signals may have to be introduced
into the principal system to realize redundancy verification. These signals we shall call
injected signals . We may further classify injected signals into three more specific types
depending upon their relationship to the tenant sign xl . These are Symbiotic, Simulative and
Idle and refer, respectively, to whether the injected signal is in some fashion "mixed" with
tenant signal, replaces an otherwise active tenant signal or is injected into the tenant signal
stream when the tenant signal is inert for long periods of time.* We note finally that there
will also be signals in the verification equipment as well . These signals we shall call supporting
signals , Figure 4.2 indicates the relationships of these signals .
	
4.3	 The Notions of Groups and Sets
If we are to examine methods of redundancy verification, we must also consider the
configurations which redundancy designs may take on . There are obviously an infinite number
of such configurations and a moments reflection will reveal that these configurations will
certainly influence redundancy verification. To further complicate the problem, it is seldom
that one is interested in verifying a single instance of redundancy: we are typically interested
in verifying whole systems containing numerous instances of redundancy. Some collective
descriptors must then be defined if intelligent statements are to be made about the effects of
redundancy configurations on redundancy verification .
Let us begin by establishing what we shall call a redundant set. This descriptor
includes single instances of redundancy wherein the members of the set (called elements of the
set) are dedicated soiely to the function to be performed by the set and this single instance of
redundancy is independent of all other instances of redundancy . A redundant set can be further
divided into simple sets and, logically enough, sets that are not simple . A simple sot is then a
redundant set whose elements all have the same predecessors and followers in a functional flow
sense ** if a redundant set does not meet these criteria it is not a simple set. Simple sets
represent the classic example of parallel redundancy and an example is shown in Figure 4.3-1(a).
*An example of a system which might employ an idle signal is a Range Safety Command Distruct
System . Such a system is idle (hopefully) over a vast portion of its missions .
**The term "functional flow" is crucial to the definition and should be interpreted in its most
literal sense.
4-2
is
u1	 5 A	 9"I'
7t
85647-25
C
f	 ^
I"
t'
y'.
uafa
I
:.1Retracing our steps, redundancy is divided into two configuration descriptors--
redundant sets, described above, and interrelated redundancy. Essentially, all redundancy
configurations which are not redundant sets are interrelated redundancy. An example of inter-
related redundancy is shown in Figure 4.3-1(b).
Having defined the collective descriptors of redundancy configurations, it will now
be necessary to indicate their relationships to redundancy verification. In this regard we shall
divide redundancy verification into two distinct problems - the simple set problem and the
group problem . The simple set problem involves redundancy configurations of exclusively
simple sets. The group problem involves redundancy configurations of sets that are not simple
and interrelated redundancy . These relationships are shown in Figure 4.3 -2 . From the devel-
opment above we note that a group may simply be a collection of interrelated elements* which
cannot be subdivided into simple sets. We shall term this a first level group. It is not incon-
sistent with the definitions to also think of higher level groups and this notion proves quite
convenient. A higher level group can consist of more than one simple set or even other groups.
The reason for this approach will become clear in Section 5.3. Throughout this report, when
we speak of "the group problem" we shal I mean al I levels of groups unless otherwise indicated .
There is a final point which should be made before leaving this section . I t is
important to recognize that the redundancy classes defined in Figure 2.3 are classes of simple
sets only. No equivalent classification could be devised for the group. I t is reasonable to
infer from this that groups are rather individualistic and each group problem will usually have
to be solved on its own merits. Verifying redundancy in a group will inevitably involve some
form of deduction and groups have !--een described by the deductive processes to which their
verification is amenable. These descriptors will be discussed in Section 5.2.3.
4.4
	 The Implications of Time
The question of when redundancy verification is performed was briefly mentioned
in Sections 4.1 and 2.2. This section is intended to highlight that question. Verification
can be performed continuously or at discrete intervals in time . The Four most important aspects
influencing this decision are the importance of the duration of a failed condition, the criticality
of a failure, the accessibility of the principal system for verification and the maintenance
policy.** If a failure is critical, if unidentified false information is important or if repair is to
be effected immediately upon a failure (see Section 3.0), then continuous verification would
Likely be required. However, if the principal system is not accessible for continuous verifica-
tion or if, during the design of the verification technique, continuous verification is identified
as not feasible, we will have to settle for noncontinuous verification. Under these circumstances,
*We shall term the lowest level at which automated verification is established as an element.
**The distinction between importance of the duration of a failure and the criticality of failure is
a subs) a one I n the former case one may not be concerned so much wi th the fact that a fai I ure
has occurred as with the fact that he is receiving false information and doesn't know it. This is
contrasted with the critical failure where the loss of function is the primary concern
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~	 the risk (in terms of crticality, reliability, false information, etc.) of not performing the
function as desired increases. The relative change in risk will be a function of the 'Interval
between verification and this is the subject of Sections 5,1.1 and 5.3.1,
A second aspect of verification when considered in the light of time is the prospect
of sampling. A discussion of sampling theory is beyond the scope of this report, however, it is
easy to see that sampling is a microscopic view of the noncontinuous verification discussed above
and subject to the some statements regarding risk, There are several reasons why samplings is
desirable (aside from the fact that, in some instances, it is the only recourse) but the most
prominent is the freedom S,o time share equipments. This is the subject of Section 5,3.2.
4.5	 The Relationshi2 of Verification to On--Line and Cuff-Line Elements
Let us begin this discussion by indicating what we mean by on-line and off-line.
While this description applies to groups as well as simple sets, it is easier to describe in terms
of a simple set and we shall take this approach. Consider a simple set with distinguishable
outputs or more specifically, outputs which are isolated. Let us also state that only one of the
elements of the set is in the information stream of the principal system at any time, i.e.,
throughputting the tenant signal to successive functions. The remaining elements have their
outputs dead ended. The one element which throughputs to successive functions is called the
on-line element and the remaining elements, off-line elements.
Thusfor in the report we have described sets and verification techniques in what
may seem to be a one -to -one correspondence This is not necessari iy true Under the situation
described above, it s entirely possible that one verification technique could be used for the
on -line element and a different technique for the off-line elements, Let us examine this
possibility further; in particular with regard to the implications of time,
When we say continuous verification we are in actuality describing the time
relationship of continuous redundancy verification, Determining the status of an on-line element
on a continuous basis and the off-line elements at discrete intervals of time is not, with the
exception of the case discussed below, continuous redundancy verification.`
Continuous redundancy verification implies continuous status identfication of both
on-line and off-line elements. One exception, to this is a case where the reliability of the off-
line element is great enough that we are willing to assume it wili not fail over the period of inter-
est. This being the case, continuous status identification of the on -line element and noncontinu-
ous status identification of the off-line element would be considered continuous redundancy
verification. In other words, knowing the status of the on-line element and knowing that, at
some time in the past, the off-line element was operative is sufficient For continuous redundancy
verification. This is equivalent to stating that during the interval when the off-liwi element is
not being verified, the verification of the one-line element is also verification of redundancy.
*When considering continuous and noncontinuous verification of on--line and off-line elements
10	 there are four possible cases. Only the case where both on-line and off-line elements are
verified continuously describes, in general, continuous redundancy verification.
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A good example of this situation is the powor steering in an automobile. The writer
knows of no one who has disabled the hydraulics on his steering to verify the operation of the
mechanical backup. Yet we all seem willing to believe that as long as the power steering is
working, the mechanical backup will work when called upon, i.e., redundancy is present. The
degree of our belief will once again depend on the risk we are willing to accept in the indica-
tion of redundancy verification.
4.6	 Some Additional Points About Status of Redundant Sets
In Section 4.1 we indicated the relationship of status to the redundancy verification
problem. Let us now consider some of the more important points about status de term it0otion.
Throughout the preceding sections we hove indicated the existence of risk as related to
redundancy verification and status verification in particular. For reasons which will become
clear in Section 5.0, it can be stated that we con seldom know with certainty the status of an
element,* In providing status identification, we are attempting to draw an inference about
operational integrity. The variable which is a measure of this operational integrity w3 shall
call the status variable and its development is ,one of the most important functions of a
verification technique. The status variable will contain statistical errors due to uncertainties
inherent to the processes which develop it. This variable must then be quantized into discrete
levels which indicate predetermined, qualitative statements regarding operational integrity.
These discrete, and usually broad, qualitative statements are the conditional status of the
element under consideration. (The reason for the term "conditional" status will be made clear
in the following paragraph.) The transformation from the status variable to conditional status
is a decision process and will introduce further statistical error. The process is depicted in
Figure 4.6
Let y= address briefly, the reason for using the term "conditional" to describe
status in the above discussion. To do this we must recall from Section 4.1 the method by which
we are achieving verification. Namely, we are measuring properties of input and output signals
(of an element) and deducing status of that element. When treating a redundant spat as an
entity, we know no more than the properties of input', output and possibly what the output should
be. Can we directly infer status of an element with this information? Usually not. We must
also know the status (or as a minimum the odmissability) of the input. for if the input is in error,
there is no guarantee the element will perform as it should and it would be a remote possibility
that the output was correct. We can not, then, decide if an element is "bad" unless we know
the status of the input is "good", i.e., the status variable is a measure of operational integrity,
*This statement deserves some commentary. Whether something can be determined with certainty
or not, many times depends on the required accuracy of the answer. If it were required to
measure the length of this page to the nearest 1/8 inch, one would likely get the some measure-
ment each time he measured it. On the other hand, if it is requirwd to measure the page to the
nearest ten thousandths inch, one would get a distribution of results depending on poralax,
temperature, humidity, etc. The former case can be considered deterministic whereas the latter
case is a probabilistic result ord we would be forced to describe the expected length of the page.
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Figure 4.6. The Relationship of the Status Variable and Conditional Status
4-9
given the input is good. Thus, the name conditional status. Conditional status can not be
related to unconditional status (the inferred status of the element) until we know ;Ile status of
the input. This seems trivial enough until we consider a failure in the middle element of a
series information chain. Typically, the conditional status of all elements to the right of the
Failed element will also indicate unacceptable. If we had only these indications to go by,
how would we determine which element had really failed? To accomplish this on an automated
basis would r%quire a device that knew the information stream and could deduce that, with high
probability, the first element in the string of "bad" elements is the culprit. It would then
declare the unconditional status accordingly. We shall Fall this function status resolution and
from the description of the function, it would typically be performed by a digital processor.*
There is an xception to this general rule, however if the risk appears warranted. Some
techniques of status identification may yield a conditional status that can, with a high probabil-
ity, be identified as unconditional status. If these techniquos are used exclusively, the status
resolution function could be eliminated. These techniques are discussed in Section 5.2.2.2.
It muslo be recognized that there is an underlying assumption in the above discussion
and that is the independence of element status. We have admitted that a failed element could
cause a conditional status indication of "bad" to ripple down succeeding elements in the on-line
chain. but we have also implied that, so long as the conditional status of an element is "good,"
that element output cannot, with high probability, degrade to a state which will cause the
succeeding element to degrade its performance to an unacceptable state. Stated another way,
if the conditional status of an element indicates acceptable operation and the conditional status -A
of the immediately succeeding element indicates unacceptable operation, the fault must be in
the second element.'he problem usually comes about when the tolerances of two communicating
elements drift in opposite directions. We see that status of an element is not only an operational
consideration vested in the mind of the user, but that it is also based on the input requirements
	 f-
of the immediately succeeding element.
The problem of preserving status independence becomes quite crucial if more than
two levers of status are required. One way around this problem is to display multilevel status
and ask the automated system to act on two leve Is which are defined by partitioning the
multilevels.
There is a natural tendency to compensate for the risk of violating status independ-
ence by enlarging the range of the status variable +n the region of unacceptable operation. This
is equivalent to lowering boundary R2 in Figure 4.6 and will indeed decrease the likelihood of
violating independence. However, this approach will usually increase the probability of
identifying an element as unacceptable when if , is, in actuality, acceptable (a Type I error).
*It should be noted that the entire concept of status resolution is based on the assumption of
single failure occurrences, i.e., only one element will became unacceptable during the short
term period of examination. If this assumption is violated, ambiguities will likely result. I	
i
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Let us complete this section by returning our attention to the redundancy classes
of Figure 2.3. We note that there are two failure detect schemes, viz , indicate status of
each element in a set or indicate the number of elements operative in a set. The latter scheme
amounts to a status of a set and will be identified as such throughout the remainder of this
rei-ort. It is recogn ized that the status of a set wi ll not identify which element is at fault and
at some time this identification must be made before repair can be effected. The determining
factor here is what we expect the automated system to accomplish. The distinction is effectively
one of status resolution. There are several valid reasons why we may not require status
identification to a specific element on an automated basis. Four of the most pertinent are:
•	 The packaging may not warrant the additional detail. It may be that the
entire set is packaged as a single line replaceable item.
•	 The cost of identifying the status of each element may be prohibitive.
• The outputs of each element may not be distinguishable. This would make the
status identification of each element impossible.
•	 Any automated scheme for identifying the stai=us of each element may prove to
be more unreliable than the element itself.
r- ^ I
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DESIGNING REDUNDANCY VERIFICATION - A DESIGN PROCESS AND
CONSIDERATIONS
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, it is intended to extend and amplify
the basic concepts of Section 4.0. Second, it is intended to relate the amplified concepts in
the framework of a design process in the belief that they will strike closer to home and at the
some time provide a method of attacking the design problem .
The section has been organized into the major' areas of interest in designing an
automated redundancy -verification system. Section 5 , 1 identifies the input q uantities to the
design and the processes for developing these inputs from other forms of information . Section
5.2 relates the process of uhieving a verification design using the inputs from Section 5.1 .
Section 5.3 discusses some of the more subtle considerations of the design and Section 5.4
describes the role of a central processor in verification design. Finally, Section 5.5 is u
summary of the entire process.
5.1
	
Design Inputs
As indicated above, we will begin the description of the design process by discussing
the necessary inputs. Before we begin  discussion of design inputs; however, it should be helpful
to at least get a snapshot of the problem to be solved . The actual process during a total system
design (design of the principal system to include automated redundancy verification) will be
one of continuous evolution between capability design, redundancy design and the verification
design, with feedback and correction until a final design is converged upon. If the design of
redundancy verification is to be explained in any reasonable manner, we must break the loop
and identify a beginning. We shall assume that the capability design (signal flow, signal
characteristics, element characteristics, etc .) and the redundancy design are fixed as inputs to
the verification design .
With the assumed starting point, the task of a redundancy verification design is to
operate on the existing capability and redundancy designs, under the constraints of operations
requirements and specifications, to produce an automated indication of the condition of
redundancy in the principal system. To operate on the capability and redundancy designs, the
verification design must have several identifiable inputs: (a) an expression, either quantitative
or qualitative, of the desired confidence in the final indication of redundancy, (b) a partitioned
principal system indicating all elements, simple sets, first level groups and higher level groups,
(c) signal descriptions (both statistical and waveform) at the output of each element in the
principal system, (d) the redundancy class for each simple set, (e) the levels of status desired,
(f) properties of the output signals which are indicative of element operation and their relation-
ship to status, (g) operational description of each element, (h) operating time profiles of each
element and their relationships to the overall operations profile of the principal system, and
finally (i) a general philosophy of approach to the highest levels of groups.* These items will
*It should be pointed out that the final design will seld m mQk(. use of all this information,
^	 however; a large percentage wi II be necessary to. perform troy eoffs.
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be treated in more detail in the following paragraphs. While the reader will recognize the
value of some of these inputs, some may seem unnecessary without further explanation . Their
purpose will become clear in Section 5.2 . it is appropriate to point out at this juncture that
the purpose of the verification design is fault detection not fault anticipation; i .e., diagnosis,
not prognosis .
5.1 .1	 Design Confidence
Throughout Section 4.0 the implications of risk appeared as a recurring theme.
This is not coincidental . Probably the most far-reaching and difficult task of a redundancy
verification design is that of establishing a desired confidence in the resulting status indication .
It is one thing to say that the results should always accurately represent the true pic,ure and
quite another to achieve this end. It is all but a foregone conclusion that a confidence of
100 percent cannot be realized . If signals are measured, errors are introduced. If they are
compared in some manner, we must ascertain what degree of similarity is desired. If threshold
techniques are used, we are making a decision subject to error . The design must settle for
something less than 100 percent confidence . it is interesting to note that, if no verification
existed, no errors could be made regarding status (we would simply remain ignorant). We are
in effect trading off information about status (decreasing our uncertainty of this subject) with
the fact that some of this information may be incorrect and falsely influence operations
decisions. We must ask the worth of this tradeoff. How much is it worth not to blindly assume
redundancy is present and find out ultimately, perhaps catastrophically, that it actuaity was
not present? is it worth the delay and cost of indication that redundancy was not present when
indeed it was?* The verification design must have some notion of the de+ri red confidence for
this factor enters into virtually every tradeoff .
There are many considerations influencing; confidence and we shall address the most
important. The first consideration is that of tolerance "snowballing" in measuring equipment.
Principal system reference signals, in particular timing signnis, typically have very small
tolerance limits. One method of determining the accuracy, and thus the functional integrity
of the generator, is to compare the tenant signal with a "standard" generator as part of the
verification equipment. For this approach we can say, as a rune of thumb, that the standard
will require at least one more place of accuracy. Such a piece of equipment would typically
be less reliable than that of the principal system and this fact hms little appeal . One way
around this problem is to use differential comparisons in time rather than absolute comparisons
as the one above. These techniques would depend only on very short term stability.
A second consideration is that of decision error. The verification equipment is
essentially making decisions regarding the operational integrity of the principal system for each
element in the system. What is the effect of this on the total confidence in design? Let us
look at an example If one is to make five independent decisions and his probability of a
correct decision is 0.6 for each decision (p = 0.4 of incorrect decision for a single decision),
Y	 i
*Note that here we are trading off Type I errors (See Glossary) only. Under the circumstances,
this is justified, however, if one is comparing two different verification designs, both Type
and Type I I errors must be evaluated
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the probability of at least one of the five decisions being incorrect is 1-(0.6) 5 = 0.92. The
results are quite revealing and a conclusion to be drawn is simply minimize the number of
decisions . We are making decisions at numerous points and each point consists of a time
sequence of decisions. The first place to reduce decisions is to reduce the number of decision
points . This typically implies that elements should be made as large as possible . Instead of
making five decisions on five separate entities, lump the five decisions into a single element.
This approach will also improve the results from a tolerance viewpoint. It may be that the
drift on two entities is marginal but in opposite directions. If a decision is made on each entity,
one (or both) could be identified as unsatisfac:+ory . However, if a decision is made on the
output of all five, the drifts may ww,ll cancel and the ultimate output is satisfactory. And
isn't this all we are asking for? Making decisions on too small a level will tend to make the
verification quite sensitive (if not hypersensitive) .
Let us return to our conclusion of minimizing decisions and look now at the time
sequence of decisions. As a device makes more and more decisions, the likelihood of a wrong
decision out of all decisions made becomes greater. One way of keeping this problem in bounds
is to establish a rule that the device must identify, say, five unacceptaLle decisions in a row
before the element stains is declared Wac ;eptable . Using the probabilities in the above
example; if the element is actually good the probability of five wrong decisions in a row is
(0.4) which is 0.010.
A final consideration is that of multilevels of confidence . Acceptable operation
can take on a range of connotations from requiring compliance to complete specifications to
requiring only the presence of a signal . We will typically be concerned with a region some-
where between these extremes, but it is quite possible to require, say, two levels of confidence
fora system. One level would critically verify the integrity of operation, approaching com-
pliance to specifications. The other level would verify operation to a "reasonable" confidence.
The former would likely be performed on a noncortinuous basis, requiring the principal system
to interrupt its intended function while verification is performed. The latter could be performed
real time on a continuous basis while the principal system is performing its intended function
The former approach would represent a higher confidence but would likely require injected
signals and predefined checkout sequences typical of most Autorratic Checkout Equipment (ACE)
today. The latter approach would rep?na e t !; -rawer confidence but has obvious advantages,
When considering the remainder of thy- mu-I PA'al in this section, it should be recalled that it
may well have to be applied to more tl- -n orie confidence level . Different techniques would
likely result from considering the two verification approaches above
5.1 .2	 Properties indicative of Operation and Their Status Relationships
There are two basic approaches to determining properties indicative of operation.
These are
•	 Tke problematic approach whereby each function and each failure mode of an
element is examined and ultimately related to the failure detection require
(	 ments . Here an equipment is judged on the basis of performance of many
internal factors we could look at every state variable
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• The symptomatic approach wherehy the output of an element is considered to
be its sole function and judgments about the operation of the equipment are
made based on characteristics of the output. Here we are not concerned about
the intricacies of the element, but only the quality of its output.
There have been many systems designed using the problematic approach and the design process
is quite involved; usually requiring investigai , ions into areas which are of second or third order
importance . We shall subscribe to the symptomatic approach. For, using this approach we are
concerned with the output of the element and consider internal properties only when circum-
stances warrant* (see below).
There are four ways of addressing the output of an element, viz, output signals
and their absolute properties, output signals as they relate to the e l ement input, signals (both
input and output) as they relate to the element operation and output signals as they relate to
output signals from other like elements in a set. in any of the cases, specific properties must
be identified which are indicative of operation and ranges must be defined on each property
which correspond to the desired levels of status . (As indicated in Section 5.2.2.3, it is also
possible that functions may be defined for these properties and a similar range definition
applied). Let us look at each of the ways o f addressing the problem.
The first method of addressing the output is to define the output signals and their
absolute, properties. With this method, we are effectively saying that as long as an element
is producing signals whose selectedproperties meet pre-established bounds, the element is
opera°ring in an acceptable manner.** For example, voltage and frequency of a signal may
be selected as properties which satisfy operation (i ,e ., they meet the dimensional requirements
of the element functional description). We may next determine than the peak voltage must not
go below 10 volts or the frequency deviate outside the range of 1 MHz ::5 kHz . For, if this
were to occur, the immediately succeeding element could no longer be expected to operate on
the output (i .e ., the levels are defined to the specification). We have thus defined the
properties and their relationship to status . in addition, we have implied a very important
result, viz, there is no reason why the same verification technique should be applied to each
pertinent signal property.
Now consider an element whose functional description is simply: provide a
faithful reproduction of the input signal amplified by A. In the first case, the functional
description did not relate directly to the input. In this case, the output is described almost
exclusively in terms of the input . This is a good example of the second method of addr. , ,ssi ng
element output, i .e ., output signals as they relate to the element input • Here we have the
*This discussion will consistently refer to the output of an element f6Y the purpose of clarity .
The same remark; will apply to the output of groups
*Throughout the remainder of this report, verification techniques which operate in this
fashion will be termed,. collectively, monitoring techniques:
0
5-4
option of taking the absolute approach of the first case or identifying properties in terms of the
relative measures. It will likely be difficult to translate "faithful reproduction" into absolute
properties of the output and relative properties would likely have more meaning.* Here we
could interpret phase shift, element frequency response and gain as relative properties.
The third method, input and output signals as they relate to the element operation,
is more subtle than the first two. Consider an element whose output is complex and we desire
comprehensive information about this element in real time, A possible method to achieve this
is by introducing random noise at a very low level into the input signal (a symbiotic signal). If
the output of the element is cross-correlated with the injected noise, the signal will cancel
and the rest,+ltwill be the impulse response of the element.** The fourth method, comparison
of the outputs of like Elements in a set is straightforward. It is based on the premise that like
elements performing the some function should have the "same" output for identical admissible
inputs. If they differ, one of the elements is operating unsatisfactorily. We should note, how-
ever, that this method is not capable of indicating which element unless a form of voting is
used .
In the preceding discussion, we addressed only those properties which immediately
described the signal's form . If the pertinent properties of a signal are stochastic, these
descriptions become all but meaningless. Under these circumstances, it is entirely possible to
describe a signal by its statistics, particularly where continuous verification is desired. If the
statistical representation provided sufficient confidence in the design, we can consider these
as absolute properties of the output signal .
Let us add one more complication. To this point we have assumed that there would
be a causative relationship through all time between the output and the operation of the element
That, is, there is no part of the element which is not contributing toward producing the output.
This can be violated in two ways: (a) the element contains nonlinearities (e.g., limiters,
clippers, saturation, etc.) such that regions of the input signal wi'I I not effect a response in
some portions of the element, (we say that the element is not exercised), and (b) the element
contains distinct operating modes such that at least one mode does not require all element
functions. If ei xwher of these two conditions exist, knowing the status of the output will not
always be the same as knowsng the status of +he element - given the input is acceptable . In
the former case, if the time during which portions of the element are not exercised is predictably
short, there is probably little loss of information. If this time is known to be long and if the
function not being exercised is critical, it is likely that we have to identify a state variable
(which is otherwise unobservable) for verification.***
*This will be particularly true if the signal is stochastic and statistical representation is
inadequate.
**This description has been oversimplified to illustrate the method. A detailed description of
the technique is contained in Section 5.2.2.2.
***An alternate method is to inject a signal which
 exercises the element. I  is not likely that
this can 'be a symbiotic signal
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In the case where the element function changes with operating modes, we must 	 .1
account for this change by a comparable change in the verification design. Under these
circumstances, there is not likely to be a reasonable means of verifying a function that is
not used.
5.1 .3	 Time Profiles and System Partitioning
The first part of this section concerns itself with the time at which verification
can be achieved on a noninterfering basis with the operation of the principal system. The
motivation for time profiles is primarily centered around interest in when idle or simulative
signals can be used without di-.rupting operations. The time profiles will also provide information
on the duration of the operating modes described in the latter part of Section 5.1 .2.
The second part of the section concerns itself with the functional relatedness of the
principal system and identifying elements, sets and groups for synthesis of the verification
design •
If redundancy in a principal system is to be verified on a continuous basis,
properties of either the tenant signals, symbiotic signals or idle signals must be used. It is
entirely possible that this cannot be realized at the desired level of confidence, This leaves
but one alternative and that is the interrupting of system function for noncontinuous verification.
Having resigned ourselves to this state of affairs, the next reasonable question is whether this
type verification can be performed on a noninterference basis with the mission of the principal
system . The time profiles will provide this answer and indicate the duration (or as a minimum the
statistics of the duration) of time available for verification. If time profiles are available for
each element, and these profiles are registered to a top system profile, it maybe possible to
find blocks of time when elements are not required during the mission . If we are fortunate,
there will be a block of time for each element and simulative signals can be injected during
these blocks of time to achieve the desired confidence in the design . However, if successive
blocks of time for an element are spaced very far apart, it may still not be possible to achieve
the desired confidence (see Section 5.3.1) . Here we are left with but two choices; either
interrupt the mission to perform verification or perform continuous verification, at a reduced
confidence, during the time between "free" blocks. Some systems, such as aircraft, will have
successive missions interrupted by periods of time on the ground for refueling, servicing and the
like. This is a block of time during which oil elements are available (or can be made available)
for high confidence verification . A lower confidence verification can then be performed during
flight (the mission) .
There is an additional piece of information that can be extracted from the time
profiles and that is programmed modes of operation for the elements.* As indicated in
Section 5.1.2, these various modes of operation can (and usually do) influence the element
output or its causative relationship with the operation of the element. Knowing the occurrence
and duration of these modes will allow us to apply strategies similar to those described in the
*Programmed modes have been indicated since there are many forms of operation which, for the O
purposes of determining their occurrence, exhibit random use of modes.
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preceding paragraph. We note also that modes which occur randomly can be handled by
extending the principal system mode control signals to the verification equipment, causing it
to alter its characteristics commensurate with the change in element output character.
Let us now turn our attention to system partitioning, for it is here that the groups
and simple sets are established. To illustrate the process, a hypothetical system has been
partitioned in Figure 5.1 .3. A functional diagram was selected to portray the system in lieu
of a reliability diagram since the functional interrelationships of the elements is quite impor-
tant.* This approach also has its disadvantages in that it is difficult to distinguish redundancy
from parallel flows of information through separate functions. In this regard, care must be
taken in interpretation . Blocks 1 .0, 3.6, 2.0 and 3.0 are intended to be parallel flows
through separate functions. Parallel paths in the remainder of the diagram represent redundancy
in various forms. Block 1 .4 exemplifies interrelated redundancy since one element feeds two
instances of redundancy. This block is then identified as a group. Block 1 .5 is a simple set
with degree zero redundancy. Since one leg of the parallel paths in block 1.6 contains
redundancy, these; elements have been identified as a group (a set cannot contain another set).
Block 3.4 is a simple set since point A feeds both elements and no other instances of redundancy.
Block 3.6 is a simple set with degree zero redundancy (all three parallel functions are required).
System partitioning accomplishes four things: (a) it breaks the principal system into
manageable pieces, (b) it identifies signal flows at the major points of interest, (c) it identifies
groups and sets and (d), it provides a basis for identifying whether status of each element in a
set can be determined or whether status of a set itself is all that can be achieved . Point (c) is
quite important since the group and simple set problems are approached from different view.-
points .
5.1 .4	 The Group Policy
Before design can begin, it is important to establish guidelines and concepts Finder
which the design is to evolve. These guidelines represent the initial translation of gross system
specifications and operations requirements into generally broad requirements of the redundancy
verification design . As such, they will typically address the group problem and form the
group policy. Phis policy will aid in selecting (if not dictate) the group fault deduction.
methods and influence the extent to which a central processor (or satellite processors) will be
used in the design,. Some of the primary functions of the group policy are to establish functional
interfaces with other systems, indicate compatibility implications and provide an indication of
available resources in the principal system which might also be utilized or shared by the
redundancy verification system.
*The importance of functional descriptions and functional interrelatedness cannot be emphasized
too strongly. Section 5.1 .2 indicates the importance of functional descriptions in identifying
the method of treating the output signal and identifying the properties of that signal indicative
of operation . The relationship between functions is important to the extent that it is the key to
redundancy and how it is achieved. Equipment does not necessarily have to be electrically
or mechanically connected to be functionally related
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Also of prime importance in this initial stage are policies regarding isolation/
independence of the redundancy verification system, These points will many times conflict
with the latter point of the previous paragraph and the resolution can only be achieved through
trade studies. I t is important that the verification system remain isolated from the principal
system: from the standpoint of inducing failures • I t is also important that, within reasonable
bounds, the verification system remain independent on a power and environmental basis.
Where these points cannot be achieved, additional care must be given to failure modes which
may not be detected due to commonalit y of power or common thermal drift rates in parts for
both systems,
Having sketched the inputs and initial deign efforts, let us now proceed to describe
the desk-n process itself. This is the subject of the following section .
5.2	 The Design Process
This section is intended to describe the steps in the design of a redundancy
verification system using the information desrribed in Section 5.1. The theme is one Cf
presenting design alternatives and guidelines for selecting an alternative under a given set of
circumstances. The section has been on-,ranized to address the two basic divisions in the
design process--the set problem and the group problem. The set problem has been approached
from the standpoint of the functions which must be performed to detemnine redundancy verifica-
tion at this Level . The group problem has been approached from the standpoint of the deductive
methods which can be used to detert , vy ine verification order the comparatively involved
relationships existing in groups .
Before the design methodology is described in detail, it is appropriate to consider
the flow of the process. As shown in Figure 5.2, the desigo process begins by consideration
of the higher level group problem. It then branches to two parallel paths - the set (simple
set) and the general group problem . The parallel branches are not intended to imply inde-
pendence, rather they imply two distinct problems requiring two different methods of solution .
The two problems can be sr*Ived somewhat autonomously but a constant exchange of information
is required to realize a rapid convergence to a final design The implication of convergence
and feedback is portrayed by the last block i t is nov expected that a design can flow smoothly
down a well marked path to a final solution . Trade studies must be made to direct the course
of the design and folding back to retrace portions of the path already traveled is inevitable
as more detail is developed and the picture becomes clearer.
The higher level group problem_, the set problem and the general group problem
are discussed in Sections 5.2.1, 5,2 .2 and 5.2 .3 respectively. Before we begin these
discussions; however, it is appropriate to add some further explanation to the selection of the
names for the two group problems . The higher level group problem is fundamentally systems
oriented and the name has simply been selected to reflect this fact (recall that a level one
group was the smallest identifiable group). The general group problem is concerned exclusively
with status identification for all levels of groups. Throughout the remainder of the report we
shall, for brevity, identify the simple set problem as, simply, the set problem. and the general
group problem as, simply, the group problem
,D
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5.2.1
	 The Higher level Group Problem
This problem is coi •icerned with the overview of the redundancy verification design.
Let us examine the most pertinent considerations.
5.2.1.1
	 Isolation/independence Plan
One of the first concerns about any automated verification scheme is that of failure
independence.* Will a failure in the verification equipment cause a secondary malfunction in
the principai system or short out tenant signals? This is a legitimate concern and must be guarded
against. The problem is usually not so chronic in the mechanical area due to the existence of
spatial separation, but in the area of electronics, care must be exercised. Long leads that are
not buffered can affect pkilse rise time and contribute to cross-talk. F^arly designed ground-
ing can lead to unanticipated cross-coupling.
Another major concern, as pointed cut in Section 5.1 .4, in the design of an
automated verification system is that of independence of power and environment. This inde-
pendence can never be completely achieved but care must b,.., = ,;ercised, particularly for thermal
independence of electronics. If the verification equipmen^ , hr housed with principal system
equipment, (unless it is put in an oven) it will experience the same temperature excursions as
the principnl equipment. Under these circumstances, the verification equipment may require
thermal compensation or be designed such that drifts essentially offset drifts in the principal
equipment. The extent of these measures obviously depends on the temperature extremes
encountered and the desired accuracy required.
To assure that these points receive attention and that a uniform approach is taken,
an isolation/Independence Plan should be set forward.
5.2.1.2	 Pol icy for Treating Off-Line Elements
The distinction of on-line and off-line elements was made in Section 4.5. When-
ever the outputs of elements in a simple set are distinguishable, it is possible (with varying
degrees of difficulty) to identify  online and off- line elements . The on - line elements will
usually pose the most difficult problem for verification— especially on a continuous basis.
(Section 4.6 described the role of status resolution for on-line elements and indicrted some of
these problems.) The question now arises as to the disposition of the off-line elementi.s. Is the
some methodology applicable to these elements?** The answer is, yes, and the particular
portion of the methodology which is appl i gable depends on the configuration we select. It is
possible to place all off-line elements in a series configuration, essentially duplicating the
*While the end result may be the same, there is a distinct difference between Type 1 errors (or
failures) within the verification equipment and failures induced in the principal system by the
verification equipment.
**It is not the intent here to address specific techniques for verification since these zr
thoroughly covered in`Section 5.2.2.2
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on-line system. The extention of the methodology under these conditions is obvious but let us
note some special points about this approach. Firwt, switching would be necessary to accom-
plish the reconfiguration. Second, a failed element, either on-line or off-line, would curtail
verification of the "off-line" system until repair was effected.
A second, and more obvious method of treating off-line elements is to simply let
each be on enti ty and veri fy i t on i is own basi s . Thi s can be accompl ished in two ways:
(a) perform verification while the element is operating on the input tenant .signal, or (b) inject
a simulative signal into the element. If the element contains entities which must be updated in
time, (stored dota, time variable logic, etc.), approach (a) is the only feasible solution. If the
redundancy is nccnsymmetrical or if the capabilities of the elements differ, (b) is usually the
logical choice .
There; are other schemes applicable to this problem--especially if there c., ­e two
off-line elements in a set. Without pursuing these; however, it can be seen that a policy
regarding the treatment of off-line elements is essential at the outset of a design. Perhaps the
most important point to be made in this section is that there is no reason why verification of
on-line and off-line equipment should employ the same techniques.
5.2.1.3
	 Determinat ion of Status Resolution and Status Reporting
Status resolution and status reporting are two functions which must be accomplished
at the system level . Status resolution has been discussed but status reporting is a new term
The status reporting function is simply the displaying, presenting, annotation, etc. of
verification results. It is iiie macki ne-man interface . The only point to be made here /about
reporting is that the medium and frequency of reporting must be established at the outset of the
design
Depending on the verification approach used, status resolution can be a key
ingredient in the design. Recall that status resolution performs the function of identifying the
faulty element in an on-line system from possibly several unconditional status indications of
unsatisfactory operation. This is a deductive process and it can be accomplished so long as we
are not trying to idontify elements in a closed loop that are using the tenant signals for verifica-
tion. Or, so long as no ambiguities exist. Such a function would typically be implemented
by a digital processor. Less costly hardware approaches are feasible; however, for systems which
do not change operational configurations . The hardware approach has the advantage of
simplicity and reliability. The processor approach is flexible and, if a processor is required for
other functions, provides compatibility. The extent to which a central processor will be useJ
for status resolution must be identified. The final choice could be a combination of hardware
and software,
It should also be recognized that, for noncontinuous verification, status resolution
can be augmented (or completely replaced) with the use of simulative signals injected at various
points. This is essentially the reverse of the approach used above for on-line continuous
verification .
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5.2.1.4
	
Relationship to a Central Processor
Part of this topic has already been discussed in the previous section and the entire
subject is addressed in detail in Section 5,4. We should like to point out that a processor can
be used in varying degrees: of sophistication to accomplish varying numbers of functions, Aside
from status resolution, there will be statistical and smoothing problems to be solved, mapping
(decisions) to be performed and comparisons to be m ide . (See Section 5.2.2 ,) To this point
we have only considered functiomi and not how those functions would be implemented, It is
now possible to purchase off-the-shelf, 8-bit A/D converters in a single microcircuit package.
With such devices we can run the gamut of sophistication. A processor could perform one
function, say, status resolution or it can perform the entire redundancy verification, starting
with A/D converters at the tenant signals. The relationship to I central processor, at least in
terms of funof'ions to be performed, should be clear during early stages of the design.
5.2.2	 The Set Problem
Whether attacking the problem of verifying a great amount of redundancy or the
problem of an isolated occurrence of r-dundancy, the designer will frequently discover that
his attention has become focused on verifying redundancy which may be described, according
to the notions introduced in Section 4.3, as a simple set . Indeed, some forms of solution of
the group problem will be seen to lead one to the consideration of verifying the redundancy
of one or more simple sets in order to determine the presence of redundancy within the group.
It is therefore proper that the problem of verifying redundancy in simple sets be directly
addressed.
The uniqueness of the simple set lies in the fact that for the purposes of redundancy
verification it may be considered as an entity, independent of other redundant sets and groups.
This means that the simple set may be isolated, at least mentally, from all surrounding equip-
ment and that its status may be determined entirely from its own input and output .
Throughout this discussion, it wi I I be considered that if element outputs remain
distinguishable, no set output as such will have been formed. If, for example, element outputs
are time multiplexed into a serial information stream, no true set output will be present. Ele-
ment outputs will stiff1 exist, only in a different arrangement. It should be recalled from the
definition of redundancy class H that, if a set output is formed, the verification of redundancy
will be impossible unless there exists some output effect which varies as the number of operating
elements in the set.
In approaching the simple set problem, it should be considered that a first goal is
to achieve continuous verification since, if this is possible, one may always choose to use the
available information on a periodic or occasional basis. However, if continuous verification
is not achievable, it may be difficult for the user to establish in his mind, confidence in the
operation of his equipment during the period 6L-tween redundancy verifications. When, in the
course of the design process, continuous verification becomes unrealizable, the use of periodic
verification will be looked upon as a retrenchment from a desirable but untenable position
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Certainly, to achieve redundancy verification on either a continuous or a periodic
basis, if will be necessary to observe a signal which possesses all the characteristics necessary
for the establishment of design confidence . The question is whether the tenant signal fits this
description ,
The desire to achieve continuous verification and the necessity of having a signal
suitable for verification lead to the conclusion that one should, first of all, try to accomplish
verification using the tenant signal . if this is not possible, the next step should be the con-
'	 sideration of signals which may be injected without interrupting the flow of tenant signal
information. Failing the identification of a suitable solution here, one will be forced to use
injected signals and divert equipment from its primary purpose in order to dedicate it to
verification.
5.2.2.1
	
Functions to be Performed
It will be advantageous to consider redundancy verification, as applied to''l-ie
set problem, as being comprised of three distinct functions. These functions are depicted in
Figure 5.2.2.1-1.
In every case of verification, the first step is to derive from the system some
indication of its operation and perform a comparison with information which describes, either
01.1 
	
directly or indirectly, either wholly or in part, what the operation is expected to be. Because
this comparison is a test of coincidence between the expected and the actual, this function has
been denoted as coincidence development. Because the output of this operation will be a
variable quantity indicative of the degree of coincidence between the two items being compared,
it has been denoted as the Coincidence Variable.
The following function, an operation on the coincidence variable, has the task of
transforming this information into a quantity indicative of the conditional status of the item being
veri fied (i BV) . The output quantity spoken of here, because of i t& role in the operation, wi I i
be referred to as the status variable. The transition to a status variable will generally be
performed by one of a set of techniques referred to mathematically as parameter estimation
techniques. Hence, this second function has been called the parameter estimation function .
It will become clear as this discussion continues just why such a function is necessary.
When the status variable is interpreted, the result is a statement of conditional
status	 It may be anticipated' that conditional status will be a set of discrete statements such
as go-no go, good-bad, stop--caution -go, etc . The interpretation process is depicted in
Figure 4.6 and may be viewed as a decision of into which slot to put a given value of a status
variable . This is a mapping operation in which status variable values are mapped into the
possible regions of conditional status. The third function, for these reasons, has been designated
the mapping function.
A simple example is given in Figure 5.2.2.1-2 to illustrate the application of
f	 these concepts. In this example, the coincidence development function derives an indication
of peak signal value and expresses the coincidence between this derived value and an expected
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value. An RC filter thenerforms an ex onentiall -wei hied integration on the coincidenceP	 P	 y	 9	 g
variable. The output of this filter, the status variable, is then compared against a threshold.
It is implied here that there are two regions of conditional status, For present purposes, call
these conditional go and conditional no-go. Values of the status variable below the threshold
value will map into the conditional go region. Values above the threshold value will map
into conditional no-go.
While the coincidence and status variables have been represented here as straight-
forward, one dimensional quantities, in many practical cases they will be multidimensional
with their values expressed as vectors. Also, it is possible, indeed likely, that the verification
of a single item will require the employment of several combinations of these three functions or
several different "chains" of the three. The degree of complexity realized in these areas of
implemen+ation is primarily dependent on the amount of information required to establish the
desired level of design confidence
The three functions introduced here are discussed in detail in the following sections.
5.2.2.2	 Coincidence Development
The first function to be performed has been identified as that of coincidence
development. in every case, the object of this function is to gather, in elementary form,
information reflecting on the operation of the element or elements under scrutiny. in fact, it
is taking the first step toward determining whether that operation is what it is expected to be.
	
_D
The word operation is applied under the concept that the input signal is operated on to form the
output signal . For a linear system (additive and homogenous), a complete description of this
operation in the time domain is the impulse response, for the same system, the transfer function
is a complete description in the frequency domain .
There are three possible approaches which are represented in Figure 5.2.2.2-1 .'`"
One may compare output to a stored reference . If the character of the input is known and
the reference represents the expected output signal or a property thereof for an input such as
is used for verification, a comparison between the output and the reference will reflect on the
similarity between the operation of the item being verified (IBV) and the operation expected of
it. Alternately, wherever two or more identical (and independent) operations have the same
input, a comparison of their outputs reflects on the similarity of the two operations. In this
case, status identification of the elements must rely on the astumption that both (or ail)
operations have not changed in the some way from their expected form; i .e ., that they have
not been altered to be identical but unacceptabl y, operations
Both of the above approaches involve deductive processes. The third, the comparison
of output to input is a direct measurement of the operation which may be checked against the
expected operation .
*These approaches are the some methods identified in Section 5.1 .2 with methods two and three
of that section merged to form the single approach of Ou tpu t,4 npu t comparison.
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IThe comparisons here may be instituled in either the time or frequency domains and
in the time domain may be carried out either on the basis of signal values or signal farm charac-
teristics such as mean value, rms value:, etc., which are functions of signal form. These
thoughts have led to the establishment of the following Glosses of techniques for coincidence
development.
Outfit/Output Comparison
Compare Two (time)
Voting (time)
Crosspower Spectral Analysis (frequency)
Output/Reference  Comparison
Value Checks Sequential (time)
Value Checks Nonsequentiol (time)
Coding (time)
Signal Form Analysis (time)
Spectral Analysis (frequency)
Ntput/lneut Comparison
Inverse Transform (time)
Correlation (time)
If it is the case that the item under investigation is characterized by a signal
generation such as an oscillator instead of by an operation on an ; nput signal, comments to
be made about those techniques employing output/output comparison or output/reference
comparison may be applied with no loss of generality. Techniques using output/input
comparison will not be applicable at all .
The techniques enumerated above will be defined as folic vs;
• Compare Two - techniques whereby the outputs of two elements are compared
on the basis of their values .
This definition allows the comparison of signal values on an analog or discrete
basis . A conceptual example appears in Figure 5.2.2.2-2 -
•	 Voting - techniques whereby inference to operational integrity is drawn from
a logical polling of outputs or combinations of outputs.
It should be pointed out that Voting here means voting as an approach to parameter
determination and has no relationship to voting in the achievement of redundancy or accuracy.
To make this clear, the conceptual example in Figure 5.2.2.2-2 shows Voting applied to a
majority voting system. O
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•	 Crosspower Spectral Analysis - techniques which involve the development
of a frequency spectrum which is the combination of the spectra of two
output signals.
A conceptual example appears in Figure 5.2.2.2-2.
•	 Value Check; Nonsequential - techniques which employ comparison of signal
value(s) with reference w lue(s) without regard to the order in which the values
occur .
This definition allows the comparison of values on a continuous basis such as
the comparison of a do voltage against a threshold. Values which are discrete in time may
also be compared. A conceptual example appears in Figure 5,2.2.2-3.
•	 Value Checks; Se uFntial - techniques which employ ,
 comparison of signal
values in a sequential manner, deriving information both from the values
and their order of occurrence.
A conceptual example appears in Figure 5.2 .2.2 -3.
•	 Coding - techniques whereby the coincidence variable is developed by
determining the number of information errors or the rate at which they occur .
	 `r "
These techniques employ the characteristics of error detecting coees to establish
a statement of status. A conceptual example appears in Figure 5.2.2.2-3.
• Signal Form .Analysis - techniques which measure signal form characteristics,
as opposed to signal values, and compare against reference measures of these
properties
Some of the signal properties whose values might be compared against stored
reference values are instantaneous frequency, peak amplitude, signal mean . A conceptual
example appears in Figure 5.2.2.2-3.
•	 Spectral Anaiysi s - techniques which derive, by any means, partial ar
complete spectral characteristics of the signa0 under observation . These
characteristics are compared against a reference in order to generate
a coincidence variable.
A conceptual example is given in Figure 5.2.2.2-4.
CODING
SIGNAL FROM ANALYSIS
low	
.mom
am
C	 I BV
REFERENCE
VtiLUE CHECKS; NONSEQUENTIAL
VALUE CHECKS; SEQUENTIAL
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Figure 5.2 .2 .2-3. Examples of Coincidence Development Techniques
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Figure 5.2.2 .2-4. Examples of Coincidence Development Techniques
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•	 Inverse Transform - techniques which perform, on the signal under
observation, on operation which is the inverse of that performed by the
item being verified and compares the result to I BV input.
The idea behind these techniques is to convert IBV output to the state of I BV input
and compare the two, A conceptual example appears in Figure 5.2.2.2-4.
•	 Correlation - techniques whereby an inference to operational integrity is
drawn through correlating the input with the output of the IBV.
A conceptual example is shown in Figure 5.2.2.2-4. The reference information
represents expected resul is of the correlation .
For the sake of completeness, two other presently used schemes have been included .
•	 Acknowledgment - techniques whereby the receipt and desired effect of a
command is indicated through a separate return signal .
•	 User Comp{aint - techniques whereby the status is directly determined by the
observation and judgment of the user .
These approaches may be considered to be means of automated redundancy
verification only if one accepts the groundrule that backup equipment is so reliable that it
e	 e e	 2.2does not require verification . (Se Section ) A good application of User Complaint
would be to automobile power steering. The pilot of an aircraft with landing skids would
consider the Acknowledgment that his landing gear was down a verification of redundancy .
i t will be helpful to employ two additional notations .
0	 Signal Form Analysis/Compare Two will be taken to mean approaches in
which a signal form characteristic of an output signal is observed and the
observation is compared to a similar one made upon a different output
signal . A comparison of the rms values of two element output signals
would exemplify such an approach.
•	 The term "monitor methods" will be used to refer to those techniques which
employ the storage of reference information concerning signal values or
signal form characteristics. This will be advantageous because several
general statements can be made on the basis of this characteristic alone .
Monitor methods will include Sequential Value Checking, Nonsequential
Value Checking, Coding, Signal Form Analysis, and Spectral Analysis.
The discussirn thus for has concentrated on identifying techniques. It is now
pertinent to inquire as to the relationships of these techniques to the design inputs and the
material of Section 2.0.., To what extent do redundancy classifications and signals influence
the use of these technioues? Recall from Section 2.2 the redundancy classes were found to
be independent of signals. Using this conclusion and developing a signalr ert classification,'P oP Y
it is possible to realize a matrix showing the applicability of each technique to various condi-
tions of redundancy and signal property classes. This applicability is shown in Figure 5.2.2.2-5.
Here, the appearance of a coincidence development technique in an element of the matrix
indicates that technique may be applied to the situation represented by the coordinates of the
element. Recall that the redundancy classes are defined in Figure 2.3.
The reasoning leading to the expression of adaptability set forth here is perhaps
most simply understood by first considering, in turn, each class of coincidence development
techniques and listing those characteristics of various situations which would obviate the
employment of that class.* This leads to the following facts:
•	 Monitoring techniques (value checks; nonsequential, value check;
sequential, spectral analysis, and statistical moments) cannot be
applied to stiochastic nonstationary signal properties. This is because
these techniq +es demand comparison against stored information which
represents what is expected of the output.
• Compare Two and Cross power Spectrum techniques are not applicable to
set output nor where it is necessary to indicate the status of each element .
Therefore, they must not be associated with redundancy classes E, F, and G.
•	 Coding and Voting techniques, like those classed as Compare Two, cannot
be used when the outputs/effects of each .element are not distinguishable
and cannot be associated with class G.
•	 Neither Acknowledge nor User Complaint techniques can be used if outputs/
effects of each element are not distinguishable or if continuous verification
is required.. Therefore, these techniques cannot be identified with any of
redundancy classes A, B, E or G .
•	 Value Check techniques require the prediction of signal values and therefore
cannot be applied where no deterministic signal is present.
These observations dictate a large number of matrix elements wherei-n particular coincidence
development techniques may not appear. This is not sufficient information, however, since
it is true that the appearance of a class of techniques in a matrix element does not restrict
application to either set or element output. This is because, in addition to the definitions
of the redundancy classes, the verification techniques themselves may impose such a restriction
Superscripts are employed in Figure _5.2_.2.2-5 to make clear this situation .
In interpreting the completed matrix, one should realize that the rightmost column,
"Independent of Signal Class," must always be given consideration. That is, a list of all
classes of coincidence development techniques applicable to o given situation should be	 0
*The reader will find it helpful_ to refer to figure 2.2
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PPecomprised of those techniques appearing in the matrix element describing the situation plusP 
the classes of techniques listed as applicable to that redundancy class but independent of
signal class.
Another point to be made here is that the explicit statements of applicability set
forth in this matrix say nothing whatsoever concerning the efficiency of employment of a given
coincidence development technique. Certainly, the use of Spectral Analysis will in some cases
represent an "overkill" of the problem . A comparison of verification techniques appears in
Appendix A and provides information for the matching of verification requirements with
coincidence development capabilities. Again, the matrix given here only presents the candi-
date verification techniques .
With some thought, it becomes obvious that, if a technique is to be applied to
the output of the entire redundant set, that characteristic of the set output which varies with
the number of elements in the set should be detectable by the coincidence development
technique . Clearly, it would be foolish to use a Spectral i%nalysis technique on a set output
whose spectral content does not vary as the number of elements in the set. Still, this should
be consciously observed when interpreting the matrix.
It is reasonable to assume that if one desires to add a symbiotic signal to a
stochastic signal, that additional signal will be made deterministic. The entries under the
second column of the matrix represent techniques which make use of the deterministic symbiotic
signal for verification purposes. Spectral Analysis and Signal Form Analysis techniques might 	 -:
also be applied to the stochastic portion of the signal . If this is tl ,.e case, restrictions on the
stochastic signal, both implied in other columns of the matrix and discussed earlier in this
section, should be observed.
It is appropriate at this point to briefly discuss the selection of stationarity as a
statistical descriptor for signals. It may be anticipated that all investigations of system signals
will be on a time series basis. That is, no ensemble collection of samples will be employed.
Then, while it is likely that the principle of ergodicity will be invoked in design and perform-
ance prediction, calculations, it will not influence the applicability of coincidence development
techniques so long as the reference statistic is also a time average.
Assuming that one has properly identified the redundancy class/signal property
class coinciding to the situation of interest, has consulted the Applicability Matrix and has
compiled therefrom a Gist of candidate coincidence development techniques, the next step
is to examine the signal to be observed and determine if it possesses the desired properties in
the desired time frame .
At this point it is necessary to involve the required design confidence in two
examinations
Firstly, it must be determined whether the signal to be observed possesses the
properties and characteristics necessary to satisfy design confidence requirements If these
requirements include, for example, information on frequency response, a sinusoidal signal could
not establish the desired level of confidence
5-28
Secondly, it must be asked of each candidate technique whether it is basically
capable of satisfying the design confidence requirements . Is the comparison of two outputs
sufficient to convince one of proper operation? With what degree of agreement between the
two? Up to this point the discussion has concentrated on signal properties. How can signal
properties be interpreted in terms of the compare-two example above? This is a valid question
and points up an important distinction to be made for Output/Output and OutpuOnput
comparison techniques . These techniques inherently compare complete signals and not just
selected properties. This does not violate any of the previously developed points. When
considering these two techniques one simply enters the Applicability Matrix with "signal
property" replaced by "signal".
If the first of the two conditions above is not met, and assuming that design con-
fidence is fixed, they only choice is to change the signal class and/or
 
the properties of the
signal used for verification . This implies the considers}ion of simulative, symbiotic, or idle
signals
If, for a given coincidence development technique, the second condition is not met,
that technique must be stricken from the list of candidates. If confidence levels still cannot
be met, an alternation in the signal used for fp,rification will be a possibility. This means
returning to the Applicability Matrix and shifting to another signal class column in order to
make available more candidate techniques.
If and only if both conditions are met, one may proceed with the consideration
of the remaining candidates . The remaining factors to be considered are whether the candidates
can achieve the desired verification confidence and whether they can comply with imposed
constraints such as restrictions on the use of sampling, reliability requirements, and cost ceilings.
The process of the selection of coincidence development techniques is summarized
in Figure 5.2 .2 .2-6.
	
The uppermost block represents a description of the signal for verifica-
tion . At the start of the process, a tenant signal characterization should appear here . This
characterization is carried to the Applicability Matrix where signal characteristics and more
design inputs, redundancy class information, dictate a choice of matrix element. A list of
candidate techniques, determined from the matrix, is compared against design confidence
requirements as are signal characteristics/properties. If inconsistencies result, a return path
to the uppermost box is provided. This denotes a change in the signal used for verification.
In the lowermost box, techniques surviv^ng previous test are examined for their compatibility
with system constraints. Incompatibilities here will also result in a change of the signal used
for verification as is denoted by a feedback arrow.
While design inputs have been spoken of here as being fixed, it is unlikely that
this will be the case in the real world. It may be anticipated T hat an active exchange will
take place between the design and the design inputs as the requirements of the design and the
capabilities of verification are mated through compromise and tradeoff. The main points to be
made here are the utility of the matri x and the way in which the process suggests the use of a
different signal for veri fication .
'3.
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Figure 5 .2 .2 .2-6 . Selection Process for Coincidence Development Techniques
0
5-30
it should be borne in mind that combinations of these techniques may be worthy
of consideration, and that, where no suitable pairing of signal and technique is possible, the
use of different techniques with given signals might be used in a time sequenced arrangement.
Both of these solutions would lead to multidimensioned coincidence vari*ibles.
Going beyond the statements of applicability which appear in the matrix of
Figure 5.2.2.2.5, an investigation of the characteristics and capabilities of the various
coincidence development techniques has been carried out. Such items as failure types detect-
able, ability to discriminate among failure type, shurabi l i ty, complexity, and amenability
to computer implementations have been identified as creas of interest and have been examined
with respect to each class of techniques. A discussion of the findings along with summaries
of the advantages and disadvantages of each class of techniques appears in Appendix A. The
reader is encouraged to make full use of the information presented therein .
From the foregoing development and the discussions of Appendix A, some
conclusive statements may be made.
a	 No coincidence development technique, in itsehl, negates the possibility
of continuous verification. It is the ability of signals to provide the
foundation for design confidence that is the basic limitation in this area
0	 Under certain circumstances, the transition from conditional status to
status may be made knowing only that an admissible input is present.
•	 All the tec!iniques offer the possibility of implementation on a sampled
basis .
5.2.2.3	 Parameter Estimation and Status Variables
it has been pointed out that the coincidence variable results from a comparison
of two pieces of information . If the simplest form of Compare Two is used, the coincidence
variable will be a point-by-point comparison of two element outputs; if Correlation is
employed with a pseudorandom input, the variable may be a point-by-point comparison
between equipment impulse response and expected impulse response, It is then required to
know whether the two pieces of information are sufficiently alike to indicate proper system
operation . The big question, then, is, "How much alike is enough alike?"'. More fundamental
is the question of what appropriate measures of similarity may be applied .
Consider the two functions of figure 5,2.2.3-1 . Among other things, these two
functions might represent two analog inputs to a Compare Two arrangement. The second curve
is a plot of i•he difference of the two original functions and might represent the coincidence
variable. If no parameter estimation function were employed, this would become the status
variable and would be considered to be indicative of conditional status.
The third curve is the square of the difference of the two functions. Obviously,
the degree of resolution offered by observing the squared difference is much greater than that
5-31
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Figure 5.2.2.3-1 .
	 Illustration of Parameter Estimation
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obtainable by simply observing the difference and information concerning which function is of
greater magnitude has been lost
The fourth curve is the mean of the squared difference . (Some liberties have been
taken in the construction of the figure, but the idea should be clear.) An investigation of this
curve will reveal that a difference of short duration tends to be masked and that, again, the
sign of the difference has been lost,
Now, if one were asked to express, through these curves, the difference between
the original functions, the manner of expression would be different for each curve and it might
be expected that an "acceptable" degree of similarity would mean different things depending
on which method of expression were chosen ,
This is the dilemma that exists within thefunctional area called parameter estima-
tion . What are the proper methods for expressing a status variable? Two methods, squaring,
and mean squaring have been exemplified here, There are scores of other possibi11tios
averaging, weighted averaging, ratio or percentage expression, differentiation, and coherence
functions to name a few.
There are two primary and important considerations here, Firstly, will a given
parameter estimation technique destroy sensitivity to information that is of interest and available
in the coincidence variable? If it is desifed that the status variable reflect information con-
cerning the existence of excessive noise in element output, the use of uniform averaging in the
`	 parameter estimation function may be a very oor choice , The choice of the parameter estima-Y	 p
tion technique is heavily dependent on the functional description of the IBV.
Consider the case of Correlation which produces system impulse response . An
axpected impulse response might be stored in a piecewise linear diode circuit so that the two
functions would appear as shown in Figure 5.2.2 .3-2  . What the mean-squared difference of
these functions implies about gain or signal distortion could be a difficult matter to determine.
The second consideration is that the chosen technique of parameter estimation must
be capable of achieving the requirements of design confidence. If an integration method of
parameter estimation is used in a noisy situation, the likelihood of Type I errors will be dimin-
ished. At the same time, the ability to provi de assurance that functions remain within a narrow
tolerance is also decreased. It is easily possible that the parameter estimation function could
render impotent the coincidence development function .
An additional complication arises when the computation of a statistical variable
over a limited-size sample set , is involved. Then the confidence level set by the sample size
must also be taken into account when matching a parameter estimation scheme to design con-
fidence requirements.
t may be seen that the parameter estimation function is of great importance in the
process of verification . I t is able to dictate design confidence and limit the comprehensiveness
of the coincide ice detection technique,
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It would be extremely helpful if one could make general statements about the
different kinds and classes of parameter estimation techniques. To do so, however, would
require extended investigation into the various techniques, the identification of common
features among the techniques, and grouping according to these features---an excercise very
similar to that carried out here on the coincidence development techniques. For the present,
such an orderly approach to the problem, as it applies to redundancy verification, does not
exist aiid the designer will be forced to examine the different options as they apply to each
individual occurrence of redundancy.
	
5.2.2.4
	
Mapping into Conditional Status
With the status variable having been generated, the third operation of simple set
redundancy verification is the mapping to conditional status. The concept here is thi " there
will be, for every value of the status variable, a coinciding statement of conditiona ► ,.^ -is.
The existence of a unique inverse will not be the usual case That is, given a statement of
conditional status, one will not be able to reconstruct the value of the status variable which
led to the statement.
The values of a status variable will not, in practice, be restricted to expression
as  simple voltage. in fact, the status variable will in many cases be multidimensional,
perhaps derived from several combinations of coincidence development and parameter estimation
functions . An example would be a two dimensional status variable one of whose components
is derived from the rms properties of the signal under observation, the other being derived from
the signal mean . Then different combinations of these components of the status variable would
be interpreted as indicating different conditional status.
Where multidimensional status variables are involved, the designer will be
responsible for setting up a sometimes complicated mapping function. In general, the snapping
can be viewed in terms of logical operations on the components of the status variable. Looking
to the example of the two-dimensional variable above, it might be possible to construct a truth
table such as that shown in Figure 5.2.2 .4.
The i mplementations of the mapping function will generally be straightforward,
comprised of one or more of threshold dec isions, logic gates and c)mputer-implemented logical
decisions.
	
5.2.2,5	 Sample Coincidence Development Implementations
Section 5.2.2.4 above completes the description of the set problem. It is probably
not necessary to comment that a great deal of material has been covered in previous sections
relating to the set problem: with particular emphasis on Coincidence Development. In this
light, it shou!d be helpful to view some hardware implementations of these techniques. This
section il lustrates typical methods of Coincidence Development implementation. Notes germane
to each method, including possible applications to KSC equipment, are included with each
5-35
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Figure 5.2.2;.4. Status Mapping Truth Table
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method. The material has been organized into the three methods of addressing output signals,
viz., output/output comparisons, output/reference comparisons and output/input comparisons.
5.2.2.5.1 Output/Output Comparisons
Compare Two, Voting and Crosspower Spectral Analysis all forms of output to
output comparisons, are detailed in this subsection .
Compare Two (Digital)
Refer to Figure 5.2.2.5.1-1 .
The Compare Two (Digital), sometimes referred to as a coincidence detector,
enables two parallel digital signals, to be compared at the same epoch of time, thus a bit by
bit comparison is quire feasible.
Composed of two (2) AND gates, two (2) inverters and an OR gate, an output
indicating both inputs are alike, regardless of whether both are zero's or one's will be received
at the OR gate output.
Compare Two (Analog)
_.
	
	 Figure 5.2.2 .5.1-2 shows a basic differential amplifier of two transistors wi th a
common emi tier resistor .
The output Vo is a function of transistor gains (K) and the difference of V 1 - V2
Vo	 K (V1-V2)
The common mode effect in this circuit grants a 1% (Max. error) to this circuit.
The common mode effect may be minimized by utilizing the composite amplifier
shown in Figure 5.2.5.1.1-2. In this configuration, the common mode voltage has a unity
gain, but the differential voltage has a gain of (1+m+n).
Voting
Voting techniques can include any odd number of parallel channels greater than
one. In this discussion the parameter of three will be delved into and the general configuration
will be referred tows Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR).
A typical application of voting is shown in Figure 5.2.2.5.1-3. The following
discussion shall be primarily focused on the redundancy Voting -circuits, though the principles
can also apply to the signal selection voting circuits.
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The redundancy Voting techniques consist of a logical polling of the outputs of each
element; The resui ► s of the vote are utilized in determining the status variable.
There are two types of voters, threshold detectors and logic voting.
The threshold sensing devices perform a switching function when either a specified
or voltage level is exceeded. Refer to Figure 5.2.2.5.1-4.
The threshold circuits operate basically as a summing amplifier. Two of the three
channels on the input must be up to provide sufficient voltage to overcome the back-biasing
from the -3V supply on the base of the transistor Q 1
 . Q 1 will turn on, thus providing a negativegoing output, with Q2 inverting the signal for a positive going signal on the output. Thus, a
Q2 positive output is a function of the input signal on the Q 1
 base which is a function of 2 or
3 inputs being up. if two channels fail in the compensating manner, one open and the other
providing a high current output to the summing mode at Q 1
 base, the threshold detector would
be ineffective and would provide a distinct Type 11 error.
Disagreement Detectors
Refer to Figure 5.2.2.5.1-5. Disagreement detectors maybe used to define the
presence or absence of a disagreement between the three elements.
In the disagreement detector the absence of a channel will alter the base emitter
biasing of Qturning on Q . The negative going ou tput of Q is inverted b Q to p rovide a1	 1	 P	 1	 Y 2	 p
positive signal for a disagreement indicator.
Further logic and implementat,on would be necessary to indicate status of each
specific element.
If desired, switchable voters incorporating Disagreement Detectors and Error
Correctors may be employed to provide the voted output after defecting one element is in dis-
agreement with the remaining two elements.
The switchable voters are composed of Nand and AND gates and can be utilized
in determining the status of individual elements. A typical switchable voter is shown in
Fi gure 5.2.2.5.1-6 .
5.2.2.5.2 Output to Reference Comparisons
.4.
This subsection details various output to reference comparisons, consisting of Value
Checks, Sequential and Nonsequential, Coding, Signal Form Analysis, Spectral Analysis and
Acknowledgment.
')
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Figure 5.2.2.5.1-4. Threshold Voter, Schematic Diagram
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Value Check Sequf^sntiai
In Value Check Sequential the signal values as well as the time order of occurrence
both present information regarding status verification. Since this is a monitor method, the
values expected would be known and the reference values could be set correspondingly.
Two sequential implementations will be detailed. One will be with direr#' computer
entry with the sequential evaluation performed internally.
in this method, the assumption of a previously stored algorithm or at minimum, a
set of threshold values correlated with the sync signal for reference is inherent. Digital inputs
are considered, though if signals are analog, A to D conversions could be implemented
externally . Refer to Figure 5.2.2.5.2-1 .
A second method of implementation consists of an array of :differential amplifiers,
each fed by analog gates triggered by the sync signal . Each analog gate triggers in series,
thus Diff. Amp. 1 will receive the first value; Diff. Amp. 2, second value.
Each Diff. Amp. will receive a reference value corresponding to the Amp. sequence.
The status variable of each Diff. Amp. could then be assessed by the Central Processor. Refer
to Figure 5.2.2.5.2-2.
Mothod One is adaptable to both analog and digital input signals while Method Two
is adapted to analog, inputs solely. Both methods are predicated upon a sequential order of
signals.
Value Check Nonsequentia I
	 o^,
Refer to Figure 5.2.2.5.2 -3. This technique is utilized in comparing a signal , input
with a stored, stable reference. The stored stable reference implies the expected value is
known, ,end this is substantiated by the matrix of Figure 5.2.2.2-5 which mandates a determin-
istic signal
The sample and hold circuits are applied to the input signal to alleviate any
problems that may be provided by a rather short time duration of e in .
The enable signal and the analog gaf'e are included to prevent the status variable
from approaching e,ref (the reference voltage) in the absence of e in .
Coding
Pari ty Checks
In this specialized case of coding, the characteristics and composition of the
digital word are evaluated in a rather mild overall error detecting scheme.
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The general operation follows. (Please refer to Figure 5.2.2.5,2-4.) The input
digital data is directed to a serial shift register, until, the digital word length is completed. The
L.S B. (Least significant bit) is previously established, as either a one or a zero, depending
upon whether even or odd parity is chosen and the number of ones and zeros in the di gi tal word .
For even parity, when the total of ones in the word is odd, then the parity bit is a one . For
odd parity when the total of ones is even, the parity bit is a one .
The general operation consists of picking out the transmitted parity bit and routing
it to the coincidence detector.. Concurrently, the parity generator through an iterative process
and the NAND gates (Figure 5.2.2.5.2-5) extracts the actual parity of the digital word in the
storage register. The parity generated from this process and the parity transmitted should agree,
and thus, both inputs to the coincidence detector should be present, enabling the data storage
register output to be shifted out. The failure to achieve coincidence of the transmitted parity
bit and the locally generated parity bit will inhibit data storage output and be counted as bad
message .
In this method the possibility of two compensating data errors creating a failure
condition which goes unnoticed is quite strong as the parity bit and the locally generated parity
bit will agree, yet there exist two errors in the data word. It is for this reason that the term
mild error dete,ting scheme is noted above.
The setup in Figure 5.2.2.5.2-6 is designed to check a transmitter-receiver data
link. Two identical pseudorandom sequence generators are used. Each generator produces a
(2n -1)-bit sequence of all permutations of n bits, except the all-zero permutation. One
generator feeds a transmitter. The received bits are used to synchronize the second generator,
so that the received bit sequences should be identical to those of the second generator. The
receiver output is compared directly with the sequence generator output, and the error counter
stores the number of bad comparisons. This error count is compared with the acceptable
maximum to evaluate the system status.
The use of the bit synchronizer allows the transmitter and receiver to be separated,
since separate sequence generators may be employed. Thus, the data link may be checked in its
normal Locations .
The PRN Gen. operates as follows. (Refer to Figure 5.2.2.5.2-7.)
The modulo-2 addition of the shift register output stage. (FF ) and one of the other
stages (FF 2 ) is used to drive the shift register input causing the output to be a sequence of
(26 -1) bits consisting of all permutations of n bits except all zeros.
Conditions
1 . PRN Seg. Generators must be synchronized for meaningful operations.
A	 2. Bit Rate of Gen. must be within range of transmission medium
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Figure 5.2.2.5.2-4. Coding Pari ty Checks
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Applications
1. A2A wideborid Iines on ACE UL and DL Lines
2. Verification of communications between LUT and Firing Room 110A Launch
Computers
3. Verification of Redundancy in PCM/DDAS - 600 KC coaxial cables
All above suggested applications must be performed off-line on a noninterference
basis .
Signal Form Analysis
This technique compares the value of some parameter of the input signal to an
expected value of that parameter, such as peak, rms or mean value. No time information is
conveyed in this verification technique , Figure 5.2.2.5.2-8 shows the block diagram of a
sample implementation of the Signal Form Analysis technique. The measurement technique shown
may be used on an analog signal (AC or DC) or on a serial digital data train as Fong as the
"ON" signals to the control switches (SCR's) are properly synchronized. The control switches
shown just determine which characteristic, of the signals (input as well as reference) are to be
used for comparison . The "scaler" is a voltage divider which provides an output which is the
rms value of the output if sinusoidal signals are assumed. If the rms value of other than
a sinusoid is required, the scaler would be replaced by true rms detection device (heating
value detector). The arbitrary function generator is a device which generates any waveform
by combining individual segments of straight lines. The slope, do offset, and time length of
each segment are variable over an extremely large range For specialized applications the
function generator could be supplanted by a direct reference, such as 6V rms, and this
configuration will reduce to 3 basic items, Reference, Holding Circuit and Differential
Comparator
The Mean Machine, _Reference Figure 5.2.2.5.2-9, accepts an analog signal,
integrates the signal over a unit interval of time, producing an output voltage equal to the:
mean of the input voltage . This value is then subtracted with a reference voltage, and the
difference is compared in a threshold detector. if the difference exceeds the allowed tolerance,
the detector wi I I output a no-go status .
The Mean Machine ll, Reference Figure 5.2.2.5.2-10, operates in the same
manner as the I version, except the resulting mean is processed digitally.
Integrator and Interval Timer, Reference Figure 5.2.2.5.2..-11	 The flip-flop holds
the relay closed until a trigger pulse (indicating the beginning of the sampling interval) is
received. The relay is then energized, opening the circuit, and allowing the integration to
begin. The next trigger pulse releases the relay, which discharges the capacitor.
F
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Peak Machine, Reference Figure 5,2.2.5.2-12. The circuit shown follows only
negative peaks, but by reversing all the diodes in the switch portion, it can be made to
follow positive peaks Negative-going values of ei n cause positive current to rapidly charge
C (R 1 C should be small compared to de " ) until the + output (+e) corresponds to the largestdt
negative peak of e 1 , at which time the error voltage at S is zero, and D d becomes noncon-
ducting. Thus, the larg^st value of e in will be stored on C, which is prevented from discharging,
by the back-biased Dd
 and the open switch. The value of epeak , is converted to digital, and a
pulse; at the end of the sampling period stores it in the storage register. This pulse and the
reset pulse come from a ► iming block (not shown), which also controls the sQ- 4ching of the
input for time-sharing purposes.
The mean-squared (M:,) machine, Reference Figure 5.2.2.5.2-13, operates
similarly to the digital mean machine, except the input signal is first squared, then averaged
and digitized.
This MS value is then subtracted with a digital reference and the difference is
evaluated to determine the status . This is, in effect, a comparison of the rms value against
its expected value but with the root-taking operation omi tted .
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The Instantaneous Frequency Machine, Reference Figure 5.2.2.5.2-14, accepts
un input signal into a wideband discriminator which outputs a voltage proportional to the
input frequency. Since this device will normally be used to measure a single-frequency sinusoid,
the output voltage of the discriminator will indicate the instantaneous frequency of the signal.
This voltage is then sampled at the desired instant, and the voltage measured is converted to
frequency. The accuracy of this conversion does not depend on the linearity of the discriminator,
since the discriminator may be calibrated in advance. The resultant frequency is then evaluated
to determine its acceptabilii-y.
Complete Spectrum Analy sis
Refer to Figure 5.2.2.5.2-15. The three elements of Group I are sampled on a time
division basis, through controls and commands from the central processor. The input signal is
applied to the spectrum analysis circuits, via the mixer. The receiver-mixer is tuned by the
sawtooth generator driving the vol.ace controlled oscillator, with the sawtooth sweep simultane-
ously applif;d to the horizontal deflection plates of the cathode ray tube. The output signal
of the receiver is applied to the vertical deflection plates, thus producing a plot of signal
amplitude versus frequency on the screen.
The complete spectrum will be reproduced for visual evaluation. For those appli-
cations where the energy level of a frequency of interest is to be ascertained, with automated
means, discriminators and analog gates must be incorporated as shown The video output is
`	 applied broadside to these analog gates and gated out to a specific monitoring device where a
monitoring technique may be applied to determine absolute levels, excedence of minimum
acceptable levels, etc . The gate is triggered by the output of discriminators centered at th,
frequency of interest . As the VCO sweeps through the spectrum, each discriminator wi I I be
exposed to its proper band in a time division sequence. Thus,when f x rs reached, the gate will
open and the video amplitude at that instant will be gated out to the monitoring device wh. h
consists of a detection measuring device, a differential amp, and a stored reference for
evaluation.
For the self test features, the test pattern is included to be utilized randomly or
after each failure is encountered, to validate the spectrum analyzer circuits. With the self
testa both Type I and Type 11 errors may be minimized.
The Input Test signal is incorporated for two conditions:
a. In the complete absence of inputs on any elements, a test signal is neces,-Jry
for determining red %sndancy of ci rcu i is .
b. Under normal operation, where only one element is uti I ized, the other two
may be randomly evaluated on a noninterferring basis.
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technique:
Typical tenant signals presently in use at KSC that could be applied to this
1. PCM/DDAS - FSK waves
DDAS .+35 kHz Dev,
PCM X75 kHz De v
2. S-Band Composite,
phase modulated carrier
3. Vibration and Acoustic Data Transmission
Par^ vial fE c frum bnal^sis
This procedure is intended for those applications where there are only selected
frequencies of interest or concern. With a limited number of frequencies of interest, it becomes
rather superfluous to assess the complete spectrum with the added equipment necessary for this
complete spectrum analy.0s. 	
I,
The operation of the configuration follows. Please refer to Figure 5.2,2.5.2-16.
On the output of each element are placed bandpass filters, centered about f(x)
the frequency of interest. Energy detection circuits, to detect the energy levels in the 	 ;F ^
bandwidth under a prescribed criteria, (RMS in bandwidth, peak level, etc .) are placed on
the output of each bandpass filter and the resultant quantities recorded.
In parallel with the energy detecting and recording, the filter outputs are time
shared to frequency sensitive voltmeters and frequency sensitive comparator circuits for real
time evaluation and control . The frequency sensiti ve comparator circuits can be instrument
servos, demodulators, circuits, etc., which are tunable to the frequency of interest.
The frequency sensitive voltmeter is a conventional RMS voltmeter with selectable
filters placed upon the input. An output ,
 signal as a function of the input signal is included for
direct computer input.
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The operati n o th verification qui  	 The exte ,^a	 ntro I
from a centralized computer, are noted. An input Test Signal Generator is present for (1) OFF
line testing of the group, or (2) selective testing of elements not in use at that moment. The
spectrum of the TS # 1 signal will be analogous to the spectrum of the tenoM signal . With the
external controls and the time sharing switch, evaluation of the f(x) component may be performed
on all elements in the group on a nondisrupting basis, presuming su Fficient isolation of the verifi-
cation equipment.
A second test signal is present, TS #2, the f(x) test signal which is included to
quantitatively evaluate both the throktghput circuits, (Filter Energy detection circuits and
the recorder) concurrently with the verification equipment consisting of the time sharing switch,
frequency sensitive voltmeter and frequency sensitive comparator circuits.
The third test signal, TS #b, is included for a rapid assessment of the end instruments
of the equipment and can be called up automatically after each deficient condition is discoverer'
to resolve the source of the difficulty.
Acknowledgment
Two ,general cases of acknowledgment will be noted . Both involve the command and
execution of a desired function with the only variance consisting of the type of affirming
indicator returned to the command location . This positive affirmation is usually utilized as an	
—Denabling function for a highly critical sequential string of events that must be performed in
perfect order .
Figure 5.2.2.5 . -17 depicts the more common usa a of Acknowledgment, The
operation fellows;
The computer° activates a command, through the command generator,for a desired
function to be executed . The transmi tter receives the command, modulates a RF carrier where
a signal extractor samples the RF signal, is demodulated and compared locally to the command
generated for an exact bit by bit comparison . A comparison OK signal enters the computer
for evaluation and further processing. Concurrently with this local check at the transmitter,
the command signal is received at the device to be controlled and the command control
function performed . Once the control function has been implemented, a response detector
senses the change of state, motion or other discernible action and transmits back to the
computer control station, a highly distinguishable signal with an equally low probability of
misinterpretation. This response signal is received, evaluated and utilized in the computer
as an Enable for a succeeding function .
The second general type of acknowledgment is illustrated in Figure.-5.2 .2 . 5 .2 -• 18
Operation is detailed as follows; the computer activates the command generator,
which drives the transmitter. The transmitter output is demodulated and compared on a bit-
by-bit basis with the rpmmand generator output. Concurrently, the transmitter output (UPLIN K)
is received, demodulated and placed in a holding register. At this point, the major divergency
5-70
with the first method appears. The entire contents of the holding register are transmitted on the
downlink back to the command control station, where a second bit-by-bit comparison is
performed , this time between the downlink word and the command generator. After the com-
porison is acceptable, a function enable is transmitted and the command actually executed.
Applications of Acknowledgment
1. Command Control
2. Comrra nd Separation
3. Critical Electromechanical Verification
A. Thrust Vector Control
B . Aerodynamic Control Surfaces
C. Hydraulic Valves
4. Remote Auto Cul ibration System (RACS)
User Complaint
r_
User Complaint can be considered a special case of acknowledgment where the
human element provides the decision criteria concerning the unacceptable status of the elennent//
set output signal
This verification method is circuitwise open-ended as only an indication of
signal is provided with no automatic remedial action.
Implementation can consist of common indicating devices;
Meters - Digital words representing signal levels,
Electromechanical Motion Detectors
5.2 .2.5.3 Output to Input Comparisons
Inverse Transform and Correlation methods for output to input comparisons are
detailed in thi s subsection .
Inverse Transform
Inverse Transform is generally applied to a complex analog function, Restrictions
include the admissibility of the input and the criticality of the delay network and differential
amplifier. Refer to Figure 5.2.2.5.3-1.
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The status variable,e,should present a null condition, subject to external noise
and EMI, thus amplifier K2 should be a highly accurate wideband amplifier with a gain con-
si stl,,g of vi ther
1. linear High Gain
2. Squaring
In either case the S/N level will be raised to levels precluding the adverse effects
of noise,
Typical functions presently in use at KSC that this method couid be applied to
consist of:
1 G&C
Inertial platform parameters
2. Servo-Controls on movable nozzles
3. PTCS Propellant tanking and computer system
4. Antenna Drive Servos
The technique illustrated in Figure 5.2.2.5.3-2 is generally classified as
Inverse Transform though it does employ some coding techniques through a tandem transmission
configuration and a bit by bit comparison of the transmitted and received codes.
The operation follows: A digital code is generated and transmitted on line 1 . Line
1 is looped through to Line 2 and retransmitted to the signal source area. The transmitted code
is delayed in time equivalent to the sum of the Line 1 and Line 2 delays and fed into a bit
comparator where a distinct bit by 'bit comparison of the locally generated and retransmitted
bits is, performed.
Differences between bits are cumulatively counted as errors. The high S/N of
the locally generated code enables the local code i ,o be acceptable as a standard, thus the
probability of both Type I and Type 11 errors is minimized.
Geographical considerations of nonproximity between ends of a transmission link
make the utilization, of this method feasible. A source of ambiguity does exist as to culpability_
when the error rate becomes excessive. With two transmi tters, two receivers, two lines and a
loop through in series, further localized testing would be necessary to isolate the indicated error
source
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A2A lines between Pads and MSOB
Two way testing of D.T.S. (Data Transmission System with Prop. Tank Comp. Sys.
The Cross Correlatar, Reference Figure 5.2.2-5.3-3, is capable of calculating
the cross correlation function, R a (y) between Jhe input and output of a set/element. The
signals to be correlated are first igitized. Thee the output signal is sampled n times at
47' =-second intervals. On the final sample, the value of a(t) is also sampled and stared.
After sampling, the unit switches to the processing mode, in which each delayed value of
b(t-m&r), m = 0, 1, 	 . n-1, is multiplied by the value of a([), forming the cross-correlations
function, Rab (T). These newest values are used to update the previous values in the average
and store: register. After a sufficient number of process cycler,, the averages  in this register
should approach a final value .
Once the cross correlation is computed, it may be displayed on a CRT, or
recorded, or processed. One forr(- of processing might be to compute the power density spectrure,
by Fourier-transforming the corre ation function . i
Cross Correlation
Time Domain Re fl ec f•ometry
A very special case of cross correlation, useful for limited special purposes in the
off-line conditions is time domain reflectometry (TDR). (Refer to Figure 5.2.2.5.3-4.)
This method consists of applying a very sharp rise time pulse in the nanosecond rancX
to an element/set and evaluating the reflected pulse.
r
The distance L is included to calculate the time between successive echoes and
thus aid in the determination of the second and third echoes.
The high impedance probe also attenuates these secondary pulse echoes further
negating error possibi i i ties ;
The reflected wave will be:
1. Delayed
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Possible Applications
1, Testing of Wideband transmission cables of the coaxial, triaxial, and balance{,
twin types
2. Antenna Testing
3. Ordnance devices - Such as exploding Bridge Wires (EBW) with the built -in
air gap and discontinuity
4. Dielectric changes in multilayered fluids
59 Dielectric changes when fluid levels recede (Fuel tank level indicators)
6 impedance Measurements
Cross Correlation - Applications
1,	 Servos in ineilial
2. Thrust vector control servos
3. Antennae drive servos
4. Measuring time delay_ s through units or through transmission mediums
(ranging equations) .
Reference figure .
5.2 ,3
	 The Group Problem
Having examined the details of the set problem, let us see how verification is
performed when the sets are put togrother to form a system and how level one groups are
addressed, The heart of the group problem is the method of identifying the status of elements
within the group. RecaiI that a group may consist of simple sets and lower level groups as
well as being an identifiable entity which does not possess the attractive properties of a simple
set (a level one group). The implication may have been drawn from Section 5.2.2 that
verification of all sets must be approached in the method described. This is not necessarily
true . From the group problem standpoint, these methods apply if verification of a particular
set must be accomplished .* Let us explain There are other methods of verifying on-line
elements. One such method is identifying the element using status information about inter-
related elements which is sufficient to reason the status of the element under contention . We
e	 j_
*This statement may seem anachronistic after the previous treatment of sets . The set problem
was addressed first in the belief that the principles are more straightforward, , than those of
groups
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shall call this process logical deduction . If uniqueness and completeness apply to the
tiitua#ion, this process is quite feasible and usually at a reduced cost. A second method of
ildentifying an on-line element which is not performing satisfactorily is simply to switch it
out and replace it with another element in the set. (We are assuming this action is performed
on an automated basis.) If the unsatisfactory condition disappeared, the element switched
out must have been unsatisfactory. To realize the full benefits of this approach, it would be
applied to an entire group (of any level). When on unsatisfactory condition developed, the
verification equipment would simply commence switching until the condition was corrected.
We Khali call this process iterative deduction. When the status of each element in a group is
determined by the techniques of Section 5.2.2, we sholl term thu process exhaustive
deduction. *
What has been gained by the processes of iterative and logical deduction? In
answering this question, we should first point out that in each case we still described a
mechanism for detecting unsatisfactory operation The primary gain has been in the number of
detecting mechanisms required. Conceptually, the iterative process would require only
knowledge of the conditional status of the group (at its output) and the status of the input. No
status of the intervening elements would be directly required. If the group is quite large,
this could be a significant savings in cost and weight provided the switching time is
ac c-eptable , Logical deduction realizes the some benefits, but typically on a much smaller
scale, It is important to note that neither approach does away with verification techniques
C,1
	 and whenever a verification technique is required, the material of Section 5.2.2 applies.
The group deduction processes are addressed in more detail in the following
suctions. Before we consider this detail, however, it may be fruitful to summorize some of
the differences between sets and groups.
e	 By their nature, the status of a group (analogous to status of a set) will
typically have no meaning, for knowing 3 of 5 elements in a group
are up will seldom tell the desired story. However, it may be possible
to attribute a status statement of the form - all elements up, not all
e I emen is up to a group.
Unlike the simple set where (usually) one element is on line and we may
have the option of using simulative input signals to the remaining elements,
the interconnection of elements in a group will require (usually) that more
than one element use the tenant signal ,
•	 In a simple set, knowing the status of one input (although it may be
many independent information paths) will confirm the conditional
status of an element. In a group this wiII typically not be so.
k,
*lt s! ould be noted that, as described in Section 5.2.1 .3, exhaustive deduction can also be
achieved by injecting a signal at the input of every element.
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5.2.3.1	 Exhaustive Deduction
Exhaustive deduction as an approach to the group problem is the determination
of status on a set-by-set basis, in essence being the simultaneous or sequential application
of the simple set techniques discussed. Wi th thin statement it becomes obvious that the mair`r
limiting factor on the use of this approach will be accessibility, for the application of the
simple set techniques requires that distinguishable element outputs or, at the least, observable
element effects in a set output be made available for verification .
Because of the degree of penetration into the group which is afforded by an
approach of this kind, the degree of comprehensiveness attainable through the use of
exhaustive deduction will exceed that due to iterative or logical deduction • The ability
to verify an operation independent of others will always offer the potential fora greater
understanding of that operation . It would not, for example, be expected that offsetting failures
or out-of-tolerance conditions in successive sets woul d go undetected.
Exhaustive deduction would naturally require the greatest amount of equipment
exclusive of command-and--control functions. if the some provisions and usages Which
allowed continuous verification in the simple .e^ case (noninterruptive sensing of signals for
verification, use of tenant, symbiotic or idle signal for verification, etc.) continuous verifica-
tion will be possible for he group problem. This is a capability unique to the exhaustive
approach. Another unique feature of exhaustive deduction is that the advantages of requiring
only an admissible input for status resolution, a feature attributed to certain of the coincidence
development techniques, can be passed on to the group problem when the some techniques are
employed for exhaustive deduction. As an example, a group problem for which exhaustive
deduction was carried out b voti n g on each set of element outputs might well require noy	 g	 p	 :^	 9	 ,^•^.
knowledge of set inputs to resolve conditional status into status. it may be additionally noted
that wherever simple sets appear in a serial configuration, exhaustive deduc±ion may establish
conditional status for the first set and input status for the second set sunultaneowy'Jy, thus	 a,
faci litating status resol ution .	 I
The results of "exercising" an element will be more readily observed than will be
the case for the other deductive schemes wherein the element's output may have to pas,
through successive elements prior to its observation.
The amount of verification equipment required to implement an exhaustive scheme
will increase in rather direct proportion to the complexity of the group under scrutiny. (We
shall for the moment ignore equipment savings by time-sharing). Exclusive of command and
control functions, the exhaustive approach will demand the most verification equipment. Mere
the possibility of verifying in a continuous fashion by the coincidence methods which facilitate
status resolution (output/output and output/input comparisons) the exhaustive approach, not
needing command and control, may require the least total amount of equipment.
With proper design of principal system equipment, such as the provision of a second,
isolated input from each element, or the use of nonnterruptive signal sensing techniques,
exhaustive deduction could be accomplished with a total lack of switching in the principal
system equipment. This is an advantage over iterative deduction.
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The possibility exists that, when output/input coincidence development techniques
are applied to n series of equipments, a tolerance buildup in the chain could go undetected
unless the group output were in some fashion checked against this possibility. For example,
n chain of Inverse Transform checks might all show good yet the group output be bad.
The abi0ty to check many sets simultaneously makes exhaustive methods faster
than 'iterative . "l`'Vie advantage is mulriplied if it is necessary to use exercising signals
The occurrence of a majority voting sot .Ohin a group will not affect the
applicability of exhaustive deduc;ion nor complicate it;: implementation so Long as element
outputs the made accessible- The same may not be said for iterative and logical deduction.
5M2.3.2
	
Iterative Deduct i on
Iterative deduction implies the ascertaining of group status by performing iterative
switching of redundant elements. This can be achieved through two basic approaches which
s fntially amount to continuous verification on the one hand and noncontinuous verification
on the other. Considering the continuous verification approach first, the play here is to
opproaoh verification of on--line and off-line elements in two distinct ways. (See Section
5.2.1.2.) The can-line elements are obviously all connected to perform the intended group
function and these elements are verified as a collection by observing only the group output
can a continuous basis. The off-line elements are configured in whatever fashion proves
convenient for their continuous verification. So long as the technique does not involve the
' C111-line elements, virtually any, in any combination, of the techniques described in Section
.` .2 can be used. For example, inverse transform may be used on one off-line element
and any one of the monito ►'ing methods could be used on the remaining off-line elements. Or,
da°v off-line elements could be configured serially, as described in Section 5.2.1 .2, to form a
second parallel collection of elements:
The above will accomplish continuous verification . However, what will happen
when an on-line element fails? Haw is the status resolved? When the on -line verification
technique determines that the on-line string has experienced a failure, it will initiate a
search routine which Liegins W ching in off-line elements, according to some algorithm,
until the failure indication is removed.* The last switching occurrence, the one that removed
the failure, is identified with the failed element. Since the off-line elements are being
verified continuously, elements of Known status are being substituted at all times. Should an
off-line element be in a failed state, the iteration processor is informed of this condition and
skips this substitution. Should all other substitutions fail to correct the failure, the skipped
element is identified as failed. From this discussion it can be observed that this approach to
iterative deduction enjoys its greatest utility when used on maintained principal systems.
'i`):e noncontinuous verification approach differs from the continuous in one important
respect. the 6fi ­Line elements are not independently verified. Verification of the group is still
*11 is important to note that this process is based on the principle of single instances of failure .
if the iteration time is short, typically within minutes, this assumption is valid.
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based on the group on-line output but periodically the group must be released from its operating ..
function while off-line elements are sequentially switched into the on-line stream for verifica-
tion , By using a technique which will switch in one new element of each set for each output
observation, (i.e., each new observation constitutes a completely different collection of off-
line elements) redundancy verificationi can be accomplished quite rapidly if no unsatisfactory
condition is indicated in the process. For then, the number of system configurations for
observation will be a minimum. However, if an unsatisfactory output is observed for one or
more of the configurations, the only information gained is that some one element which is
on line in that configuration is bad,A switching sequence mast then be undertaken to identify
the faulty element and, even though an optimum sequence can probably be developed, the
location of the culprit will usually be time consuming
If the design confidence requirements are su::h that the input for verification must
be varied over some range in frequency, amplitude, etc,, the necessity of doing this in all
the different system configurations could be a lengthy procedure.
Iterative deduction must fail to match exhaustive deduction in the degree of
comprehensiveness attainable. It would be unreasonable to expect to gain as much information
on an element buried within a group from, say, a spectral analysis of the group output as could
be gained from a similar analysis of the element's output.
Iterative deduction wi ll require knowledge of group input status, at the least, to
allow status resolution .
This approach will be economical in the use of equipment performing the five basic
functions of verification, since the only signal observation will be made at the group output.
The degree of command and control equipment used for this approach will exceed that required
for most exhaustive implementat'ons, however. Logical deduction would be expected to use
less command and control equipment but more observation equipment than would iterative
deduction .
When design confidence; demands that a simulative signal be used to exercise an
element, the abil i ty to employ iterati ve deduction will depend on accessibility of the point at
which the signal will be injected. Consider that the group under scrutiny will have as its
output that signal (s) under observation . Its input, though, may be located earlier in the
signal path than is the signal injection point and sequential switching may occur between input
and injection points. As an example, consider simple sets 1 . l and 1 .2 of Figure 5.1 .3 to be
a group for verification and assume that it is necessary to exercise the elements of simple set
1.2. The concept of iterative deduction would be compatible with the need for exercising
if the switching of simple set 1.1 were such that all elements of that set could be switched
out simultaneously.
If it happens that elements are designed to give a second, isolated output for the
purpose of verification, this second output will not be useful for iterative deduction, since the
output used for the verification of an element must pass through succeeding elements if this
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approach is to be used . The one exception is for a simple set whose output is the output of the
group .
The danger of a tolerance buildup going undetected is not present as it may be in
an exhaustive arrangement using output/input comparisons on each set,
A
The occurrence of ,a majority voting set within a group should usually be handled
by some means other than iterative deduction; in fact, exhaustive deduction will be the best
choice
5.2.3.3	 Logical Deduction
The concept of logical deduction, when applied to redundancy verification,
implies the use of knowledge concerning system configuration and signal flow to minimize
the number of points which must be observed to deduce status . We are then talking about
deriving a maximum amount of status information by intelligently choosing a minimum number
)f observation points. A simple example is in order. Consider Figure 5.2.3.3 where the
input at A' corresponds uniquely to the output at A, B' to B, and C' to C Suppose, then
that an "unsatisfactory" output was observed at A' while outputs at B' and C' looked good.
A logical conclusion might be that box A is at fault, since any failure in X or L would have
shown up at B' or C'. (We must be willing to make such an assumption in this example.)
" ;The one general statement vt^ich can easily be made concerning logical deduction
is that it will, to the utmost, be specialized to the equipment it i s
 designed to verify. TheY
advantages gained in reducing the number of observation points and the attendant reductions in
observing equipment will be traded off against loss in flexibility. If logical deduction is
^.hosen for extensive use in a complex system, any change in system configuration could lead
to th y: major revision, probably in both hardware and software areas of the verification scherie.
The "exercising" of elements will not necessarily be complicated by the use of
logical deduction. The only important consideration will be whether points for signal injection
remain accessible .
The complexity of a logical deduction system will vary strongly with the complexity
of the group to be verified, though sometimes this complexity may appear entirely in the
software portion of the system .
The amount of switching required by a logical deduction approach will' be less than
that required by iterative deduction . A compari Ann of switching requirements between the
logical and exhaustive techniques is not possibl `nce exhaustive techniques may be achieved
wii1h no switching at all or may involve a great deal of switching. Certainly any switching
activity in a logical deduction scheme must be well coordinated. This is in contrast to
the case for some imaginable exhaustive deduction implementations.
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Figure 5.2.3.3. Logical Deduction - An Illustrative Example
0
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The time required for a complete verification process under logical deduction will
be less, in some cases for less, than that required by iterative deduction. Exhaustive deduction
schemes may be made faster than those employing logical deduction, though equipment
sharing and the necessity of switching to obtain distinguishable element outputs may result
in the exhaustive scheme being slower.
Logical deduction will not evidence the some ease of states resolution that may
be realized by using other than monitor methods in an exhaustive deduction implementation.
In practice, combinations of exhaustive and logical deduction will be common. It would
be prudent to exploit logical deduction to its fullest and use exhaustive deduction to resolve
any remaining ambiguities.
No coincidence development technique may be ruled out for use with a
logical deduction scheme, but element output would have to be observable at the output
side of the group if Compare Two and Voting were to be used. Monitor methods are by for the
most likely candidates for use here .
If a majority voting (for the achievement of redundancy or error correction)
set appeared within a group and the element outputs were neither acce ssihie nor switchable/
logical deduction would be at a loss.
^r
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5.3	 Other Design Considerations
In addition to the areas discussed earlier as design inputs, the final determination of
verification equipment configuration must consider the important areas of the rjeed for continuous
verification, the requirement of dedicating equipment to verification, and fhe" implications of
sharing verification devices.
5.3.1	 Continuous Verification and the Dedication of Equipment to Verification
in some imaginable redundant configurations, the desire to achieve continuous
redundancy verification may be stymied by the inability of the tenant signal to "exercise" the
redundant elements to the extent necessary for the establishment of designs confidence. The same
impasse may be reached if the tenant signal "exercises" the elements on an occasional basis but
without the assurance that the period between these occasions will be sufficiently small. As one
example, the verification of a diode would undoubtedly require the back-biasing of that device.
Unless this condition resulted under the influence of the tenant signal and with reasonable
frequency, it would be necessary to provide a signal, simulative or idle, to perform the exercis-
ing. One might consider also an audio amplifier in a communications link as a redundant
element. A requirement for design confidence here could well be a minimum signal distortion
for a signal of given bandwidth. If the tenant signal lacked sufficient bandwidth to exercise the
amplifier there would again arise the necessity of providing a signal .
}
An important point to keep in mind is that the use of simulative, idle, or symbiotic
signals may facilitate status resolution, the presumption being that the status of the injected
signal will be known.
The importance of exercising redundant equipment is one to be carefully evaluated
by the designer. The tradeoff between the loss of flexibility and comprehensiveness implied by
a requirement for continuous verification and a sacrifice in system confidence because of noncon-
tinuous verification has been addressed by questioning the quantitative relationship between
system confidence and the period between 'verifications.
As a first approach, consider the case where the set will succeed in its mission if at
least one of its elements succeeds.
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the elements are capable of taking on
two states during the time required to operate; a failed state and a success state. Intermittent
failures are not considered which precludes transitions from a failed state to a success state. If
the probability of the i th element working is Pi then the probability of the n element set working
is:
nPS = 1 - 7r1 (1 - Pi )	 (5.3.1-1)
when the elements are statistically independent.
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Through verification the set can be inspected at predetermined points in time which
has the effect of producing time intervals in which the set must operate without observation. in
the normal operation of systems, care is taken to avoid failures due to wearout, hence, it is
reasonable to assume that wearout will not be a cause of set element failure. Each element in
the set is modelled as following an exponential failure law. The exponential model allows for
ease in mathematical tractability and is not a requirement imposed upon the elements. Then in
the exponential case Pi = e- T/N1i for each element in the time interval of length T, where Mi is
the MTBF of the i th element.
A measure of risk can be associated with sets in the following wrjy. Let of be the
risk that one is willing to assume that the set will fail in T, or, stated conversely 1-ca is the
probability that a set will work in the time interval T It is therefore necessary that the
following relation holds:
Ps = 1-,of
	 (5.3.1-2)
where P$ is defined by Equation 5.3.1 .
 1 and a is the acceptable risk or an acceptable value for
the probability of set failure in the time interval T. Using Equation'(5.3.1-1) and the exponen-
tial model for each element, Equation (5.3.1-2) becomes:
n
1 - 7r (1 - e-T/Mi) = 1- of	 (5.3.1-3)
i=1
Under the condition of identical elements M e = M1 = M2 = ... = Mn , Equation 5.3.1 -3 becomes
1 - (1 - e-T/Me)n = l -a
	 (5.3.1-4)
where Me is the MTBF of an individual element of the simple set consisting of n elements. The
next step is to investigate simple sets and their behavior under some values of acceptable risk.
In essence this amounts to fixing a and the number of elements in the set (n) and solving Equation
5.3.1- ,4 for the ratio T/Me. One, two and three element sets were investigated with a= .01,
.05 and .10. Equation 5.3.1-4 then becomes:
e-T/Me = 1- of; n-1	 (5.3.1-5)	 I
i
2e- I/Me - e-2T/Me 1 -a; n=2	 (5.3.1-6)
3e-T/Me .. 3e-2T/Me + e'3T/Me = 1-^ a; n=3	 (5.3.1-7)
i
Figures 5.3.1-1 through 5.3.1-3 graphically depict Equations (5.3.1-5) through (5.3:1 =-7) for	 I
of= .01 ,  .05 and .10,
Figure 5.3.1 -1, for instance, shows that if one is willing to accept a risk of ae .100,
:v
	then any single element set with Me on the line marked 1- 0t= .90 presents the same risk provided
-	 that T is chosen as indicated. For Me = 200 hours one would have to set T = 20 hours for
1-et= .90 (i.e., a = 10) and for Me = 150 hours, T must be equal to 15 hours for of .10.
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If T is known and of is fixed, then it is a simple matter to determine the Me which
must be met. An example would be when T - 25 hours and a = .10, then one would need to
select a Me = 250 hours. In the case of a fixed Me t one would have to adjust T accordingly
each time ot was changed*
TO decrease the risk a from .10 to .01 it would be necessary to decrease T from 25 to
2.5 hours for Me = 250 as seen from Figure 5.3.1 -1.
Figure 5.3.1-2 provides for similar observations but represents a two element
simple set. For Me = 200 hours and ct = . 1 0 then T must be equal to 75 hours. S lAd in a differ-
ent manner, a two element set with the MTBF of are individual element equal to 200 hours, will
have a probability of failing equal to .10 for a time interval of 75 hours. To decrease the risk
to .01 for Me W 200 hours it is necessary to decrease T from 75 hours to 20 hours.
Figure 5.3.1-3 represents a three element set and can be used in the some manner
as Figures 5.3.1-1 and 5.3.1 -2.
The figures can be used as vehicles for performing various tradeoffs such as accept-
able risks versus time intervals in which the set musr operate unobserved (T).
Since three elements can be arranged in such a manner as to result in other require-
ments of element success for the assurance of set success, it is constructive to investigate the
major ity vote set	 majority to set is defined to consist f threebehavior  of a m i n 	A m l r^ y vo	 finequal el ments^ o	 q
(i.e., Me = M1 = M2 = M3) such that the set will succeed if at least two of three elements
succeed; the assumption being that the voter is perfectly reliable. Mathematically, for
statistically independent elements:
3
Ps = 11 (^ ) Pk (1 -P)3-k .	 (5.3.1-8)
k=2
Introducing ce in the same manner as before and setting P = e-T/Me, Equation (5.3.1-8) becomes
Ps = 3e-2T/Me 2e-3T/Me	 (5.3.1-9)
where P. is the probability that the majority vote set will succeed in the time interval T. Figure
5.3.1 -4 is a graph of Equation (5.3.3-9) for ct = .10, .05 and .01 as a function of T and Me.
Figure 5.3.1-4 can be used in the some manner as Figures 5.3.1-1 through 5.3.1-3. For
example, assume that ot = .05 (1 -ce = .95) and that it is known that T must be 20 hours then a
majority vote set must be selected such that Me equals 140 hours.
Comparisons of sets for which the success of a single element means set success and
the three element majority vote (MV) set are presented in Figures 5.3.1-5 through 5.3.1-7.
Note that the MV set lies between the one and two element parallel sets. The figures can be
used to compare or decide on the proper set configuration for a given a and Me in the following
way: Let ce - .10 (Figure 5.3.1-5 is used since 1-c( = .90) and Me = 200 hours then T must be
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20, 45, 75 or 125 hours for one element,, majority vote, two-elementor three-element sets. Hence,
if it is known that T is greater than 50 hours but less than 100, at least a two element set must be
used to provide the desired probability of success for the interval T.
While the designation of a leads to determining the probability of set succ ess in T,
another pertinent question arises concerning the time interval T. What is the probability that the
parallel set will lose all but one element in the interval T?*
This question will be of particular interest when (ms of rt iundancy during a mission
could result in an abort. If this is the mission philosophy, the first reaction is to stipulate con-
tinuous verification so that the user may be alarmed to the fact that he has lost one (for first
degree) or two (for second degree) elements. However, if it should happen that periodic verifi-
cation can establish a sufficiently low likelihood that a redundant set will degrade to this point,
the requirement for continuous verification may be relaxed.
Two sets are of interest here, namely the three-element and the two-element sets.
Consider the three-element case where all elements are operating at the start of the
interval T, then according to the set and element models defined previously.
P (213; P) = 3(1.e-T/Me)2(e-T/Me) 	 (5.3.1-10)
where P = e -T/Me and P(2 13; P) gives the probability of two of three elements failing in the
time interval T, or the probability tha' ,he three-element set wi ll have only one element
operating in the time interval T.
In the two element set:
P(1 12, P) = 2e-T/Me (1-e -T/Me)	 (5.3.1-11)
where P(1 1 2, P) is the probability that one element out of two elements will fail in the interval
T. Since P = e-T/Me, then it is sufficient to select a value of P and solve Equations (5.3.1- 10)
and (5.3.1-11) for the desired probability of being "down to exactly one" operating element in
the interval T. Once a value of P is selected, them Figure 5.3.1-1 can be used to determine
the appropriate Me and T. For instance, if P = .95 then any point on me line marked 1 -ot = .95
in Figure 5.3.1-1 has a corresponding Me and T; if Me is fixed along with P, then T can be
determined from the graph, if T is fixed then Me can be read off the graph.
Table 5.3.1 compares the two and three element sets with respect to being "down to
exactly one" element. Consider a two element set with the probability of an individual element
succeeding in time T equal to .90 then the probability that the set will lose one out of two
elements is .1800. In the case of a three element set, the probability of being "down to
exactly one" element is .0270, a fairly large improveelent.
Th is is equivalent to asking for the probability of exactly one element surviving.
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Figures 5.3.1-8 through 5.3.1-11 are graphs of Equations (5.3.1-5) (5.3,1-6),
(5.3.1-7) and (5.3.1-9) solved for a range of values on a from .20 to .0001 and some selected
values of Me . These graphs can be used to determine the pointat which,' for a given Me, a
decreasing T would not be very profitable for the set in question. Figure 5.;3.1-10 for example,
shows that to go from a risk of .005 to .0001 for M e ° 3001 T has to decrease from 56 to 14.
More complex situations can be modelled and investigated in a manner similar to
that employed here. The mathematics become somewhat more complicated but in general
probability bounds can be derived for these complex structures.
For sets which do not ,
 have statistically independent elements, bounds can be
determined from the probabilities of the individual elements.
Table 5.3.1. Probability of being Down to Exactly One Element for the Two and Three
Element Sets
PROBABILITY OF
INDIVIDUAL
ELEMENT WORKING(P)
PROBABILITY OF BEING DOWN TO EXACTLY ONE ELEMENT
TWO ELEMENT SET THREE ELEMENT SET
.80 03.20 x 10-1 0.96 x 10-1
.85 25.25 x 10-2 5.74 x 10-2
. 90 18.00 n 10'2 2. J x 10'2
.92 14.72 x 10-2 1.77 x 10-2 j
.95 09.50 x 10-2 0.71 x 10-2
.99 01.98 x 10-2 0.03 x 10-2
.995 09.95 x 10-3 0.07 x 10-3
.999 19.98 x 10-4 0.03 x 10-4
.9995 99.95 x 10-5 0.08 x 10-5
.9999 19.99 x 10-5 0.003 x '10-5
Consider a group of sets instead of ra single set; then the preceding discussion and
approach can be used to arrive at an overall risk or conversely the probability that some
member(s) of the group will fail where group success is possible only if all sets work properly.
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i=1
(5.3.1-12)
if the probability of the i th set working is Psi then the probability that at least one
member of the group failing is,
where the Psi are statistically independent sets. As noted previously, if the members of the group
are not statistically independent then bounds would be derived to replace Qg. Equation
(5.3.1-12) in turn gives the overall probability of at least one set failing in a group of i" sets
and Qg can be interpreted as the overall group risk.
5.3.2	 Implications of Sharing Verifi cation Devices
Because of the cost of implementing some verification methods and because of the
possibility of an on-line/bff-line situation arising in the achievement of redundancy, it is
pertinent to question the implications of sharing verification equipment.
Probably most important to consider is the impact of equipment sharing on time
partitioning requirements and design confidence. It could easily arise, with extensive sharing of
equipment and automatic command and control of the verification process, that the times between F
the updates of status of a given set are not frequent enough to satisfy the user. This is particu-
larly likely to happen if a central processing function is handling numerous verification inputs
on a priority-interrupt basis. A point that appears here is that conditional status determination
requires the simultaneous presence of the proper signal and the proper equipment. Status
resolution may have to await other information such as the status or conditional status of
preceeding equipment. It is the specified maximum times between completions of this process
that must be satisfactory to the user. In terms of verification equipment, this requires a certain
degree of rapidity in the status resolution function as well as an avoidance of oversharing
equipment.
In the question of which of the verification functions may be shared, it is found to
be a good rule that the closer the function is to the equipment being verified, the less sharable
it is. This is an extension of a point made in the discussions of Appendix A and in Section
5.2.2. For most of the coincidence development_ techniques a degree of specialization to the
equipment being verified is mandatory. The characteristics of each technique with regard to
sharability are discussed in Appendix A, but it is clear at first glance that verification equip-
ment will be restricted in the type and range of signal that it can handle. it is not likely that
equipment would compare two sets of signals, one in the 100v range and the other in the milli-
volt range. Parameter estimation functions will be more sharable and mapping functions still
more so. Naturally, wherever digitization occurs, on the signal being observed, the coincidence
variable or the status variable, succeeding function will be amenable to sharing since almost all
the functions could be performed by a digital machine.
Wherever time-sharing is used the deletion of equipment to perform the basic func-
tions will be traded off for command and control implementations. If the rule-of-thumb is
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accepted that the cost and complexity of command and control equipment should not exceed that
of the equipment it is, deleting, it is obvious that the sharing of the more complicated functions
is most attractive.
A tradeoff between the sharability of a particular piece of verification equipment
and accuracy is likely to arise. The designer may well be tempted to "open up" a function in
order to allow its sharing among a larger scat of proceeding functions. It should be borne in mind
that this will probably affect the accuracy of verification and a careful assessment must be made
of the implications.
Tl "e proper approach to the design of a sharing verification system will be to identify
the points in the principal system from which information for verification will be drawn and
outline the functions to be performed on the extracted information. The set of functions to be
performed may then be partitioned into groups which have similar outputs; coincidence variables
of the some form, status variables of the some form, etc. These groups then identify where
sharing can begin.
After the decisions have been made concerning which functions are to be shared,
several areas must be considered in the design of verification equipment to be shared. The
output of the shared equipment must be inhibited during ;witching to avoid an output which may
be interpreted by succeeding equipment as on inference of operational integrity. In digital
implementations, this is likely to be less of a problem than in analog implementations, since
-	 data won be "clocked out" in an orderly fashion and is not required to have a real-time relation-
ship with the input.
Verification a( ' 1pment must not overload, saturate, or drift excessively during
switchover. This consideration will in some instances require the provision to the verification
equipment of dummy loads or signals, remembering that for Large-scale sharing systems the duty
cycle on a particular piece of equipment may be low.
The sharing of verification equipment must never disturb the characteristics of a
tenant signal when such a signal is being used for verification. Furthermore, if simulative,
symbiotic or idle signals are to be used "downstream" in a system verification problem, any
effect on these signals of switching verification equipment will complicate the status resolution
of succeeding equipment.
Time-shared equipment must not provide the means for crosstalk between different
portions ofthe system.
Means for identifying information sources must be provided. This may be done
either by tagging the information itself or by obtaining routing information from the command
and control equipment.
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5.4
	
Relationships To a Central Processor and Existing Ace Techni ue$
The intent of this section is to present the general role which a digital processor may
play in an automated redundancy verification scheme and to briefly discuss the relatedness and
applicability of automatic checkout equipment (ACC) techniques as applied to complex
electronic/electromechanical systems.
Singe the exact configuration and characteristics of a futuristic complex system can
only at best be surmised, a well defined set of guidelines for definitizing processor design and
function is beyond the scope of this report. However.. this does riot preclude a generalized
treatment of the universal problem. To this end, an introductory paragraph is presented to
establish some considerations that are relevant to any application of digital processing equip-
ments in such an environment. Digital processing applicability is discommd to pose certain
questions relevant to the system design process. Following this is a brief reiteration of the
general functional flow of the redundancy verification process. This is done to maintain logical
continuity of the discussion and to lead into further argument. The central processor's role is
then discussed relative to four functional configurations of verification processing. The treat-
ment of the central processor is concluded with a paragraph concerned with programming con-
siderations. Finally, exisi`ing ACE techniques are discussed to present a related technology
which involves techniques similar to those to be encountere in automation of redundancy
verification.
5.4.1
	
Automation Considerations
The role played by a central processor in a complex electronic/electromechanical
system is influenced by many factors. Some of the salient factors to be considered are:
e Operational Requirements
e Performance Criteria
e Reliability Criteria
• State-of-the-art Technology
o Digital Data Base Volume and Diversity
• Digital Data Base Acquisition Interface
• Data Transmission Rates and Timing
e Raw Data Formats
e Measurement Timing and Accuracy	 0
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• Processing Requirements
• Computational Accuracy
• Data Storage and Recording
• Information Display
• Man/Machine Interface
• System Expandability
The selection or design of any real time digital processor should never be considered
before the overall digital processing functions have been determined. Operational requirements,
performance criteria and reliability criteria are the cornerstones of the system design process.
The primary factors to be considered in the central processor design are digital data
base volume and diversity, data transmission rates and timing, processing Requirements, and man
machine interface. These factors when properly evaluated will set the general structural
bou -.ft;ries of the processor design.
5.4.2	 Digital Processing Applicability
The applicability of digital processing to the automation (or partial automation) of
redundancy verification in a complex electronic/electromechanical system environment is
discussed here from the viewpoint of conceptual design considerations. Consider the following
questions:
• What is the scope of the automation problem?
• What functions can be accomplished by digital processing?
• What functions can be,time shared?
• What functions require central processing?
• Can one central processor handle the total digital processing workload?
To answer these questions in detail could easily result in a study in its own right.
They are presented here to remind the reader of the general line of thinking that must be
devoted to determination of digital processing applicability in any real time system.
t
5.4.3	 Redundancy Verification Functional Flow
We may summarize the result, of Sections 5.2.1.3 and 5.2.2.1 into five functions
required for redundancy verification.
I. Coincidence Development
2. Parameter Estimation
3. Mapping and Decision
4. Status Resolution
5. Status Recording and Display
:1)
Figure 5.4.3 depicts the functional flow and illustrates this flow from the simple
set level to the group level. These concepts have been discussed previously in detail and will
not be belabored here. It is necessary at this level of perspective; however, to view the overall
process as this is the theme of the following sections,
5.4.4	 Central Processing Options
The role of a central processor in the total automated redundancy verification scheme
can be determined precisely only by a design process based on a specific system configuration
and established operational and performance requirements.- But in general, that role can be
represented by four candidate system configuration options. Figure 5.4.4 depicts the system
configurator for these options. This figure is an extension of the redundancy verification func-
tional flow as shown in Figure 5.4.3. The states resolution function in all four options to be
discussed is relegated to the central processor. But before proceeding with discussion of the
four options, consider the structure of the configurator and the functions of each of the entities
depicted.
The central processor is the focal point of automation. Its function and design can
range from a special purpose digital processor with limited arithmetic and input/output capability
to a giant computer with multiple environments, extensive instruction repertoire, buffered and
multiplexed input/output capability, microprogrammed macro instructions, multipart memory,
and many other features. The basic functions to be performed by the central processor are as
follows:
• Executive (command, control, sequencing)
• Data Acquisition
• Data Storage and Retrieval	 0
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Figure 5.4.3. Redundancy Verification Functional Flow
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r• Data Recording and Display
• Processing (mapping, decision, formatting)
• Reporting
The Digital Data Acquisition Interface provides the communications link between
the central processor and the special peripheral hardware which performs all necessary verifi-
cation functions on the principal system.
The interface problem can be divided into three cases (see Figure 5.4.4).
Case I In this case all signal processing (coincidence development and parameter
estimation) and mapping are performed by special purpose equipments. The conditional status for
each simple set is presented to the data acquisition interface in digital form. The interface may
be comprised of a combination of multiplexed or buffered channels depending on the data rates
and volumes to be transferred.
Case II - In this case special purpose peripheral equipment performs the signal pro-
cessing function. A status variable for each simple set is presented to the data acquisition 'Inter-
face. The form of the status variables may be either analog or digital. All digital inputs will
be handled as in Case 1. However, analog signals must be digitized and formatted. These
digitized quantities may then be handled as in Case I.
Case III - In this case virtually all the verificai ion functions have been relegated to
the processor: With few exceptions, all the pertinent tenant signals or transducer signals have
been digitized and routed directly to the Acquisition Interface. Under these circumstances, the
Acquisition Interface must be capable of handling a wide variety of word lengths, word rates
and, if the tenant signals are digital, varying formats.
The Data Storage function provides the mechanism for storing all digital information
associated with the redundancy verification process. This includes buffer storage for data
acquisition and transrrjission, program storage for all processing programs, bulk storage for raw
data and reference daj a, and output k tfer storage for display data.
The status display function presents in real time the current system redundancy
status. The standard elements of the display mechanism are display boards, CRT displays, and
aural transducers.
The control and inquiry function allows the operator to communicate with the central
processor executive to initiate actions and retrieve information. The standard elements of the
control and inquiry mechanism are keyboards, switches, teletypewriters, and CRT terminals.
The datatecording and display function provides the mechanism for permanently
recording data requested by the operator or as a result of programmed output and for displaying
i
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any data in permanent form output as a result of programming or oparator inquiry. The standard
units associated with this function are magnetic tape recorders, line printers, stripchart
recorders, photographic film, and digital plotters.
It will be instructive to examine each of the above interface cases in the light of
the central processor. This is the subject of the following subsections.
	
5.4.4.1	 Case I
This option is defined to be a configuration of functional elements represented by
Figure 5.4.4 that requires the central processor to perform status resolution and status recording
and display. Signal processing and mapping functions are performed by special peripheral
equipment(s) which resolve the verification signals to a conditional status signal and input to a
Case I data acquisition interface. The primary processing algorithm is, therefore, concerned
with a logical decision process of resolving composite status ., an unambiguous statement of system
redundancy state. This case places a minimum processing load on the central processor. Com-
putational speed and accuracy will not be a critical factor in selecting a processor for this
option. Since most of the data processing is performed external to the central processor the
overall data base will be relatively small and will consequently require less storage and produce
a minimum load on the input/output channels.
	
5.4.4.2	 Case II
Thus option is defined to be a configuration like Case I that relegates the Mapping
and decision function into the central processor as well as status resolution and status recording
and display functions. This configuration requires o Case it data acquisition interface. The
addition of more and different computational requirements on the central processor will require
possibly more, precision, speed, and instruction types. The increased data base and processing
will significantly effect the throughput rate and may require expanded input,/output capability.
Data storage, recording and display requirements will expand proportionally.
	5.4.4.3	 Case III
This case represents a quantum leap in central processing requirements. This case
requires that all verification signals be inputted directly to a Case III,4data acquisition interface.
The data acquisition and storage problem is compounded by the many types and varied rates of
signals to be processed and stored. The signal processing algorithms will be many and time
sharing of all processing functions will certainly be necessary for any sizable principal system.
This type of requirement could very easily accommodate a large scale multienvironment real time
computer system with sophisticated input/output structure mass random access storage and a full
blown real time multiprogramming operating system. Large random access storage will probably
be necessary to contain the data base and the full complement of processing programs. `
1.
5.4.4.4	 Case IV
Case IV is an added, compromise option defined to be an optimum combination of
Cases I, 11 and III to take advantage of the good points of each. In reality, Case IV is the
most typical. By proper selection of off-the-shelf hardware, many of the signal processing
tasks can be accomplished with proven equipment. In other cases, signal processing can be
accomplished only through special designs. Still others can be accomplished by direct input to
standard multiplexed processing channels in the data acquisition interface. The some holds true
for mapping. By judicious system design, the central processor can be reduced substantially
from that typically required for Case III implementation.
5.4.5	 Programming Considerations
The type of programming encountered in this type of system configuration will be
highly specialized real time programming. The size and scope of the programming task is, of
course, dependent on the complexity of the central processor and the type of processing to be
accomplished. In Section 5.4.4 four central processing options were discussed. Each of these 	 ^..
options entails an entirely different configuration of central processor, peripheral equipments,
and processing tasks„ The total programming task is also influenced by such factors as:
s What off-line processing equipments are available and are they compatible with
the on-line system?
• What vendor-supplied system software is directly applicable to the problem?
What programming aids such as operating systems, compilers, assemblers,
emulators, and simulators are available?
Selection of a central processor that is compatible with off - line equipment is a very
significant factor in reducing the prime equipment configuration. Often off-line equipment can
)ossess capabilities far beyond the prime equipment and provide for programming aids and
services that sometimes spell the difference between a superior and marginal software system. If
the central processor has a very limited capability some programming develop_ ment problems may
be insurmountable without good support equipment.
Selection of a digital processor or computer of any significant scale should be made
bearing in mind the direct applicability of vendor supplied software. This is particularly true if
the computer is to be a large scale multienvironment real time machine with a complex input/
output structure. In this case a monitor system capable of performing complex compilation and
synthesization is a must for program development. Further, the vendor can readily incorporate
changes to the system corresponding to increased hardware and software requirements with mini-
mum impact on the operational programs.
The availability and applicability of special programming aids such as emulators and
simulators should be given careNI consideration. Emulators can significantly reduce programming
^}f
5-111
development time by providing debug capability not dependent on prime equipment availability.
Simulation on the other hand can be quite effective in evaluating hardware system design,
developing and evaluating optimum processing algorithms, and determining system feasibility.
Simulation can also be utilized to select and configure the central processor.
5.4.6	 Existing ACE Techniques
Applications for real-time digital processing technology have evolved in many
fields of science, engineering, and commercial enterprises. The one most closely related to the
problem of automated redundancy verification is Automatic Testing.
Over the past decade military and aerospace requirements for more sophisticated,
more compact, and more reliable modular electroni%lectromechanical systems have required
innovations in design, packaging, and testing. Testing of such systems must be conducted
during research and development to validate and improve system design, during production to
maintain quality control, and in the field to perform routine preventative maintenance and fault
isolation in case of failure. Initially this testing was performed manually by a test engineer
using laboratory equipments. But, as test articles became faster, more complex, more compact,
and the volume of testing increased, manual checkout became infeasible.
Digital processors provided the ideal solution to keeping pace with state-of-the-art
developments in electronic systems since digital techniques are largely employed in space flight
and ground based equipments. Further, digital processing enables man to take advantage of the
speed, decision making, consistency, repeatability, and other of its attributes as described in
Paragraph 5.4.1.
The number and types of automatic checkout equipments are many but all have a
very basic common functional design and operation. Figure 5.4.6 illustrates this design. The
test environment consists of a test article, test equipment, and man. The man/machine inter-
fo enables the man to select, setup, initiate, monitor and control the test sequence. The con-
tool and decision function performs a precisely timed sequence of stimuli and measurements
designed to exercise the test article according to performance and acceptance criteria. The
stimuli and measurement interfaces respond to commands from the control and decision unit to
produce stimuli and perform measurements respectively. The measurements are evaluated by the
contvoi and decision unit. Out-of-tolerance conditions are recorded and displayed via the
man/machine interface. Usually the first level of testing is a general functional test. When
out-of-tolerance conditions are detected, special fault isolation programs are envoked to
resolve the problem. Fault isolation equates somewhat to status resolution in redundancy verifi-
cation.
Most automatic test sets today are designed around a general purpose real time
digital computer. The type of computer is determined by such requirements ass
g
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e Memory Access Time
e Word Length
e Instruction Repertoire
e inpuVOutput Characteristics
e Standard Peripheral Equipments Available
e Support Syste;ns Software Available
The special peripheral hardware that comprises the stimilusfineasurement subsystem
is usually comprised of commercial ly'ovailable off-the-shelf hardware; universal computer
interfaces, channel multiplexers, digital-to-analog converters, an-cilog-to- digital converters,
digital voltmeters and programmable power supplies are but a few.
Digital CRT display and keyboard terminals, teletypewriter units, and control panels
provide the usual operator interface.
Core memory, disc file, and magnetic tape provide the data and program storage
media.
ProgramrrFng aids for automatic testing have been developed but are generally highly
specialized. The development of automatic checkout languages has evolved around the idea of
providing the test engineer with an on-line capability to write and execute short test programs
in a test oriented interpretive macro language.
5.5	 Summary of the Process
A great deal of material has been covered in this section and before beginning a
new subject it is important that this material be coalesced. In addition, the preceding
sections have not necessarily followed a chronological development, for clarity of presentation
was given precedence over chronology in the order of presentation. This section will take into
account the time dependence of the various activities. The reader is also referred to a case
study in Section 7.0 for an example of the process.
5.5.1	 Establishing the Framework
Initial efforts in the design will consist of iwo parallel activities; partitioning the
principal system and resolution of the higher level group problem. principal system partitioning
is identified as an initial activity, for it is here that the problem can first be divided into
smaller, more manageable problems and the true scope of the process is first' manifested. Together
with the required design confidence, the quantity of different confidence levels to be consid-
ered and the general group lever guidelines; the partitioned system marks the definition of the
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set and group problems. Having identified groups and sets, the design ca n now concentrate on
specific points within the principal system for signal characteristic identification and properties
indicative of operation. In addition, with the groups and sets parceled out, the status relation-
ship of output properties and time profile information can be directly related to the functions of
interest, This will allow assessment of each set and group on its own merits.
Resolution of the higher level group problem provides the verification design an
ovarviow and initial, gross direction . This activity establishes the method of status reporting
and four general design philosopbl--^; method of status resolution, use of, and relationship to,
a central processor (and/or satellite processors), policy of treating off-line equipments and plans
for achieving isolation/independence of the verification equipment.
	
5.5,2
	
The General Group Problem
With the groups identified by partitioning and the general policies and philosophies
established, verification design of the groups can begin. Drawing on this information, verifica-
tion design for a group essentially amounts to selecting the deductive process or combination of
the deductive process, viz., exhaustive, iterative, logical deduction. These processes are
selected on the basis of signals, design confidence and functional relationships of the elements
and sets within the group. It should be borne in mind that, ultimately, the output of each group
must be considered before the verification of elements/sets within that group can begin. As
such, the techniques of Section 5.5.3 will also be applicable to groups in this regard. Also,
groups higher than first order will usually contain sets and the group design will certainly
dictate the handling of these sets. It is not unusual, however, that the requirements of a set
design can reflect up the chain to impact group decisions. From this standpoint, once partition-
ing is complete, the group and set problems can be solved in parallel - with the group problem
typica lly taking the dominant, if not necessarily the most time consuming, role.
	
5.5.3
	
The Set Problem
As a consequence of partitioning and any additional constraints established in the
solution of the group problem (Section 5.5.2 above), verification design of the sets can begin.
From the functional description of the set and the redundancy classification, the method of
addressing the output is established, viz.,
• Comparison of Output to Output
• Comparison of Output to Reference
(output signals and their absolute properties)
• Comparison of Output to Input
(output signals as they relate to element input and as input/output relates to
element operation)
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4-* )From these three categories and the statistical nature of the signal properties identified as
indicative of element operation, the applicability matrix is consulted for candidate coincide
development techniques. Using the statement of design confidence, time profiles (where
necessary) and the capabilities and limitations of the candidate Coincidence development
techniques, the technique is chosen which best matches the requirements.
With the coincidence development technique 1 dentifiod a parameter estimation
technique must now be selected. This is basically a task of identifying a performance criteria-
(or criteria in some cases) which best describes the operational integrity of the element/set
being verified based on the functional description of the element being verified, the output
signal and frequently, the functional description of the immediately surceedinr, element.
The parameter estimation technique provides a status variable which is indicative,
the operating integrity of the item being verified (iBV). Using the relationship of the signal
properties to status, a mapping function is next designed to translate the values of the status
variable into discrete values of conditional status. It should bi noted that if the status varia[-A
consists of a compound performance criterion (e.g., integral squared error, volts squared per
cycle) the translation into conditional status will involve more than the basic signal property
relationships to status. The reader is also reminded that a single simple set can require sever
status variables. Consequently, a typical mapping approach will consist of two levels of
threshold (or equivalent) decisions. Once a means of obtaining conditional status for each IS'
is established, the process must return to the higher level group problem for solution of the start.
resolution problem. Along these same lines, it is possible that any of the techniques above co,.,
be implemented on a digital processor. This should be borne in mind and if this implementatiol.
is selected, the problem again essentially becomes one for solution at the higher level group
with requirements passed along from the set solution.
5.5.4
	
Design Outputs
The final automated redundancy verification design should provide;
• A means of status reporting
• A status resolution function
• An implementation that is, within all practicability, independent of the
principal system
• A high confidence in the status being reported
o Minimum changes to the principal system or the tenant signals
IF
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	6.4	 DEVELOPMENT OF DESIGN CRITERIA AND iDENTINCATION OF NEW
	
T
TECHNOLOGY
it is the purpose here to address, in particular, redundant situations which may be
"unveriFi:Ade". The goal of this investigation is to point out means by which such situations
may be avoided, including the elimination of troublesome practices from use, and the employ-
ment of new technological means for changing these practices into an acceptable form.
	
6.1
	 Ve ri fi abi l
It is important to realize at the start that, while some redundant situations are, in
a strict sense, not verifioble, many other situations may be considered unverifiable from the
standpoint that a sufficiently high Level of confidence in the verification cannot be established,
or from the standpoint that the allowable or available verification equipment is incapable of
deriving or -fully utilizing the information available in the signal . To illustrate the former
situation, consider the Example of a diode which is at all times forward biased, Then the
observation of its output signal is simply inadequate for the evaluation of its operational
integrity, although there may be nothing about its physical situation which makes it unverifi-
able . An example, of the latter si tuation is the case of "hardwired" element outputs . While
such element outputs are not distinguishable in a voltage sense (they are voltage-common),
they are disringuishable in a current sense (they are current-add tive). How,Jver, unless
verification equipment is capnble of extracting this current information, the situation must be
considered to be unverifiable. Also the sensitivity r accura cy of verification equipmentY	 Y
may determine the verifiability of a situation. One could easily imagine an occurrence of
redundancy wherein the output of a redundant set varied as the number of properly functioning
elements within the set, but where this variation was so small thc4,t laboratory-grade equipment
would by required to sense it. It would be possible then that this case would be classed as
,;nveri fiable on the grounds that proper verification equipment was not available.
it is seen that a statement of verifiability must be taken in the context of what is
required of the verification process and of the capabilities of the verification equipment.
By considering the group problem, one realizes that the only occurrence which would
lead to an unverifiable group situation but whose effect would not be seen in the set problem is
the necessity for sequential switching if iterative deduction is to be used. It is reasonable to
expect that this method will not be employed unless such switching is or can be provided. The
lack of switching capabilities will not be considered a roadblock to verification since methods
other than iterative deduction are available. Therefore, only those things which cause
unverifiabil'ify ih simple sets need be considered.
There are, then, basically four ways in which a situation may become classed as
unverifiable
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I .	 The features of the principal system which are important to the verification
process may be such that the situation is placed it redundancy class H .
2. The electrical points of interest in the principal system may be inaccessible
to the verification equipment.
3. The signal available for verification may be inadequate for establishing the
required verification confidence.
4. There may exist basic incompatibilities between principal system and
verification equipments.
It may be noted that, by expressing these as the only possible paths to unverifi-
ability, an implicit assumption has been made. This assumption, which has been invoked
earlier in the study, is that, given the pro per output signal from the redundant items and the
capability in verification equipment to analyze the information in this signal, any given level
of verification confidence can be established. That is, all the information necessary to
establish a given level of verification confidence may be obtained from the proper output
signal . This may mean, of course, the necessity of providing the input which corresponds to
this proper output.
To discover why the situations of class H are termed unverifiable, one may list all
the possible combinations of the four redundancy features which define the redundancy classes
and examine those combinations comprising class H . When this is done, it is noted that two
occurrences can be responsible for the classification . Firstly, if the set output does not vary
detectably with the number of operational elenents in the set and the output/effects of each
element are not distinguishable, there is simply no way to identify any malfunction, either on
a set or on an element basis. Secondly, if the failure detect scheme demands an indication of
the status of each element but the outputs/ effects of each element are not distinguishable,
requirements of the verification process cannot be met
While the statements above concern the existence of proper senor element outputs,
it is certainly true that their extence is not sufficient and that they must be made available
cs inputs to the verification equipment. This question may reduce to one of simply providing
for the physical connection of verification equipment to principal system equipment or of
bringing out the necessary signals for verification to a point that is geographically accessible
to verification equipment. Whereas the problem of these outputs existing is one of concept,
configuration, and redundancy policy, the problem of accessibility is one of providing the
proper principal system equipment features and of packaging
If the signal available for verification is insufficient to establish the desired
verification confidence, no verification equipment can compensate for the inadequacy. The
meaning here is that the element or set output does not contain all the information necessary
for verification to a given level of confidence. Recall the example of the diode which is not
reverse-biased by the signal through it.
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fOn a very practical basis, it may happen that there are incompatibilities between
principal system equipment and verification equipment. These incompatibilities may be either
physical or electrical in nature . If principal system equipment were not tolerant of electrical
loading by verification equipment, an electrical incompatibility would exist. If element out-
puts were hardwired together in a printed circuit board implementation, current-sense distin-
guishable outputs would exist. However, if only current probes were available to extract the
information, an incompatibility would exist which would render the situation unverifiable.
Because these are the four ways in which an unverifiable situation may arise, it is
the avoidance of these situations to which design criteria should be addressed and the alteration
of these situations to which the development of new technology should be addressed.
In examining the first of these areas, the placing of a redu idancy situation into
class H, it is necessary to ask what practical factors result ir, such a classification. Assuming
that the requirements of the failure defect scheme are fixed and may not be compromised, the
placement of a given situation into class H is entirely dependent on the manner in which element
outputs are combined. However, if the different methods for combination are listed, including
hardwiring, majority voting, sense -and-switch arrangement, etc., it is seen that only one
method, that of hardwiring element outputs, destroys voltage-sense distinguishability of
element outputs, and this method provides current-sense distinguishable element outputs. In
fact then, the concern is not for whether distinguishable outputs exist, but whether they are
available to and usable by the verification equipment. Obviously, too, the redundancy
configurations requiring the greatest attention here are those employing hardwired outputs.
6.2	 Design Criteria
It is desired here to establish design criteria which, whem imposed on redundant
equipments, help insure that those equipments may be verified in an automated fashion. These
criteria should be viewed as standards of judgement or decision thresholds to be applied to the
characteristics of principal system equipment. No unique set of such criteria may be
constructed. This is because of the dependence of what is required of equipment being
verified upon what is required of the verification process and also because of the fact that
sew, ral different c;oml?^nations of characteristics in principal system equipment may be capable
of satisfying the needs of verification . For examp!e, verification requires either distinguishable
element outputs or a suitable set output but generally not both This clearlys shows the
influence of requirements placed on the verification process. It is, therefore, necessary to
set forth a number of criteria and identify wrnen each should be imposed and when each may be
i gnored .
In order to avoid the placement of a redundant situation into Class H, one of
three criteria must be met . These are
1. The outputs from redundant items shall be distinguishable, one from the
other.
2. The output from a set of redundant items shall vary according to the number
of operable items in the set.
3. From each redundant item theca shall be provided an output which is in
addition to and isolated from the signal throughput path .
Any requirement that the status of individual redundant items be determined immediately means
that the first or the third of these criteria must be imposed . In other cases, the satisfaction of
any one criterion will be satisfactory. in Number 1, above, "Distinguishable" must be inter-
preted with regard to the capabilities of verification equipment and may be specifically stated
as "voltage-sense distinguishable" if current sensing equipment is not available . In Number 2,
above,"shall vary" must also be interpreted in the context of verification equipment capabilities.
Both the type and magnitude of the variation must be observable by the coincidence development
equipment. Criterion Number 1 needs only be met during the period of actual verification and,
where continuous verification is not o necessity, switching could be used to satisfy the require-
ment during verification. Number 3 represents the inclusion of additional features in the design
of principal system equipment expressly for the purpose of enabling verification.
To make sure that the electrical points of interest are physically accessible, the
following criteria may be presented.
4. Access to the output of each redundant item shal I be provided .
5 . Access to the combined output of redundant items shall be provided.
6. Access to such points as are determined to be necessary for the injection
of verification signals shall be provided
In general, it should be required that Number 4 be satisfied when satisfaction of either of
Numbers 1 or 3 is required. Number 5 should be required when, of the first three criteria, the
satisfaction of only Number 2 is sufficient. The satisfaction of N•un;,ber 6 should always be
required.
In all of criteria 4, 5 and 6 access may be provided either by simply allowing for the
attachment of verification equipment or by "bringing out" signals for verification to a point
at which interface with verification equipment may be conveniently accomplished.
No design criteria have been established to assure that the signal for verification -
is adequate to establish the desired level of verification confidence . I t would be unreasonable
to flatly require this capability of the tenant signal, since a conflict with its primary goal,
that of transferring intelligence might arise; and, if an injected signal were used for verification
one should assume that such a signal would be designed to fulfill its purpose
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The following criteria may be set forth to avoid the occurrence of incompatibilities
between equipment being verified and verification equipment:
7. Principal system equipment shall be tolerant of effects of verification equipment
such as electrical loading.
8. Accesses provided in the satisfaction of criteria 4, 5, or 6 shall be in a form
acceptable to verification equipment.
It is deemed unwise to set quantitative limits on the effect to be tolerated as
mentioned in Number 7. If, for example, limits  were set on loading effects according to the
worst case to be expected from verification equipment, a requirement which would be overly
stringent in a majority of cases would be established. If tolerance to the minimum loading to be
expected from verification equipment were used as a limit, the result could be that verification
equipment presenting a greater load than the minimum would be unusable
It is necessary, too, to require that information made available to verification
equipment be provided in a form usable by that equipment. For example, element outputs might
be brought out of a unit by fiber optics and presented in the form of amplitude modulated light.
Though all the information be present, if the veri ication equipment could noi ,
 accept it in this
form, verification would not be possible. If verification requires access to current information,
the provision of access to voltage information would not be satisfactory.
Numbers 7 and 8 should both be applied to every set of equipment.
The discussions above have shown that some knowledge of equipment to be verified
and requirements on the verifi cation
 p,-acess must be available to allow the intelligent imposition
of these criteria. Included are:
1. Whether the status of individual elements is required.
2. Whether the level of confidence attainable by using the tenant signal is
sufficient.
3. Whether continuous verificatit,-^^:, i,, r°}'tquired.
4. What types and magnitudes of signal variation the verification equipment is
_sensi ti ve to .
5. Acceptable forms of input to the verification equipment.
6. Confidence level required of the verification process.
The design criteria generated have been concerned with three primary areas of
application.
I.
Area A - the avoidance of placing a situation into redundancy class H; consists
of criteria 1, 2, and 3.
Area B - providing to verification equipment access to the necessary electrical
locations; consists of criteria 4, 5, and 6.
Area C - avoiding incompatibilities between equipment being verified and
verification equipment; consists of design criteria 7 and 8.
In the most general case it is necessary that any one criteria from Area A must be
satisfied, that one of criteria 4 and 5 must be satisfied, and that all of criteria 6, 7, and 8 must
be satisfied. The comments accompanying the introduction of 'these criteria, above, will aid
in identifying  when requirements should be different from those of the general case .
The criteria presented here appear in a form consistent with NHB 8040.2 in
Appendix D.
6.3
	
New Technology
there have been identified four ways in which a redundant situation may come to
be considered unverifiable, and there have been presented design criteria aimed at preventing
the classification of these situations as unverifiable . It is the purpose here to investigate by
the application of what new technologies the occurrence of unverifiable situations may be
avoided .
Realizing }hat these new technological developments must be used as aids in
complying with the design criteria, the major areas of concern are the provision of distinguish-
able element outputs and the provision of access to the electrical points of interest. Again,
attention is focused on situations which employ hardwired element outputs. Also, when the
problem of adapting existing equipment to verification is considered, technologies which allow
the derivation of signal information for verification without major alteration to the equipment
being verified becomes important
Addressing the situation of hardwired outputs, there are two ways to alleviate the
problem . One may either contrive another method of combining outputs which p1"ClIvides voltage-
sense distinguishability or devise means for deriving information from current flowing in the
outputs
Semiconductor technology is the likely area for development of a new w.hnique
for combining the outputs of redundant elements. The object would be to construct a device
which retains, at its inputs, separate and distinguishable (in a voltage sense) signals, yet
employs no switching or voting to develop its output and meets the success criteria that if one
element of the seat is operable, set operation will be proper. This devicemight, in fact,
function as a combination of parallel isolation devices whose outputs are voltage-common As
a minimum, such devices should be developed to handle two and three inputs. Naturally, it
should be true that failures in the device do not cause total loss of set output. 0
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The derivation of current information is perhaps a more attractive solution to the
problem and, in fact, the extension of some existing technologies offer promise . There are at
least five types of devices which are candidates for this function. They are current transformers,
light-emitting diodes, grain-of-wheat lamps, ferrite core devices, and Hall-effect devices,
Current transformers are currently used as sensing devices for clip-on ammeters and
voltmeters and are often referred to as current probes, They operate by sensing vol toges induced
by the electromagnetic field of a current-carrying conductor. The characteristics of a presently-
used current probe are Iisted below to represent typical values.
Sensitivity
Frequency Response
I nput I mpedonce
1 mV/mA +1% at 1 kHz
t2%, 100 Hz to 3 MHz;
+5%, 60 Hz to 4 MHz;
-3 dB < 25 Hz and > 20 MHz
< 50 m52 in series with 0.05 pH
The major disadvantage of these devices include their susceptibility to stray electromagnetic
energy, and their restriction to use with certain forms of conductors. For example, they cannot
be used when stripl ine or coaxial cable are the transmission medium . Also, the achievement
of high sensitivity may impose a requirement for a power supply for the probe itself. They may,
however, be easily retrofitted in some cases.
Light-emitting diodes are of great interest for current-sensing purposes. Models
are presently available which offer essentially linear outpLt-intensity/throughput-current
characteristics over an appreciable current range .
Typical ranges of values for Gallium Arsenide emitters care listed below..
0
Output Wavelength
	 9000A
Output Po,^vzr
Total Device Dissipation
Maximum Continuous Forward
Current
fi
Forward Dynamic Resistance
Maximum Reverse Voltage
Forward 'Voltage Drop
200 pW - 1.5 mW
150 m W
150 mA 1 .5A
0.20- 1.552
3V
1 - 2.5V
6-7
The use of these devices offers a great deal of isolation between the equipment being verified
and the verification equipment (up to 10" Ohms). These devices are :necessarily placed in line
with the signal being verified. While this means that provision for verification must be made
before the fact, these devices may be made very reliable and, since the probability is high
that when they fail it will be in such a way that the through signal current will not be inter-
rupted, their being placed in line will not seriously affect principal system reliability. Gallium
Arsenide and Gallium Arsenide Phosphide diodes are presently available for application up to
the 30-50 MHz range. Because these are diodes, in many redundancy verification applications
it would be necessary to employ two emissive diodos paralleled with opposite polarities. in
this way, both positive and negative portions of the signal wi ll be transmi tted as light.
Great flexibility s afforded in the transmission of derived information since it may
be transmitted either by fiber optics in the form of light or immediately detected by a photo-
conductive device to establish an electrical signal for transmission. It would be profitable to
develop unitized modules containing two photocoupled pairs (emitters and detectors) to derive
current-proportional information from hardwired element outputs. Such devices could be made
to be inexpensive, rugged, and impervious to interference from surrounding equipment.
The major shortcomings of these light-emitting diodes are their sensitivity to
temperature variations and their forward voltage drop. The relative intensity of their emissions
may vary by a factor of 6 between -500C and 1200C and the form of this variation is dependent
on forward current in the device. The forward voltage drop, which can usually be minimized
to 1 .3V, could easily be intolerable in some implementations .
The third candidate device is the grain-of-,wheat lamp . This is simply an excep-
tionally small tungsten filament lamp which may be placed in line to sense current. because
the device has a relatively long decay time, it must be viewed as an integrator and should be
used as an indicator of rms current. However, there is practically no upper limit on frequency
response of these lamps.
 I t is true that these devices fail to an open condition and by their
failing would destroy the output of the redundant element they were monitoring. However,
by operating at low current levels, their expected life can be thousands of hours and, whenever
this reliability is great compared to that of the element being monitored, overall reliability
will not be affected. As wi th l ight-emitting diodes the derived information may either be
transmitted in the form of light or detected and transmitted electrically.
Ferrite core indicators offer another passible means for sensing current but are
limited to the sensing of do currents . These indicators consist of primary and secondary windings
on a toroidal ferrite core. The do current to be sensed is passed through the center of the
toroid and an ac signal is supplied to the primary windings. Monitoring the amplitude and phase
of the voltage at the secondary windings reveals the magnitude and direction of the do current
of interest. Devices such as this have proved their capability to sense currents from 5 to 300mA.
The major disadvantages of these devices, aside from their limitation to do sensing, are the
requirement for an ac signal source and restrictions on the conductor configurations to which they
may be applied
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Hall-effect devices may be used to sense current in either of two ways. The device
may be placed in line with the current to be detected and an external magnetic field applied.
The voltage developed across the device transverse to the current flow is then proportional to
that current. Alternatively, the device may be placed in the air gap of a magnetic collar which
surrounds the conductor carrying the signal for verification. An input signal is supplied to the
device and an output signal is derived which contains information from the signal for verification.
In fact, this is an alternate form of current probe. The former of these two implementations
requires the supplying of a magnetic field, the latter an external power source . The use of
the device in line would probably not result in sensitive detection. The magnetic collar
implementa(;on should provide sensitive detection, but would be restricted in the conductor
configurations with which it could be used.
Of the methods discussed above, current transformers, ferrite core indicators, and
current probe implementations using Hall-effect devices all offer sensing without electrical
connection to the circuit under investigation. Such ability could be of immeasurable worth in
the verification of existing equipment wherein the opportunity for electrical connection to
the circuit does not exist. Therefore, these areas should be expanded and tailored for employ-
ment in the verification of redundancy. Any additional techniques having this capability
should also be investigated and developed.
Also identified as an area for development is the use of multiplexing techniques
for gaining access to electrical points important to the verification process. That is, using
already existing conductors for the transport of coincidence and status variables. Power supply
conductors should be included as a possibility.
In the area of redundancy verification equipment, it has been realized from the
case study that there exists a need for sampling spectrum analyzers with extended capabilities . 	 YAK
Present analyzers are limited in the upper end of their frequency range by their maximum
sampling rate. Also, time required for verification is increased by the processing time inherent
in these machines. The processing time is dependent not only on sampling rate but also on the
time required for the generation of an autocorrelation function and the Fourier analysis of this
function.
Because of the power of the spectral analysis technique and the often-desired
advantages of sampling, the availability of more capable sampling spectrum analyzers is an
attractive prospect.
6.4
	
Technology Development Plan
Four major areas for technological development have been identified. These are:
1	 Techniques for sensing current and for sensing without electrical connection.
2. Devices for combining element outputs in a voltage-common manner while
retaining voltage-sense distinguishability at some point in the circuit
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3. Techniques for multiplexing verification information onto existing
conductors .
4. Construction of sampling spectral analyzers with extended capabilities,
These four areas are essentially independent and future efforts in these areas may be highly
divorced from each other. A technology development plan, then, should consist of four major
branches which may proceed in parallel Each of these branches will be discussed individually
below .
6.4.1
	
Current Sensors and "No-Touch" Sensing
Development in this area should include investigation into the possibility of over-
coming the limitarions of presently available devices and the establishment of a family of such
devices to fill the existing gap. Elements of such a development are given in flow chart form
in Figure 6.4.1-1 and are identified and explained immediately below,
Task 1 .	 Investigate the practicality of reducing temperature sensitivity in
photocoupled pairs, producing integrated bipolar combinations, and
reducing forward voltage drop in photoemissi ve diodes.
Task 2.	 Inveoigate the practicality of extending ferrite core devices for use in
sensing ac and for use with difficult conductor configurations such as
stripl ine and coaxial cables .
Task 3. Investigate the practicality of improving the efficiency of Hall-effect
devices, of altering undesirable chorocteristics, and of adapting their
use as current probes to difficult conductor configurations
Task 4.	 Investigate the practicality of improving the efficiency of current
transformers and adapting them for use with difficult conductor config-
urations.
Task 5.	 Establish suitable families for the devices according to frequency and
current ranges . That is porti tion the ranges of frequency and current
to be accommodated into segments which can be covered by a single
member from a family of devices.
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Task 6.	 Evaluate the effect of devices on principal system reliability. Here the
consideration of whether or not the device is used in line with the tenant
signal must come into play.
Task 7.	 Generate estimates of development time for the devices with altered
characteristics .
PHOTOEMISSIVE AND PHOTOCONDUCTIVE DEVICES
Figure 6.4.1-1 . 	 Development Plan Current and "No Touch" Sensing Devices
I
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Task 8.	 Investigate the existence of other techniques for sensing which meet
requirements. if such techniques are identified, bring the state of
knowledge concerning them to a level equal with that concerning the
devices identified herein as candidates
Task 9.	 From all the information gathered in earlier tasks, compare the various
techniques and devices to develop a maximally efficient approach to
providing the capabilities desired. The resulting approach may include
the actual development of several different types of devices.
Task 10. Produce prototypes of the devices.
Task 11. Test and develop to production-ready sxatus the prototype models.
Task 12. Disseminate information on new devices orjl techniques.
It is estimated that to accomplish Tasks 1 throuq, 8, above, will require 4-6 months
of intensive effort. The time required for Tasks 9 through 12' is estimated at 8-10 months, though
time required to develop prototypes could cause gross deviation from this estimate .
Of the four manor branches for technological development, this first is the most
important and promises the greatest return on investment.	 1
6.4.2	 Devices for Combining Element Outputs
The second branch of the development plan, that for devices to be used to combine
element outputs, ranks second in importance and consists of five serl es steps detailed below.
Task 1 .
	 Develop a concept for a device to fulfill needs in this area as
described previously
To yA 2 .	 Compare such a device against alternate methods of athieving the
voltage-common combination of isolated element outputs.
Task 3.	 Contingent on a favorable decision in 2, above, establish characteristics
for the members of a family of combining devices.
Trask 4.	 Design, produce, and test prototype devices.
Task 5 .
	 Disseminate information on the new devices.
The estimated time to accomplish these five tasks is 8-10 months.
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6,4.3	 Multiplexing Techniques
The third branch of the development plan, the establishment of techniques for
multiplexing verification information onto existing conductors ranks third in importance and is
comprised of six series tasks. These are:
Task 1 .	 Identify types of signal paths available for the multiplexing, discover
the features of these paths which are important to the multiplexing
process, aril identify roadblocks to the multiplexed information.
Task 2.	 Study, enumerate mid invent techniques for bypassing the identified
signal roadb' -ices
Task 3.	 Evaluate the techniques of 2, obi.-,ve . Establish statements of limitatiurn,
Task 4.	 Identify technologies required for implementation of techniques.
Task 5.	 Develop identified technologies.
Task 6.	 Disseminate information
It is estimated that the. completion of the first four of these tasks would require
4-6 months, Because of the dependency of Task 5 on preceding tasks, it is impossible to
estimate further .
	
6.4.4	 Sam ling Spectrum Analyzers
The fourth branch of the plan is the development of sampling spectrum analyzers
having extended capabilities. No detailed plan has been developed here. There are two
reasons for this: it is certain that segments of private industry are in full pursuit of this goal;
and it is felt that pursuit of the other three branches of the plan will be more rewarding than
the expedition of developments in this area which would result from the dedication of additional
funds .
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7.0	 A CASE STUDY
A case study was perform.-id of the design of Redundancy Verification for a hypothet-
ical communication system. The technical description of the hypothetical system used for the
case study is given in Appendix B, The experience of the design team and the resulting redun-
dacy verification design is given in Appendix C.
The purpose of conducting the case study has been threefold..
a. To show proof of redundancy verification methodology;
b . To sound out the methodology for weak areas and possible oversights, and
c . To provide an illustrative example of the redundancy verification design
process.
To realize these ends, the case study closely followed the design process and imple-
mentation considerations of Redundancy Verification in Section 5.0.
7.1	 The Hypothetical System
Rather than use an existing system on which to perform the case study, a hypothetical
system was developed for several reasons. Firstly, it was felt that the system should be of
limited scope so that a reasonably , complete design could be performed in the allotted time.
Secondly, a hypothetical system gives greater freedom in choosing redundancy schemes and
operating conditions so that more classes of redundancy verification techniques could be exer-
cised Thirdly, preconceived notions (and sacred cows) could be avoided by the designers and
by those cr itiq eing The design.
The system developed for the case study is a Hypothetical Communications Down
Link Earth Receiving Subsystem (HCDL-ERS). The Earth Receiving Subsystem is located at one
of three stations equally spaced in longitude around the world.
The purpose of the HCDL-ERS is to receive information from a fixed, manned moon
base vio an S-Band link, convert this information to baseband and feed the baseband signals to
the proper distribution buses. The S-Band carriers contain commercial-grade video, a one
megabit per second telemetry channel, a voice channel consisting of five frequency multiplexed
circuits, and an emergency telemetry channel. The case study is limited to the receiving
System of the earth station. The microwave feed subsystem, the servo electronics and other
auxiliary equipment are not considered part of the earth receiving subsystem for purposes of this
case study. The HCDL-ERS system parame,ers and operating profile, were chosen to be reasonable
and practical. The receiving subsystem of the Unified S-Band Apollo communications system was
used as a guide to assure practicality. However, it is worth reiterating that the system, described
in Appendix B should not be judged per se; it is a vehicle for performing the redundancy verifica-
tion case study. The personnel who developed the HCDL-ERS were not members of the Redundant,
'	 Verification design team. They did, however, provide additional system details as the desigh
team recognized the need for them. 7-1
7.2	 Redundancy Verification Design
The 2eeundancy Verification design team was composed of three experienced sys;-em
design engineers. One had been a member of the study team who developed the Redundancy
Verification techniques. The others became familiar with Redundancy Verification techniques
by reading the published reports. The following instructions were given at the redundancy veri-
fication design kickoff meeting. The case study must ovolve through the developed process,
using the developed methodology. It is imperative that the verification redundancy terminology
be used consistently aw-=d throughout , the case study. The design is not to simply be a passive
effort to fit the subsystem as detailed. So long as the :subsystem functions are performed in the
proper time reference, a ,,erification design can be expected to require additions and modifi-
cations to a system--especir lly in the areas of redundancy tie points, redundancy configurations
and signal insertion/extraction. The scope of the design is to be such that reliability and cost
tradeoffs can be performed and some confidence statements can be developed.,Design decisions
must be justified.
After a brief orientation period during which the design team tended to encumber
themselves with end of the design details, they were directed to begin at the begi nn, ng of the
Redundancy Verification Design PrQc-,ss. The design then proceeded extremely smoothly. They
found that the Design Process was very effective. From time to time the team requested additional
detai Is concerning system signal charocteristics when the information furnished originally proved
inadequate. After a few days, the partitioning was completed, the signals were classified, and
the coincidence development techniques were chosen. The bulk of the design team effort was
then spent in determining the best i^ardware configuration to perform the redundancy verification.
An informal design review was held which was attended also by the principal investigator of the
Redundancy Verification Technique Study and by the persons who developed the HCDL •-ERS. The
redundancy verification design team did recommend changes in the HCDL-ERS. Usually these
included a change in the method of implementing the redundancy. They were not permitted, nor
did they feel it was necessary, to change all of the redundancy to simple set form. In every
instance the design team had come up with a feasible method of implementing the redundancy
verification. Some suggestions were made for alternative implementation schemes in a few cases.
Of these one or two were adopted.
Generally it may be concluded the experience of the case study has been most
.gratifying. The three goals were met. The Design Process proved most adequate. Feasible hard-
ware implementations were obtained. (The availability of through variable (flow) sensors would
have permitted hard wired outputs which would have simplified the implementation in some cafes . )
The design team, inexperienced in redundancy verification design, was able to work smoothly
together.
Aft
''	
t{
t
8.0
	
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
in the course of Phase I through III of this study, the examinations of redundancy
and the verification thereof have revealed a number of important facts.
8.1	 Conclusions
Redundancy may be characterized, for the purpose of verification, by four features.
Based on the-s ,5 four features, eight redundancy classes about which general and categorical
statements may be made, can be established. The placing of an occurrence of redundancy into
one of then: classes is by no means a suf 1.-ient description to allow the choice of a verification
method. Information concerning the characteristics and properties of the output signal is also
required. Where the use of the tenant signal for verification is not satisfactory ', that is, where
the desired level of confidence in the operational integrity of the redundant equipment cannot
be thus established, the use of symbiotic, idle, or simulative signals must ba considered. By
definition, simulai'ive signals negate the possibility of continuous verification.
The problem of redundancy verification has been shown to be most profitably viewed
as a segment of the overall status identification problem.
11 , has br;en seen that, for verification purposes, redundancy situations may be
placed in one of two categories. Namely, a given collection of redundant items should be con
,--,^	 sidered to be either a group or a spat, the approaches applying to the two problems being quite
different.
The verification process consists of five distinct functions: coincidence develop-
ment, parameter estimation, mapping to conditional status, status resolution, and status re-
porting. Two of these functions, parameter estimation and status resolution, may, in special
instances, be greatly simplified or even eliminated. The conditions under which this may occur
have been determined.
The five constituent{ functions of redundancy verification have been individually
examined.
Exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories can and have been established for
methods of implementing the coincidence development function. This function interfaces with
the equipment being verified and it is significant that there is no class of coincidence develop-
ment techniques the use of which negates the possibility of continuous verification. Bases of
comparison and selection among various coincidence development have been identified to
include the number of failure types detectable, the ability to identify failure type, the degree of
specialization to the equipment being verified, sharability, complexity, amenability to digital
implementation, sources of errors, restrictions on minimum sampling rate, assistance in sta tus
resolution, and sensitivity to unsymmetrical redundancy._ A design process for the selection of
a coincidence development technique has been defined and the required inputs to the design
have been determined.
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IThe function of parameter estimation has been seen to be influential and compli-
cated, it is capable of restricting design confidence to a level below the maximum offered by a
given coincidence development technique and a given signal for verification,
Mapping to conditional status is a comparatively uncomplicated process to imple•
anent, though design decisions on the intierpreta lt lon of status variable values may be involved.
The states resolution function is usually a member of the group problem but may
sometimes be eliminated as an entity through a proper choice of coincidence development tech-
niques. For large groups of equipment, the need for status resolution may require the employ-
ment of a central processor.
An overall design process for redundancy verificaion has been detailed„ A case
study has been carried out in order to exercise and test the presented methodology. The stt,4y
affirmed the presented methodolgy and design process.
It has been determined that restrictions on the number of status levels achievable
are determined by two factors; q?.iantization in the verification process and the number of
dimensions allowed the status variable
The reasons for needing continuous verification hove been identified. They are
the criticality of failures, the importance of unidentified false information, and the need to
repair immediately upon failure. An investigation of the need for continuous verification has
provided tools for determining the suitability of substituting periodic verification. The tenant
signal should always be considered first as a signal for verification so that the possibility for
continuous verification may be retained.
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The things which make an occurrence of redundancy unverifiable (in some context)
are the following:
a. The possession of characteristics which force the redundancy situation into
class H. This occurs when a neither distinguishable element outputs nor a
set output which varies delectably with the number of operational elements and
exist or (b) when the failure detect scheme requires an indication of the
status of each element but distinguishable element outputs do not exist,
b The lack of availability of the required electrical locations.
c. The absence of a signal suitable for verification purposes.
d. Interface proUems between principal system equipment and verification
equipment.
The term "verifiable" must be interpreted in the context of required verification
confidence and difficulty of implementing the verification. A given redundant configuration
may well be ;;urifiable only if a very low level of confidence is required or only through the
use of very complicated, sophistic.ated, or even exotic verification equipment.
Likewise, "distinguishable element outputs" must be interpreted in light of the
capabilities of allowed and available verification equipment. Hardwired element outputs,
while not distinguishable in a voltage sense, may be considered so in a current sense so long
as current sensors are available to make use of this distinguishability.
Design criteria for principal system equipments have been generated. These are
standards of judgment for evaluating the adaptability of these equipments to automated Verifi-
cation. The particular criteria to be applied in a given situation must be a function of what
is to be required of the verification process, such as the identification of failed elements or
the "exercising" of certain elements.
The areas of current sensing and sensing without physical connection to redundant
circuitry are the most important technological areas as regards the establishment of increased
adaptability to automated verification. The development of isolation devices having particular
characteristics and of new techniques for the combining of outputs from redundant items would
also prove profitable.
8.2	 Recommendations
As a result of the investigations of Phase I, II, and IIi of this study, the following
recommendations are made.
Inputs to the redundancy verification design which concern required levels of
verification confidence, the required number of levels of verification confidence, and time
profiles should be provided in the early design stages of principal system equipments. These
factors should be allowed to influence system and tenant signal design.
The equipment designer should be required to justify a need for continuous veri-
fication, particularly when associated with a high level of verification confidence. This is
recommended as a cost-effective measure in light of the equipment savings which are often
commensurate with the relaxation of a requirement for continuous verification. A similar
requirement too justify a high level of confidence would also be a cost-effective measure.
The function of parameter estimation should be investigated to the extent that
coincidence development has been. A general organization and explanation of the techniques,
or classes thereof, should be provided to the designer of verification equipments.
The influences of redundancy verification requirements on a redundancy design
have been pointed out. These influences have given rise to the desirability of considering
the relative advantages and disadvantages of redundancy designs in their own right, i-.e., in
the absence of any requirement for verification. The result should be comments, criticism, and
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evaluations which take into account both the inherent qualities of the configuration or policy
and the influence of the required verification.
Means of sensing current and of sensing signals without electrical connection to
the source circuit are the primary areas to be pursued and developed to then end of achieving
increased adaptability of common redundant configurations to automated verification.
{
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INTRODUCTION
These discussions are intended to aid the designer in the selection of a coincidence
development techni que by pointing up the relative advantages, disadvantages, limitations and
pitfalls attributable to each. A number of statements appear herein which should be mentally
prefixed by the reader, "where applicable". That is to say, statements concerning sampling
rates should be taken to apply if sammpling is employed, those concerning computer implemant'a-
tions when computers are employed, One should not consider that statements concerning
sampling rate, infer a recommendation that sampling be used, nor that statements about computers
infer that computer implementations are recommended,
Throughout these discussions a careful distinction between the terms "discrete" sand
"digital" is made. "Discrete" nnenos that only discrete values, as opposed to a continuum of
values, may be assumed by the function. "Digital" implies the encoding of a value to form a
digital word.
	
A2.0	 COMPARE TWO TECHNIQUES
The Compare Two class of coincidence development techniques is one of the simpler
approaches avoilcble and has the distinction, along with voting Methods, of requiring at least
first-order redundancy.
Techniques of this class are generally capable of detecting a large number of failure
types, the only requirement being that the failure result in a sufficient change in output from
that which would be present from a properly operating unit. The addition of excessNe noise by
the Item Being Verified (iBV) would be detectable by this method. Differentiation among failure
modes is not possible ;vhen Compare Two is employed. That is, a determi= Ion can be made that
a failures has occurred, but the way in which an element has failed will remain in question.
it can be noted from the matrix of Figure 5.2.2.2-5 that this class of techniques
requires that element output be distinguishable and, in fact, that application to set output is not
possible.
The application of Compare Two techniques may be on an analog basis by using a
simple differential amplifier or on a discrete basis with logical comparison done by computer or
by specially designed, but probably uncomplicated, logic gates. The use of sampling implied
by digital implementation of these techniques would not be sensitive to sampling rate. Since
there would be no concern over signal information lost in the sampling process, sumpling could
be performed on a slow or even random basis as long as care were taken to assure the synchroni-
zation of sampling on the two element outputs under consideration. A further design option
would be realized in determining a method for comparing sample values; the values could either
be compared directly by differential circuitry, or could be encoded (perhaps to a binary form)
and compared on that basis.
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rFor the case of comparison on an analog basis, verification equipment could be
mode very reliable, at ieost ,hy comparison to implementations of more complex coincidence
development techniques. If a sampling approach were chosen, the reliability of the verifi-
cation equipment would be dependent upon the sampling equipment and the equipment
performing the comparison of the samples. If the latter were, for example, a computer, the
fact that it was being used for the comparison of two .samples would not enhance its reliabililly
beyond that Yor the case where the some computer was used for spectral analysis. The fact that
lower sampling rates are a possibility in Compare Two techniques might, however, allow the
use of simpler, more reliable sampling equipment than that required by more comprehensive
"coincidence development techniques.
In some cases, to take advantage of the simplicity of Compare Two techniques will
mean a socrifico of accuracy. Whereas some methods allow comparison of an output (or a
representation of that output or a portion thereof) against a well-defined standard, a comparison
against another output forces the designer to allow for the possibility that both outputs will, at
some time, vary within tolerable limits and in opposite directions. This could be crudely
viewed as building twice as much "sloppiness" into the equipment.
The output of a Compare Two system will always be simple in form and display
requirements for any individ" ►al Compare Two implementation will be minimal. The coincidence
variable developed from one of these implementations may be continuous if analog implemen-
tation is chosen, through the use of sampling implies the generation of  coincidence variable
which is discrete in time,, only, the use of encoding restricts the coincidences variable to be
discrete in range.
With regard to equipment location, for the analog implementation a good general
statement would be that the lbasic comparison equipment, for exampie, a simple differential
amplifier, should be located in proximity to the IBV. For sample-and-compare implementation,
as for the analog case, the coincidence variable should be developed before any tran ►misjion is
attempted. 0f samples are encoded be''ore comparison, transmission of the encoded samples will
generally be possible without loss of precision in the verification process. This allows the
coincidence variable to be developed elsewhere.
A particular advantage might be attributed to the Compare Two techniques when
time multiplexed signals are considered. Since the only assumption is that two outputs should
be alike, an evaluation of the truth of any statement of "likene; ►s" will not require the use of
timing information. For example, if two elements are expected to output the bits comprising
digital words in a synchronous fashion, it is of little consequence which bits in which words
are compared. Indeed, a larger, more important statement can be made: if Compare Two
techniques are used, the transition from conditional status to status requires only the knowledge
that the input is admissible - the status of the input is not required.
A restriction on these techniques is that, where the use of unsymmetrical redundancy
means the use of redundant equipments with different capabilities, a comparison of their outputs t,
may not furnish useful 4iformation. Tc realize its full potential, this class of techniques should
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t	 be applied to "identical" outputs, where here "identical" is taken to mean alike within the
practi cal restraints of equipment tolerances, noise environment, etc.
The tithe-sharing of Compare Two equipment is certainly possible and may be
envisioned ir. several d i fferent forms. For analog implementation, it would only be required
than the output of the verification equipment be inhibited during the required switching among
items to be verified - this provided that all euitputs to be investigated by a given set of verifi-
cation equipment be the same. In general, equipment doing the actual comparison would be
sharable either among eleme0s of the some set or among different sets; equipment preparing
signals for comparison, such sampling networks would not.
Since no accumulation of a number of samples is necessary for comparison (it
could be done on a sample-by-sample basis if desired), verification can be done quite rapidly.
Any speed limitations imposed by operations prior to actual comparison would be insignificant.
Some degree of disadvantage must be attributed to these techniques in certain cases
where off- line elements are to be verified, since it would be required that two off-line
elements be available and powered up. If only one off-line element existed in a configuration,
it would 63 necessary to involve the on-line element in verification; in other cases, perhaps
where power conservation is desirable, Compare Two techniques will be less preferable than
techniques which require only one powered-up element.
{
By comparison with other coincidence development techniques, such as Inverse
Transform and Spectral Analysis, a minimum of design consi deration with regard to the type of
elements and class of signals under scrutiny is demanded by Compare Two Techniques.
0	 Sources of Type l errors in Compare Two systems wiII be lack of synchronization
^.	 between two acceptable outputs, imbalance in verification equipment, and system noise. Also,
`t when comparison is made analog or sample-by-sample basis, the verification equipment will
have no way of discriminating between element failures and legitimate errors on one of the
outputs. For exrmple, if one of two elements outputs a bit error which doesn't exist in the
other element, an indication of disagreement will result. Techniques which operate by collec-
ting information for evaluation (spectral analysis would be one's would be more forgiving.
Compensation for this shortcoming could be accomplished through parameter estimation.
Viewing the signal comparisons here as the measurement of one element output
against a "noisy reference signal" (the other element output) it spears that the likelihood of
a Type I error due to noise will be somewhat greater than would result from a comparison
against a noiseless reference, However, the aforementioned fact that any Compare Two design
would allow tolerance for variations in both element outputs, independently and in the absence
of noise, iktould probably be that no net increase in Type I errors would result.
Type Ii errors should result only from catastrophic failures in the verification
.	 equipment and in the case of identical failures in the elements being verified. However, it
should be noted that if elements contain bilevel logic, the likelihood of identical failures may
be greater since it is common for such logic to fail by Locking up in one state or the other. A-5
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Compare Two - Relative Advantages
e Allows continuous verification
s Simple and, in some implementations, inexpensive
e Capable of detecting numerous types of failures
a Analog or digital implementations available
e Sampling rate, if used, not critical
e Computer implementation possible
• Does not require timing information
e Requires only an admissible input
Compare Two - Relative Disadvantages
e Not applicable to set output
e Unable to distinguish among failure types
e Unable to identify failed element
o May lack accuracy
e May experience limitations with regard to unsymmetrical redundancy
• Requires two powered-up elements
9 Not advantageous in low S/N situations
i
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A3.0	 VOTING TECHNIQUES
It should be pointed out here again, that the voting techniques to be discussed are
Voting techniques applied for the purpose of redundancy verification and do not necessarily have
anything to do with the manner in which redundancy is achieved. Majority voting for the
purposes of error elimination or the achievement of redundancy is not of interest here.
When used for redundancy verification, it is characteristic of Voting techniques that
they are unable to distinguish among failure types. That is, when the results of a polling
procedure indicd^es a disagreement among element outputs, it is generally not possible to deter-
mine whether the cause of the disagreement is noise, loss of signal, signal distortion, etc.
The number and kinds of failures detectable by Voting are highly dependent on the
implementation of Voting chosen. For the purposes of discussion, consider the three baseline
implementations shown in Figure A3 where the three input' lines may be considered to be element
outputs, implementation A allows analog voting. In practice, some estimation process, such as
mean squaring and/or integration would be performed on differential amplifier outputs. It would
likely be a complicated matter to decide on the details of developing a coincidence variable in
any analog Voting implementation; for example, if mean squaring were done on the outputs of the
first two differential amplifiers, what level of disagreement at the third differential amplifier
should be accepi •able. While many failure types may be detected by a first comparison of
outputs, the multiple application of estimation techniques and comparison may mask some failure
types and comp licate the mapp ing to status.yp	 p	 pp g
Implementation B uses Exclusive OR logic gates for voting. To assure proper logic
operation, samples have been quantized before applied to the gates. The choice of quanti-
zation levels and sampling rates will, in large part, determine the. accuracy of verification and
the number of failure types detectable.
Implementation C compares outputs on a digital basis. Again, quantization and
sampling rate enter the picture as limiting factors on verification accuracy and on the types of
failures detectable. It would be expected, however, that voting on a digital basis could be
made both more aocurate and more comprehensive than voting on a quantized but nondigitized
basis (Implementcitr=gin B). In general, implementations of the form shown in C will be the
preferred of the three. Too, for implementation on a digital basis, the equipment could be made
to indicate the significance of the bit (most significant, least significant, etc. ) on which. a
disagreement was detected thereby allowing mapping to a more comprehensive statement of
status.
The first of the two implementations above are incapable of identifying the status of
individual elements. That is, they can indicate disagreements, but cannot choose which of the
outputs disagrees with the other two. In implementation C a statement of which is the disagreeing
element is possible. It is not intended to imply that this capability is attributable only to com-
parison on a digital basis. In general, voting on any basis is, in its simplest form, incapable of
identifying element status but, with simple extension of the technique, such capability may be
rea l ized.
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Perhaps a strong advantage of Voting techniques is that input status will usually not
be required for a transition from conditional status to status. If indications are that two of three
outputs agree or that all outputs agree, one will Likely require only a knowledge of input
admissibility before he is willing to pronounce an eleme;)t status.
The three implementations shown have implicitly assumed that inputs ABC may require
sampling, quantization, or digitization. Certainly, it may be the case that the signals to be
polled are already in such a form that they may be directly applied to the logic; for example, if
A, B and C were 6i level bit streams.
If the approach chosen were Voting on a digital  basis, Voting procedufres could be
handled by computer, either special purpose or a large general purpose machine.
While sampling rates would affect the confidence and accuracy of Voting, there is
no minimum placed on sampling rare as is the case with spectral analysis. it is conceivable that,
for a clean digital bit stream, one would be satisfied to vote c,l one bit out of every ten, one-
of-fifty, or one-of-one-hundred.
Voting methods are applicable only to distinguishable element outputs.
Timing information need not be supplied to Voting equipment. The only important
factor is that element outputs are allowed to vote in a synchronous fashion.
Because of the simplicity and inexpensiveness attributable to voting equipment, it
would not likely be attractive to time-share Voting equipment among sets or elements. An
exception would be when computer implementation was used and then sharing should be a simple
matter;
Type I errors may occur due to system noise or failures in verification equipment;
also, lack of accuracy due to quantization may result in Type I errors though this can be avoided
by careful design. Type II errors will be very unlikely'in verification by Voting. However, one
should consider the possibility of two elements failing in the same way. if this happens in a
triple redundant configuration, both Type I and Type II errors may occur; two failed elements
could show good while one good element would show bad. Similar failures in all three elements
would result in can indication that full redundancy was present. The likelihood of such occur-
rences is not so remote if the elements contain digital logic. It is very common for such equip-
ment to fail by "locking up" in one of its legitimate states. Also, total loss of signal's from
elements might result in an indication of unanimity.
The simple and straightforward nature of Voting leads one to expect that mapping to
status and display of status will usually be uncomplicated. Equipment required to display status,
then, could probably be as simple as two or three lights.
To avoid errors in verification, equipment voting on element outputs should be
located in proximity to the IBV's. If samples of element output are digitized before voting,
these digitized samples could be transmitted for voting elsewhere with no loss of accuracy.
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Unsymmetrical redundancy will affect the applicability of Voting techniques only
insofar as the element outputs differ. If elements perform their functions in different manners
but have identical outputs, it is of no consequence. The degree of dissimilarity which can be
accommodated by the Voting equipment without sacrificing verification confidence will be
entirely dependent on the nature of the dissimilarity and the particular situation,
It is obvious that, if elements require prime power, all elements to be involved in
the polling procedure must be powered up. This could be of concern if power consumption were
critical or if an off-line equipment situation exists.
Voting techniques would probably not be a good choice for verification in low S/N
ratio situations, since the effect of noise could cause apparent disagreements when, in actuality,
all elements were operating properly.
As with Compare Two, the fact that element outputs are being compared against each
other, rather than against a stored reference, probably represents some sacrifice in accuracy
since it must be allowed that outputs may go to opposite extremes within their range of tolerance
with no indication of disagreement.
1
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Voting techniques - Relative Advantages
• Simple, reliable, and inexpensive implementations available
• Can be made to identify element status
• Requires only admissible input for status determination
• Implementation by simple computational machines possible
• No restriction of minimum sampling rate
• Simple development of status variable, mapping to status, and display of status
Voting Techniques - Relative Disadvantages
• Unable to distinguish among failure types
• Less accurate than comparison against a stored reference
• May be affected by unsymmetrical redundancy
y	 • Requires all polling elements  to be powered
• Not advantageous in low S/N ratio situations
• For, say, a three element case, the techniques are unable to give a conclusive
status indication when two failures occur
• If an element must be added to a set to achieve the technique, the final design
can be noncompetative from a cost and'utiIitystandpoint.
i,
A4.0	 CROSS POWER SPE ,^TRUM TECHNiQUES
The Cross Power Spectrum technique of coincidence development consists of taking
the cross-spectrum of output pairs of the redundant elements in a simple set. This results in a
qualitative measure of the amplitude and phase similarities of each frequency present in the
outputs. The measure can be normalized by computing the coherence function from the cross-
spectrum. Naturally, the technique is limited to analog signals.
The interpretation of the cross-spectrum is rather limited in scope without _a priori
knowledge of both the spectral content of the input -signal and the element transfer function.
Even this knowledge may not explain some high values of coherence at frequencies which were
not expected to be coherent. A high cross-spectra; measurement at some frequency may be
attributed to a strong gain of the two elements at that frequency, or to a Large input at that
frequency, or to strong contaminating noise common to botti elements. Thus, the only feasible
way of interpreting the cross-spectrum or coherence measure is by simply ascertaining that the
coherence is high for any pair of outputs, over the frequency ~ange of interest. The lower
limit for "high" coherence will depend on the elements under consideration. Noise on the
input to the elements will not degrade the coherence, since it should appear in the same form on
the outputs of the elements. However, the noise added internally by each element wi ll be
incoherent with all components, and will thus degrade the overa0l coherence. Other factors
which will affect the degree of coherence are the tolerances of fl-M components in the elements
and any external noise sources which affect one element more than the others.
Another possible means of interpreting the cross-spectrum would be to compare the
cross-spectrum of the two outputs with the auto-spectrum of one output. For identical signals,
these spectra should be the same. The results of this comparison would form the coincidence'
"
var iable,
The Cross Power Spectrum technique is essentially a "Compare Two" in the frequency
domain. As such, it requires first degree redundancy to determine that a failure has occurred and
at least second degree redundancy to identify the status of the individual elements (a Voting
technique). It has the advantage over the Compare Two techniques of being a more thorough
comparison, but it also requires more hardware and time to generate the comparison.
Any admissable input may be used, including the tenant ;signal, or even a random
noise input. Thus the S/N ratio of the input signal has no deleterious effect on the usefulness
of the method. The Cross-Spectrum technique does not require dedication of principal system
elements. A frequency limit is imposed by the type of sampler used, since the maximum
frequency which can be resolved by the cross-spectral process (the Nygliist frequency) is one-
half the sampling frequency. Any frequencies in the output abovo the i'Slyquist f requency should
be removed with a low-pass filter to avoid aliasing error. Sampling rates of up'lo 10 MHz
should be possible with current equipment.
The Cross-Spectrum technique is capable of indicating the degree of failure,^.,within an ,Ilk
Out-of-tolerance failures result in reduced coherence between Outputs, whereaselement.
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loss-Of-signal failures result in zero coherence. Since a general purpose computer performs all
analysis of the sampled data, many possibilities exist for the definition of the coincidence
variable. This variable could be simply the value of the coherence function, or it could be a
complex function of coherence and frequency.
The technique's usefulness is diminished in cases of unsymmetrical redundancy com-
parisons, because the spectral content of the element outputs is likely to differ. The method may
still be useful when the coherence suffers only small decreases.
°he only equipment which must be located in closs proximity to the IBV's is the
sampling and digitizing equipment. Once digitized, the sample data may be recorded or trans-
mitted to the computer for analysis. No other requirements exist for location of equipment.
The data is sampled simultaneously from pairs of outputs, so time-sharing of the
sampling equipment is certainly possible. This sampling in pairs makes it necessary to power up
two elements simultaneously for redundancy verification, but then need not remain on after
sampling. Only two sampling and digitizing devices are necessary, and these can be manually
or programmably switched to different elements.
The reliability of sampling equipment is generally very high, so the computer
reliability Limits the reliability of the verification equipment.
Type I errors will be primarily due to failures in the sampli ng equipment. The most
common failure is for one or more bits out of the analog-to-digital converter to be locked on one
state. This type error would be difficult to distinguish from prime system failures, because either
one would degrade the coherence. Since the sampling equipment has high reliability, however,
the likelihood of Type I errors is small.
Type I) errors should never occur, because the sampling heads operate independently
of each other. if one element failed, i'Fs sampler will not be connected in any way to the output
of the other element, so the coherence should be zero.
In general, the Cross-Spectrum technique cc-in be applied to any functions within a
pair of elements for which the some spectral content is anticipated. It may also be used for
indirect sensors, provided the outputs are expected to be the same.
The advantages and disadvantages of the Cross-Spectral technique are summarized
A,-13
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Cross Power Spectrum - Relative Advantages
• The input need only be admissible
o Sf N ratio of input does not affect usefulness of method {
• Any admissible signal, including tenant signal, may be used
o May be made able to identify failure type
o Allows great freedom in formation of coincidence variable
e Time-sharing of sampling equipment is possible
o Provides a comprehensive indication of element operation
Cross Power Spectrum - Relative Disadvantages
o Limited to analog signals
f°
o Requires first degree redundancy to detect an error; second degree redundancy to
Identify element status
* Technique is not as useful for unsymmetrical redundancies
ito Necessary to power up two elements simultaneously
	 #
r
• Time and expense are greater than for simpler techniques
G
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A5.0	 VALUE; CHECK; SEQUENTIAL TECHNIQUES
Sequential Value Checking techniques have a great deal in common with
Nonsequential Value Checking techniques. Many of the statements made here w0l also appear
in the discussion of the nonsequential techniques. The major distinction between the two is that
here information concerning status is contained in .signal values and in their order of occurrence.
In Nonsequential, order-of-occurrence is of no inter.9st.
Sequential Value Checking is one of the monitor methods and, as such, carries the
requirement of a priori signal knowledge. Indeed, a deterministic signal is required since
verification equipme1nt is expected to "know" what values are acceptable and in what order they
should occur. This requirement is obvious from the matrix of Figure 5.2.2.2-5.
The fact that time-sequential values are to be observed implies a process that is
discrete in time. Where discreteness in time is not a characteristic of the signal under obser-
vation, it can be established by quantization, sampling, or digital encoding. Comparison of
signal values with stored values may be accomplished on a continuous or a discrete basis. The
use of unquantized signal samples for comparison would be a continuous realization; digitized
signal samples represent a discrete value comparison. An analog signal such as a sine wave
would generally not be compared without sampling since an entire waveform rather than discrete
values would have to be stored; a bilevel bit stream out of a piece of digital equipment would
already be discrete in both time and value.
Sequential Value Checking equipment will, in general, require timing information or
synchronization capabilities since it must know when the sequonce of values to be chocked is in
progress. Often, the achievement of synchronization through the use of digital logic will be
relative ly simple.
When element outputs are time multiplexed signal,,, Sequential Value Checking will
be a definitie candidate. The serial bit stream will already contain synchronization information
so that the establishment of timing should be a simple matter.
Like Nonsequential Value Checks, these techniques (require a knowledge of input
status to allow the conversion of conditional status into status. As has been pointed out, this
requirement along with that of a deterministic signal will in some cases result in the necessity
of dedicating principal system equipment to verification procedures.
Value check methods will be inherently more accurate than those techniques which
compare output signals against each other since here one constituent of the comparison is a
reference which can presumably be made very precise.
As with the nonsequential case, no minimum is placed on sampling rate since there
is no concern over output signal information loss. if sampling is to be employed, sampling rate
will be determined by the rate-of-occurrence of the values to be observed and the level of
confidence to be demanded of the verification.
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Equipment for comparing sequential signal values can be made simpl y and reliable.
The ea.-,e with which timing is established will vary greatly with the silu..;$on. in some cases,
timing will be available from principal system equipment; in another case, verification equip-
ment may be atkod to synchronize to a quantized form of the signal to be observed. Obviously
the requirements of the second case may lead to the use of sophisticated equipment.
Sequential Value Checks can be given the ability to detect a large number of failure
types. Their sensitivity to excessive noise can be odiusted through the parameter estimation
scheme employed. Since information is available from both the values and the order of their
occurrence, t'ne potential exists for these techniques to be more comprehensive than nonsequential
checking, but only an investigation of failure modes of the principal system equipment will
reveal whether the identification of failure types is possible by sequentially checking values.
That is to say, if all failure modes effect each value in the sequence in the same way, no dis-
crimination among types of failures will be possible. The order-of-occurrence information, then,,
will be entirely involved in the establishment of verification confidence.
Sequential Value Check will have the ability to yield information on individual
elements of the set, not only on the status of the set.
Computer implementation, either by speciol or general purpose machine, is a
definite candidate approach to value checking.
The shareabilityofSequential Value Checking equipment among element outputs
could be extensive. The degree to which equipment would be sharable among sets would likely
be limited due to the different timing requirements which would generally oxist between different
sets and, less importantly, the requirement for storing more sequences of values. If the sequential
checking were implemented by logae gates and/or shift register, the design of these would be
with consideration for the equipment to be verified and the signal to be observed. Their adopt-
ability to other principal system equipments and signals would likely be small. if implementation
were by computer, the machine could act simply as several sets of verification equipment,
selecting the proper functions for the equipment and signal under scrutiny.
The general rule for flexibility in the location of equipment will be observed for
these techniques; if signal samples are encoded for comparison, transmission of these encoded
samples can likely be accomplished with little sacrifice in verification confidence. If nonen-
coded samples or analog values are chosen for comparison against reference values, this compari-
son should be performed before any transmission is attempted.
The use of unsymmetrical redundancy will usually not affect the applicability of
Sequential Value Checking, though it may complicate or negate the sharing of verification
equipment among element outputs.
Since value checks may be performed on one element at a time, if elements require
prime power this power ;need be applied to only one element at a time for value checking. This 10is in contrast' to what is true for Compare Two and Voting Techniques.
i!
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The requirement of timing information, generally imposed by sequential value
checking, should be viewed as an additional source of Type I errors since bad timing can cause
,i disagreement between signal values and stared values even though the signal is entirely proper.
Of course, bad timing can also cause Type it errors, though it will usually be highly unlikely.
Also, attempts to share verification equipment among sets opens the possibility of checking
against the wrong set of stored values. Sequential Value Checking techniques are not tolerant
of legitimate system errors. If a value does not check "good," the equipment has no way of
determining whether the cause is a failure or an error. The effects of such legitimate errors, as
well as those of noise, may be minimized through parameter estimation procedures.
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Value Checks; Sequential - Relative AdyantagM's
• Simple implementations available
• More accurate than Compare Two and Voting techniques
• No severe restriction on minimum sampling rate
• Computer implementation possible
• Able to identify status of individual elements
Value Checks; Sequential Relative Disadvantages
• Requires deterministic signal
• Requires timing information
• Usually not applicable to set output
• Requires knowledge of input status for determination of equipment status
• May require dedication of principal system equipment to checking
• Limited in ability to distinguish among failure types
• Timing requirements introduce additional source of errors
}
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A6.0	 VALUE CHECK; NONSEQUENTIAL TECHNIQUES
Being one of the monitoring methods, the employment of Nonsequential Value Check
techniques entails the comparison of a signal parameter value against a stored reference value.
Obviously, then, the requirement that oxpected values be available is imposed. In fact, the
general requirement is that the signal under investigation be deterministic. This is reflected by
the matrix of Figure 5.2.2.2-5.
Implementations of these techniques may be of a continuous or discrete nature, both
in time and value. For example, the direct comparison of a DC voltage against a fixed threshold
is con'4inuous in time and in value. The sampling (at the frame rate) of a bit stream in order to
check the presence of a frame marker bit would be discrete in rime and could be either continuous
or discrete ir value depending on whether the sampled value were quantized (discrete) or not
(continuous) for comparison against the reference value.
Value Check techniques, like other monitor methods, are, in themselves, capable of
givcng only an indication of conditional status. To make a statement of set status requires
knowledge of the status of the input. This requirement, along with that of having an input of
deterministic nature could severely limit the use of these techniques when it is undesirable to
dedicaPe principal system equipment to verification.
(`)	 stable and
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is compared against a stored reference which is presumably
very	 e	 the degree of accuracy achievable with value check techniques gener-
ally will be greater that with those techniques which compare element outputs.
A relative disadvantage must be accorded to these techniques when it is desired to
check values which are not constant in time, for then it is required that verification equipment
be given timing information or the ability to derive such information. While timing information
may be required, no restriction on minimum sampling rate is imposed as it is by Spectral Analysis.
That is, there is no interest here in compiling a sample set which completely describes the wave-
form. So, to the extent that the designer is satisfied with the level of confidence achieved, a
signal value may be sampled for verification purposes at the rate of its occurrences or at any
subharmonic thereof.
The reliability achievable in Nonsequential Value Checking equipment will vary
widely with the choice of implementation. Wherever synchronization capabilities are required,
reliability of verification equipment will suffer. In the simplest cases, such as that of comparing
a DC voltage against a threshold, simple and reliable equipment may be used. More complicated
and less reliable equipment would be required to check frame marker bits, for example.
Value Check techniques, while not nearly so comprehensive as Spectral Analysis
and some other techniques, are capable of detecting numerous failure types. But here again,
the characteristics and capabilities of the verification equipment is a strong function of the
degree to which its design considers the signal being checked and the nature of that signal. A
peak voltage detector, for example, would be relatively insensitive to signal distortion and the
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addition of excessive noise; in the comparison of the DC voltage against a threshold, both of
these failure types could be detectable. However, the general and significant statement may be
made that Nonsequential Value Check techniques are not capable of distinguishing between or
among types of failures. They are at the most able to paint out that something is of ill order.
it is characteristic of this class of techniques that they identify the status of the
individual elements - not only the status of the set.
Computer implementation of Nonsequential Value Checking s a fiosible approach.
Encoded samples of signal values could be provided to a computer for comparison against a
stored reference value. For such a simple operation, however, a small special purpose computer
with values stored in read-only memories might be a more cost-effective choice than a general
purpose machine.
Value checking equipment would be readily sharable among element outputs. if the
value to be checked occurred only periodically in the element outputs, the choice facing the
designer would be whether to sample all element outputs simultaneously and store the samples for
sequential comparison against a stored value or to use no storage and dedicate the equipment
performing the value comparison to one element ouiput at a time. The first technique would
require sampling; the second might or might not involve sampling.
Because of the simplicity of the concept of checking an actual value against a stored
value (and the limits of derivable information thereby placed), reporting and display requirements
for a value checking system will be minim(,„. Likewise, the development of a coincidence
variable will be for Less complicated than for, say, Correlation and Spectral Analysis techniques.
As with other classes of verification techniques, flexibility in the location of veri-
fication equipment will be dictated by the implementation chosen. If signal samples are encoded
for comparison, ,transmission of these encoded samples can likely be accomplished with little
sacrifice in ver f ication confidence. for analog or non-encoded samples, comparison against the
reference should be performed, and thus the status variable would be developed, before any
transmission.
While the use of unsymmetrical redundancy may complicate the, design of value
checking equipment, the applicability of the technique will seldom if eve W. be negated by the
fact that element outputs differ somewhat or by the fact that elements have different capabilities.
The greatest impact of unsymmetrical redundancy on value check techniques would be in the
case that is is desired to share verification equipment among element outputs. Here, differences
in element output due to lack of symmetry could force the design and construction of additional
verification equipment.
Value Check equipment could also be shared among sets. Most amenable, to such
usage are the computer implementations because of the ease with which several reference values
may be stored and the ability to program the equipment to call forward the proper reference. In
other implementations, switching arrangement , could be set up to select proper references for
various set outputs or element outputs within the various sets.
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For cases where it mig ht be desirable to check off-line eq uipment, it would beg
necessary to power up only one element at a time for checking purposes. This is an advantage
which would probably be seldom realized.
For the Value Check implementations for which timing information is required, and
additional source of both Type I and Type II errors is provided. If timing information were
incorrect but the signal actual ly good, a Type I error could occur; if both were incorrect, a
Type II error could occur, though for most situations the likelihood  of this would be low. Where
set-shared equipment is involved, errors could result from comparisons against the wrong refer-
ence value. System noise, as is usual, is a source of Type I errors; also these techniques may
give incorrect status information because of legitimate data errors. The effects of both noise and
data errors may be minimized in the parameter estimation function.
If these is interest in storing information for trend evaluation, value checking
methods can certainly provide this.
,
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Value Ch--cks; Nonsequential - Relative Advantages
• Simple implementations available
• More accurate than Compare Two and Voting techniques
• No severe restriction on minimum sampling rate
• Computer implementation possible
• Able to identify status of individual elements
• Simple development of status variable and display
Value Checks; Nonsequential - Relative Disadvantages
• Requires deterministic signal
• May require timing information
• Usually not applicable to set output
• Requires knowledge of input status for determination of equipment status
• May require dedication of principal system equipment to checking
• Unable to distinguish among failure types
• Timing requirements introduce additional source of errors
r
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A7 0	 CODING  E HN TECH IQ UESl
Coding techniques are basically methods contrived for the detection of errors, not
for the achievement of the verification of redundancy. However, when error-detection coding
is present in distinguishable element outputs, the potential for their use in redundancy verifi-
cation exists. Probably the simplest example is the case of an element which outputs a digital
data stream containing parity bits. Depending on the design of the system, some percent of
message errors would be acceptable - say 1%. Then it is likely that, if a simple accounting
system revealed that 20% of the messages being received contained bad parity,, one would be
willing to concede that a failure had occurred. Least the obvious be overlooked, this also
implies that Coding techniques will detect failures (e.g., locked logic circuits) in equipment.
As considered here, verification by coding will provide information on the status of
individual elements.
.
A statement of which or even how many types of failures are detectable through
coding is difficult to make because of the strong dependence on principal system design.
However, it may be pointed out that "failures" occurring between the points of encoding and
error detection which do not result in message errors are likely of little interest.
Type I and II errors due to the verification equipment itself are both very unlikely
with this technique (considering that a very clean signal will probably be provided as element
output). Also, some tolerance to legitimate principal system errors is already built in. The
principal contributer to ^'rpe I and 11 errors is the code itself. With careful design of the code,
the probabi l ity of these errors can be made quite small.
Enceding and decoding equipment for these uses (especially for simple parity
checking) is relatively simple and reliable. About the equipment necessary to extend error-
detecting capabilities to redundancy verification capabilities, the some may be said.
It would be unlikely that unsymmetrical redundancy would influence the applica-
bilitiy of these techniques.
The sharing of Coding verification equipment would generally be undesirabie
because of the necessity of extensive error counting on any given element output. However,
the cost of designing equipment to be dedicated to individual element outputs should be such
that lack of sharability would be no cause for concern.
Because of the necessity to assume that encoding was done correctly, this is
another class of techniques which requires knowledge of input status in order to go beyond a
statement of conditional status to a statement of status.
Coding Techniques - Relative Advantages
• Able to identify element status
• Simple implementations available
• Low likelihood of errors in statements of status
• Unlikely to be affected by unsymmetrical redundancy
Coding Techniques - Relative Disadvantages
• Applicable only to digital systems
• Generally not compatible with concepts of shared verification equipment
1
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A8.0	 SIGNAL FORM ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
Signal Form Analysis techniques involve the derivation of some indicator of signal
form (rms value, mean value, variance, instantaneous frequency are examples) for comparison
against a reference value.* By virtue of this comparison to a reference, the requirement of a
pr iori knowledge of the signal under observation is imposed. However, the instances for- which
signal form characteristics are predictable can be reasonably expected to outnumber by for those
for which signal values are predictable. The requirement for the application of these techniques
is that a deterministic property be present.** If the property is reflected by a value which is
constant in time, no timing information would be needed. Peak detection applied to an FM
signal would be an example or Signal Form Analysis with no requirement of timing information.
The development of many signal form indicators such as rms value, mean value and
variance require integration time or the collection of a sample set. This does not, however,
negate the possibility of continuous verification since the definition thereof allows reasonable
delays for processing. If characteristics such as those named above vary as functions of time,
observation of such characteristics by integrating or collecting sample sets will complicate the
determination, of how closely the observed values should agree with the stored reference and
would undoubtedly mean a sacrifice in verification accuracy. Hence, it is a good general
statement that a characteristic value will be required to be constant and known over many
periods of the lowest frequency present. Then any requirement for timing will be only for gross
and relatively inaccurate information.
.r r
Signal Form Analysis will most often be applied to element outputs. When this is
the case, it will be within the capabilities of these techniques to identify 4he status of individual
elements, not only to identify set status.
An obvious point is that, if Signal Form Analysis is to be applied to set output, the
signal characteristic to be observed by the verification equipment should be one that varies as a
Function of the number of operating elements. For application to set output, the ability to
identify the status of individual elements will be lost.
The number of failure types detectable through the use of these techniques will be
principally determined by the number of failure types which evidence themselves as variations
in the signal characteristic under observation - the rms value of a signal out of an oscillator will
not generally disclose Frequency drift. The comprehensiveness permitted by these techniques,
it is apparent, will be determined only by analysis of the particular situation in which their
application is contemplated.
*These descriptions are called signal characteristics, in contrast to signal values used in Value
Check Techniques.
*This statement deserves some comment. Not that statistical properties have been included
among the signal form characteristics. This does not conflict with the deterministic requirement
of the technique. Population means and variances are deterministic parameters; even if they are
statistical representations.
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Depending on the signal characteristic to be investiga +yed, implementation may be
either on an analog or on a discrete basis. Meson and rms values of analog signals will be easily
derived on an analog basis; the variance of a stochastic signal would more likely be determined
on the basis of a sample set. Sampling techniques will generally be applicable to the investi-
gation of signal characteristics. It will be usual that those properties which are amenable to
analog implementations can be observed on a sampled basis. An exception is the characteristic
of instantaneous frequency. Also, the desire to investigate frequency on a sampled basis will
set a minimum on sampling rate. As a rule, for the investigation of signal characteristics other
than instantaneous frequency, minimum sampling rate will be determined only by the require-
ments of verification confidence, a design input. Characterisfics such as mean, variance, and
rms value may be determined by sampling on a "slow" basis (slow by comparison to signal fre-
quencies) or on an aperiodic or random basis.
These techniques involve both the process of extracting an indication of a signal
characteristic and the comparison of this indication against a stored reference; and both of these
functions might be performed on a digital basis. As an example, a signal could be sampled and
these samples digitally encoded. A computer could then determine the mean of the sample set
and compare the derived value against a stored reference value.
The reliability of the verification equipment for Signal Form Analysis will vary over
awide !range, depending on the signal property chosen for investigation and on the selection
of a basis of comparison. Some of the simplest implementations, such as an envelope detector
to determine peak amplitude, may be made very simple and reliable. Equipment to sample and
compute a mean, though certainly not failure-prone, would fall for below the envelope detector
in reliability. By comparison to swept frequency mixing and FFT implementations of Spectral
Analysis, the use of these techniques will usually result in good reliability of verification
equipment.
In contrast to some other techniques, the inherent time delay of this technique will
typically allow erroneous information to be transmitted before an unacceptable status indication
is realized. This could be a drawback for large filter constants with critical information. Trad-
ing off shorter filter constants with the probability of error will inevitably result.
Equipment required to implement Signal Form Analysis techniques could be shared
among the elements of a set without complication. For symmetrical redundancy, both the equip=
ment examining the signal characteristic and that performing the comparison would be sharable.
One implication of unsymmetrical redundancy might be the necessity of dedicating the property-
examining equipment (such as the peak voltage detector) to a particular element; also, a differ-
ent reference value might need to be supplied for each element. But comparison equipment along
with that performing the functions of parameter estimation and mapping would be sharable among
elements.
The design of Signal form Analysis equipment Auld usually be specialized to the
MV and the signal and would, hence, likely be unsharable among sets.
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cFor signal observations which require integration or sample oollection, the likeli-
hood of errors, both Type 1 and Type 11, attributable to the coincidence development function
would be determined by the accuracy built into the equipment versus the accuracy asked of the
equipment . That is to say, far a given degree of accuracy, the tighter the tolerances placed
on the comparison, the more Type I and the fewer Type it errors would be expected. For other
signal observations, such as the checking of instantaneous frequency, system noise would also be
a source of Type I errors,
Signal Form Anal sis - Relative Advantages
r	 Allows continuous ver ► fiction
0	 Computer implementation, possible.
•	 May be applicable to set output
e	 Requires one powered-up element
•	 Able to identify status of individual elements
And, depending on the signal property of interest,
•	 No severe restriction on sampling rate
Signal Form Analysis - Relative Disadvantages
M	 Requires input status to allow transition from conditional status
0	 Usually unable to identify a;s many kinds of Failures as techniques observing
signal values or spectral characteristics
And, depending on the signal property of interest,
a	 Restriction on minimum sampling rate
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A9.0	 SPECTRAL ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
Spectral Analysis techniques are comprehensive and generally complex and expen-
sive. Their implementations may take the form of swept frequency mixing, filters, chirp filters,
autocorrelaticn equipment, or a computer performing fast Fourier transforms. All these implemen-
tations ara concerned with the investigation of a single signal. This signal may be a set output
if elements failures ore reflected as changes in the spectral content of the set output. More
often, Spectral Analysis will be applied to an element output.
As with all monitoring techniques, the requirement of a rp iori knowledge is present.
Here, the requirement is placed on the frequency content of the signal under investigation. in
many cases, the necessity of an output with known frequency content will mean that an input
will have to be provided; this, in turn, would require the dedication of prime system equipment
to verification.
The types of failures detectable by Spectral Analysis are almost without exclusion
and, certainly, it is difficult to imagine that one would be interested in any failure which
would not cause a change in signal spectral content. Loss of signal, excessive noise, and signal
distortions are all detectable by some of these implementations, and, significantly, these tech-
nigo s offer the potential for going beyond the detection of these failures to a statement of the
nature of the failure. In the usage imagined as most common for these techniques, the scrutiny
of an element output, identification of the faulty element (as opposed to only the indication ofC! some level of redundancy) may be a valuable capability.
Spectral Analysis by filtering might be achievable rather simply in certain instances.
Most often, however, a bank of filters or a set of swept filters will be required. Along with this
implementation the other forms of Spectral Analysis must be rated; as comparati";lely complicated
and requiring much maintenance.
A result of the ability of these techniques to furnish great amounts of information
may be a complicated process for the development of a coincidence variable. One could
require simultaneously, for example, that third harmonic content be in a certain rat ►a to the
fundamental, that the fundamental be within certain ranges of amplitude and frequency, that
even harmonics be missing, etc., so that the display of information desired or the development
of a simple statement oi primary system "goodness" therefore becomes a sizeable task within
itself
Spectral Analysis may be implemented using sampled data. One possibility is the
generation of an autocorrelation function directly from the samples; a second possibility is tl,ie
encoding of sample values for analysis by Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) methods. In the former
implementation, sampling rate would not be critical - could in fact be done on a random basis.
In the latter implementation, sampling rate would be critical; the Nyquist sampling criterion
would have to be observed and the fixing of a sampling rate would imply an assumption of funda-
mental frequency„
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MIn of least one form, namely Spectral Analysis by the generation of an autocorrelation
function, the verification equipment would tend to reject random components of the output. This
should be counted as an advantage when the output to be investigated possesses a low S/N ratio,
since the signal could be retrieved from the noisy background. On the other hand, if the addi-
tion of excessive noise by the IBV were a failure type of interest, the inability of this implemen-
tation to detect this noise would be disadvantageous.
The reliability o^ verification varies widely depending on the choice of implementa-
tion. Where passive filters or chirp filters (tapped dispersive delay lines) could be used, relc-
tively good reliability would be achievable. Swept frequency mixing would be significantly less
reliable. For the case of computer analysis of sampled data (FFT and autocorrelation), naturally,
the reliability would be the same as for any other verification technique using computer analysis
of sampled data. However, the fact thatSpectralAnalysis might impose the requirement for
more complicated sampling equipment than that needed for other techniques (notably Comp(Are
Two and Voting) could mean Less reliable verification equipment.
There is nothing inheeent in any of the implementations of Spectral Analysis which
should preclude the time sharing of verification equipment. Where such sharing is contemplated
among set outputs, the choice of implementation should consider the fact that swept frequency
mixing, chirp filters, swept filters and autocorrelation require the least attention to the parti-
cular signal under scrutiny (though general limitation on frequency range must certainly be
observed). for fixed filters the restrictions are obvious. The sharing of equipment to perform
Fast Fourier Transforms is certainly feasible, though sharing among different signal types would
demand that sampling rates be tailored to the particular signals. In other words, while the
processing could be shared among sets; sampling and preprocessing equipment would generally
have to be dedicated to a set.
All these Spectral Analysis imp leme stations are capable of constant verification,
but two practical considerations might make this undesirable:
a. The expense of most Spectral Analysis equipment makes the sharing of verifica-
tion equipment very attractive.
b. Many real-world signals will have neither constant nor predictable frequency
content; the situation then would require that a set input be provided (probably
a simulative signal) and this, in turn, would require the dedication of prime
system equipment to verification.
The computer-based implementations of Spectral Analysis may exhibit limitations on
the speed of verification. FFT, though achievable through algorithms which reduce computa-
tional redundancies, is a time -consuming process in itself. Of less direct influence is the fact
that, in order to make efficient usage of computer capabilities, a machine would probably be
shared and the verification time of any elernc ;t or set would be determined primarily by the
computer's l oad	 1
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It is true of Spectral Analysis, as it is of the other three monitoring techniques, that
the transition from a statement of conditional status to one of status requires knowledge of input
status. This must be considered less desirable than the requiring of only an admissible input as is
the case with some other techniques.
The primary sources of Type I errors in these techniques are failures in the verifi-
cation equipment and system noise. Autocorrelation processing virtually eliminates the threat of
errors due to noise. But where a requirement for rapid autocorrelation leads to the use of a
"batch" sampling method (this is a method whereby a sampling rate much higher than those for
complete sequences of delay, multiplication and averaging can be used) the result is an approxi-
mation to the autocorrelation function with the accuracy of the approximation being dependent
on the sample size. In this case, then, there is a tradeoff between accuracy (and consequently
the likelihood of Type I errors) and the time required for verification.
Unless data is encoded and sent to a computer for processing, all equipment neces-
sary for the development of a status variable should be located in proximity to the (BV's in order ......
_
to avoid noise pollution and signal distortion by transmission.
The display requirements of Spectral Analysis may be great for, when a great deal
of information is derived, the only choices are to allow equipment to perform the operations
necessary for reduction to a simple statement of status or to display a large amount of information.
.A 1
These techniques, despite their generally complex nature, afford a good means of
verification where a Frequency-multiplexed signal is of concern - for example, on a data bus.
	
l'
Also, though the Spectral Analysis of time-multiplexed signals may require the providing of a
simulative input, no synchronization information would be required by the verification
equipment.
Because output characteristics are compared to a stored reference, only one element
at a time (whether on-line or off-line) need be powered up.
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Spectral Analysis - Relative Advantages
•	 Allows continuous verification
•	 Extremely comprehensive - detects a large number of failure types and is
capable of identifying
•	 Analog or digital implementations available
•	 Computer implementation possible
•	 Does not require timing information
•	 May be applicable to set output
•	 Advantageous in low S/N ratio situations
•	 Adaptable to frequency multiplexed signals
Spectral Analysis - Relative Disadvantages
•	 Most implementations complex and may be expensive
•	 Minimum sampling rate requirement
•	 Requires knowledge of input status for transition from conditional status to
status
•	 May require dedication of principal system equipment to verification
•	 Inherent time delay for results
^r
I' I `
Bout - k in
2
e in = ^ k Bout
since a solution for e. is
in
{
A10.0	 INVERSE TRANSFORM TECHNIQUES
Inverse transforms, p^Lr se, are based on the mathematical premise that the product
of an equipment transfer function and its inverse is one. Then conceptually, a signal which is
passed sequentially through an item having transfer function F(s) and one having transfer func-
tion F(s)-1 will have been returned to its original form (input E2 output). The applicability, in
theory if not in practice, of these techniques is dependent on the existence of the inverse trans-
form and on the satisfaction of mathematical characteristics implicit in the statement above.
Firstly, the system (not the signal) must be stationary in nature. That is, its transfer function
may not vary in time. In practice, it will be sufficient if the system is piecewise stationary
and either is predictable in its time-variant behavior or is able to provide timely data on its own
form. To see this, consider an amplifier whose gain is time-variable. Neglecting other param-
eters such as phase characteristics, if one knows the amplifier's (piecewise invariant) gain over
a given span of time, a suitable amount of attenuation may Le set up to provide the inverse
operation. Knowledge of gain values may be had either by prediction or by the amplifier pro-
viding, as a separate output, gain information.
A second assumption implied by the use of frequency domain transfer functions is
that the system is linear; i.e., the principle of superposition applies to the system because it is
both additive and homogeneous. If the time restrictions discussed above are met and tie system
is linear, a unique inverse transform will exist. For some nonlinear systems an inverse will
exist. An example would be the nonlinear system described by
eout _ mein + b
where in and b are constants. The inverse operation is described by
eout -b
eout	 m
A nonlinear system for which a unique inverse does not exist is described by
and an ambiguity in sign exists. Still, if verification equipment could be given a rule for
resolving the ambiguity, perhaps through the knowledge that e in was always a positive quantity,
inverse transform would be possible.
In short, if a system is linear and stationary a unique inverse transform will exist.
IF these conditions are not met, only an investigaticn of the particular system to be verified will
prove applicability of these techniques.
As an example, consider a A/D convertor. This is certainly a nonlinear operation.
The inverse operation might be performed by a D/A converter. in this case the problem in invers-
ing arises from the fact that the reconstructed input signal suffers the effects of quantization
errors. The acceptable degree of coincidence betwo,^n this signal and the input signal which
should be demanded, may be a difficult matter to resolve.
A lack of unique inverse operation may be observed in the case of a limiter or
clipper. A loss of information occurs in the operation which cannot be compensated for in the
inverse operation.
The Inverse Transform Technique can be a very comprehensive one. With the
assumption that all principal system Failures of interest will be reflected as changes in that
system's transfer function,, the types of failure detectable becomes limited only by the accuracy
of the verification equipment. Generally, then this will be a very comprehensive approach to
the problem.
The ability of verification equipment to distinguish among failure types is dependent
on the method of	 y	 comparison	 yoem t comparison	 P	 ed if this	 i n is b simple subtraction, no capa-
bility in this area will be realized. If comparison is by correlation, the potential for identify-
ing failure types is great. (However, if correlation is tc be involved, it might be more cost
effective to eliminate the inverse equipment and go to Correlation techniques entirely.)
The Inverse Transform Technique is capable of providing information on the condi-
tional status of individual elements and will usually be applied to element output. When ele-
ment transfer functions are observable constituents of a set- transfer function, a transform may be
introduced which is the inverse of that for the set, thus performing verification on set output
rather than on element output. in either case, it is true that the verification equipment trust be
designed specifically to suit the equipment which it is to verify. This infers that a given set of
verification equipment will be inflexible and only rarely will be sharable among sets.
Most implementations will require the co mparison of input and inverse -transformed.
output without deletion of information from either. Therefore, it sampling is to be used on
either input or output, the Nyquist sampling criteria should be observed. In effect, a lower
bound is thereby set on sampl ing
 rate. It is unlikely that inverse operations performed on a
sample set which cannot fully represent the output signal will Lead to useful results.
At least two possibilities for implementation exist. One choice is the construction
of dedicated equipment which operates real-time on the output signa l. An example of this is
the attenuator performing the inverse operation on amplifier output. A second choice is to digi -
tize output signal and, by employing algorithms, perform the inverse operation. This would
necessarily be non-real-time and storage of the input unti_i the completion of the inverse oper-
	 to
ation would be required. Naturally, there would be quantization errors involved here. An
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advantage of the second choice would be that the storage of several inversing algorithms would
render a computer sharable among sets.
An advantage of Inverse Transform over monitor methods is that only knowledge
that the input is admissible will be required to transition from conditional status to status.
Additionally, as inspection of the matrix of Figure 5.2.2.2-5 shows, nothing con-
cerning the Farm or statistics of the signal used For verification need be known a rp iori . This
may be a tremendous credit to this technique.
The potential for Type I errors will be higher when Inverse Transform is used than is
the case when other techniques are employed. This is because unallowed-for inaccuracies in
verification equipment and almost all failures in equipment performing the inverse operation will
result in a false indication of poor performance. In many instances the equipment performing
the inversing will be complex in nature, costly, and comparatively (with respect to other candi-
date techniques) unreliable.
This technique is capable of performing continuous verification. When the equip-
ment performing the inverse operation is shared, the sharing would have to be on an automatic
basis in order that verification qualify as continuous.
Since no knowledge of the signal being observed is required and no knowledge of
input status is necessary, there will be no need to dedicate equipment to verification.
The likelihood of Type II errors will be determined almost entirely by the accuracy
of the verification equipment.
Sensitivity of the verification equipment to noise added by the IBV will be deter-
mined by the accuracy of verification equipment and by the form of estimation. Note that, in
this technique, verification equipment increases the noise level of one of the inputs to the
comparison.
Requirements for display and for the development of the status variable are quite
flexible and are dependent on the degree of comprehensiveness desired of the verification
process. It would always be possible to condense status mapping to an expression of two possible
states ("go-no-go" or good-bad"'). If comparison were by correlation, for instance, a great deal
of information would be made available to develop a coincidence variable, to be displayed
(perhaps for mental mapping to conditional status), or to be discarded.
Inverse Transform will not be a good choice for verification when element outputs
which have been time multiplexed are to be observed since the multiplexing represents a non-
linear operation. In either situations, Inverse Transform equipment will not require timing
information.
Inverse Transform - Relati ve Advantage
• Allows continuous verification
• Capable of detecting numerous types of failures
• Computer implementation possible
• Does not require timing information
•. Requires only admissible input
• Can be made able to distinguish among failure types
Able to identify conditional status of individual elements
• Requires only one powered element at a time
• May be applicable to set output
• No a priorif signal knowledge required
Inverse Transform - Relative Disadyant U, 	 s
• Little control over expense and complexity
• Restrictions on minimum sampling rate
• Design highly dependent on item being verified
• Verification equipment rarely sharable among sets
• High potent ial for Type I errors
• Verification equipment adds noise to signal under observation
0 Not applicable to element outputs which have been time multiplexed
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A11.0	 CORRELATION TECHNIQUES
Correlation as a technique for automated redundancy verification has been accepted
to mean the employment of information gathered by cross correlation of input and output signals.
in general, this technique will be applicable only to.-Ilnear systems. immediately, then, any
elements or sets which involve encoding or decoding (including A/D and D/A conversion) as part
of their functional operation are excluded from consideration. Additionally, if the operation
performed by the iBV is not stationary in nature, information on its time-variant narWre would
have to be provided to verification equipment.
A great degree of foxibility with regard to signal characteristics must be attributed
to this approach. In general, the applicability of Correlation is not determined by the signal to
be observed, but ronly by the nature of the operations performed by the principal system. it
does happen, however, that a unique situation arises for one particular input signal. If the input
is pseudorandom in nature, the result of input/output cross correlation is can expression of the
impulse response of the system, Since it is known the impulse response contains all observable
information about system performance and since this information may be used to predict system
response to any given input, such an analysis isAndeed a powerful tool . Adding to the utility
of this approach is the fact that a pseudorandom input may be injected at a level 10 to 30 dB
below the tenant signal to be carried as a symbiotic signal. By cross correlating this symbiotic
signal (actually only a portion of the input signal) with the output, system impulse response may
be obtained without disturbing information contained in the tenant signal.
The number of failure types detectable and the extent to which failure may be
identified by type is dependent, in large part, on whether impulse response is the result of the
correlation process. If it is, the limits of failure detection and identification depend only on the
designer's w-illingness to provide capability in the parameter estimation and mapping functions;
all the information obtainable will be available. If correlation is performed on an input signal
that is other than pseudorandom, the capabilities of this approach (with regard to the two areas
under discussion here) would have to be developed through analysis of failure modes and signal
characteristics. A simple example might be the correlation of input and output for an audio
amplifier. For such a case, loss of signal, decrease in gain, and signal distortion would show
up as decreases in the peak value of the correlation function. What effect different types of
signal distortion (clipping, loss of high frequencies, frequency dispersion, etc.) might have on
the correlation function would have to be determirieRl-by analysis. Regardless of what input was
used for verification, design of the mapping process would be highly dependent on the equipment
being verified and, as is shown here, the mapping process may not be simple.
Correlation techniques provide the capability for identifying not only set status but
also the stratus of individual elements. They are not, however, restricted to the observation of
element outputs. The criterion for application to set output would be the requirement that a
change in element transfer function be observable as a change in set transfer function. This
criterion would usually be met. If correlation were applied to set output and if symmetrical
redundancy were being verified, the ability to identify the status of individual elements would
h t be lost.
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As regards application to unsymmetrical redundancy, the choice of Correlation as an
approach is an acceptable one. In fact, as was alluded to above, the presence of unsymmetrical
redundancy might allow the observation of set output while retaining the ability to identify the
status of individual elements. This would be true whenever the elements had different transfer
functions. The application of Correlation to the element outputs of an unsymmetrical configura-
tion may be expected to result in complications in the process of comparing against an expected
correlation function Ossuming the elements have different transfer functions) since what is
expected will vary from element to element.
It will be desirable to accomplish correlation through the use of sampling techniques
since the process requires the storoge of signal values. No restriction on minimum sampling rate
will exist; as a matter of Fact, no requirement of periodicity will be placed on sampling - it may
be done randomly. Accuracy will, however, depend on the number of sample points used to
describe the correlation function.
The reliability of correlation equipment should rank low, along with the more
sophisticated implementations of Spectral Analysis and Inverse Transform, because of its com-
plexity as compared to that of Compare Two and Voting.
The correlation function must be generated by a computer. A special purpose
machine which could be time shared would be a more cost effective choice than a general purr
pose machine.	 9
Random noise added to the signal by the IBV will be undetectable. This would prob-
ably be disadvantageous since, wherever the potential for the addition of a large amount of
noiise exists, it would probably be regarded as a failure type of interest.
Because of the applicability of correlation to all signal types, the transition from a
statement of conditional status to one of status will require only that an admissible input be
present, riot that the status of the input be known.
The potential for Type I errors will be determined mainly by the design. For a given
degree of accuracy in the generation of the correlation function, the degree of agreement which
is demanded between generated and reference correlation functions will be determined by a
tradeoff of verification accuracy and Type II errors against Type 1 errors. As the tolerance on
agreement is tightened, Type II errors will become 'less likely and Type I errors more likely. The
parameter estimation scheme chosen can provide some measure of compensation to this effect.
Legitimate system errors will not be a source of Type I errors when Correlation (not including
comparison, parameter estimation and mapping equiipment) will result in Type I errors.
4
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tCorrelation - Relative Advantnies
0	 Allows continuous verification
•	 Capable of detecting numerous types of failures
9	 Sampling rate not critical
•	 Does not require timing information
•	 Requires only an admissible input
May be applicable to set outpuit
•	 Can be made to idontify failure types
e Adaptable to unsymmetrical redundancy
0	 Requires one powered element at a time
•	 Independent of „signal class
•	 May be used with symbiotic pseudorandom input
• May be made to be extremely comprehensive
i	 Capable of identifying element status
Correlation - Relative Disadvantages
•	 Relatively complex implementation
•	 Use of sampling mandatory
•	 Design of accompanying parameter estimation and mapping equipnnent special-
ized to each kind of IBV
•	 Applicable only to Linear systems
e 	 Not able to detect noise added by IBV
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Al2.0	 ACKNOWLEDGMENT TECHNIQUES
Acknowledgment has been accepted as a method for redundancy verification with
the stipulation that backup equipment, as opposed N,° that primarily relied upon for the accomp-
lishment of a function, is so reliable that the identification of status of the primary equipment
constitutes redundancy verification (see Figure 2.2).
The name in itself implies action. The concept is that equipment receives a com-
many
 and, upon completing its assigned task, acknowledges that its duties have been dispatched.
For maximum verification confidence, the functions of compliance and acknowledgment should
be as closely associated as pospsible.
Consider a commandable switch which routes its output to either of points A or B
(SPDT), Acknowledgment could be accomplished by noting the appearance of signal at A or B
and transmitting notification of this fact as a return, or by using a separate contact to indicate
switch position, perhaps being open when the switch is in position A and connecting to a bV
reference when the switch is in position B. The second choice would probably be more reliable
because the sensing of the tenant signal would not be required.
Lack of accomplishment or lack of compliance would be the only failure types
detectable by the technique. inmost acknowledgmentsituctions, Type I and Type II errors should
occur only as the result of failure in verification equipment.
	 -
Under the ground ruleaccepted above, acknowledgment would be applicable typically
to unsymmetrical redundancy.
Acknowledgment - Relative Advantages
•	 Generally simple and reliable
Acknowledgment - Relative Disadvantages
•	 Very limited applicability
•	 Typically applicable only to unsymmetrical redundancy
•	 Requires distinguishable outputs
I C)
Y
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A13.4	 USER COMPLAINT TECHNIQUES
User Complaint Techniques, like acknowledgment, have been accepted for the
sake of cot..ipletene;;s because only under the groundrule that backup systems are so rel iable that
they do not require checking wi ll these tru ly represent a class of techniques for automated
redundancy verification.
The need for a riot knowledge 'is implied in that the user must have stored informc-
Lion on performance against which to compare actual performance. This, then, is like a human-
implemented monitor method. The failure types detectable will obviously be those which
manifest themselves as output which the user can identify as erroneous.
Potential for errors, both Type I and Type 11, is great because the performance
criteria stored in the mind will often be qualitative and the mind is notoriously poor for accur-
ately recalling qualitative matter. Also, the signals to which these techniques apply will be
limited to those observable by a human.
Of course, the advantages of human capabilities including the ability of handling
unforeseen occurrences will be real ized. It is interesting to note that, ultimately, the user
will always detect a failure; although the time lag could ba significant in some cases. If a
system exists wherein the laser would not detect the failure, one must seveously question the
utility of such a system. There will be some instances where user complaint, although not an
automated technigi se,
 will be a sound engi neering solution.
I
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zUser Complaint - Relative Advantages t
r-
• No additional equipment design
a
• No verification equipment cost
• Economical
User Complaint Relative Disadvantages
• Application to limited class of signals
k
• Typically applicable only to unsymmetrical redundanc^
• Require, a priori knowledge in the form of user experience
• Requires distinguishable outputs
i
• High potential for errors
• Potentially long time delay , to failure identification
A14.0	 COMBINED SIGNAL FORM ANALYSIS/COMPARE TWO TECHNIQUES
A technique which observes a signal property and compares the derived value to one
similarly obtained will enjoy advantages and suffer limitations which are a combination ofrhose
attributable to the two constituent techniques.
The fact that signal properties will be observed will probably mean a decrease in
the number of failure. modes detectable (from what is the case for Compare Two). It will usually
mean a decrease in sensitivity to system noise and, in the design of the equipment observing the
signal (such as a low pass filter to observe the mean) less attention to the signal to be observed
would be required. As cn example, if integration were performed, the time over which the
integration was performed would not be very critical; the important thing would be whether the
some value resulted when the two signals under scrutiny were each subjected to the some period
of integration.
The main features contributed by Compare Two would be the inability to identify the
status of individual elements and the possible allowance of transition from conditional status to
status through the knowledge of admissible input.
I f^
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APPENDIX B
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
HCDL-FRS
(Hypothetical Communications Down-
Link-Earth Receiving Subsystem)
Site A
0.,	 1
B-2
PREFACE
As the name implies, the HCDL-ERS is a hypoothetical system. When faced with the problem of
developing a representative example to demonstrate the methodology of the study, careful con-
sideration most be given to an example which will draw on all aspects of the methodology and
yet not require an inordinate amount of solutf'on time or detail boarding on being inconsequential.
Examples from actual systems in use were found to violate at least one of these prospects and it
was determined that a hypothetical system was the only solution . The hypothetical system could
not simply be a textbook example which ignored real-word constraints; nor could it involve part-
level redundancy. The HCDL-ERS was developed under this philosophy. The system is considered
topical and its design is not trivial. In some cases, license was taken with what might be con-
sidered a "best" approat,h to bring out a point in the methodology. The design represents an
approach and is not intended to be a recommended approach to Lunar-Earth Communication.
J
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r81 .0	 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the MCDL-ERS is to receive information from a fixed moon base via
an S-band link, convert this information to baseband and feed the baseband signals to the proper
distribution busses. Thc- S-band carriers contain commercio1 ­9rode T.V., a 1 Mbs TLM channel,
a voice channel (consisting of five frequency multiplexed circuits) and an emergency digital
channel. The antenna, antenna pointing control and microwave components prior to the cooled
pargmp are not considered part of the ERS. Due to the criticality of the mission, redundancy
will undoubtedly be required for the ERS.
B2.0
	
MISSION AND OPERATIONS PROFILES
The mission profile of a single station of the HCDL-ERS coincides with the diurnal
cycle of the moon . Since a 15-foot hard-mount antenna on the moon with a 2-degree beam-
width will just illuminate the earth, no relay satellites will be used. The use of relay satellites
would require the moonbosed antenna to either radiate a 12-degree beam (a loss of about 15 dB)
or tq be provided with a steerable mount. Neither alternative is attractive. Complete coverage
of communications will be achieved by three earth stations located approximately 120 degrees
apart in longitude and between 40 degrees North and 40 degrees South latitudes. A HCDL-ERS
will,not be required to track below 15 degrees elevation. Considering the latitudinal variations
in the lunar orbit, we can state that the average mission for Site A will be seven hours in dura-
tion. Due to lunar phasing, the time between missions wi l l be 17.8 hours. Due to the critical-
ity of the mission, a complete checkout of the ERS will be required 30 minutes prior to the start
of each mission. To achieve the desired reliability, continuous redundr,=,y verification at a high
degree of confidence is considered essential during the mission so that failed redundant equip-
ments may be repaired immediately upon failure. These considerations are shown in Figure. B2.0
for Site A. (The average mission duration is the only difference between the three sites.)
B2.1
	
Definition of Failure
The ERS will be considered to have failed if any of the specified outputs are beyond
pecified limits for longer than the following time durations:
a. 15 minutes with knowledge of suspect (or Lost) information, and/or
b. 100 msec without knowledge of suspect information.
The goal for the emergency channel shall be five minutes with knowledge of suspect information.
B2 J =	 Traffic Density
'.	 This section describes the traffic density of the four channels in terms of percent
utilization. All times are in Zulu. The profiles are given in Figure B2.2. The PCM channel will
be transmitted on a separate carrier from the remaining three channels (a total of two carriers
see Saction B4.2). From the detailed operations requirements below, both carriers must remain
present at all times.
I	 ,_
B-3
t
{SG
f}fP
ii
MISSION
TERMINATION
SYSTEM CHECKOUT
,,, START OF MISSION
SYSTEM
DEMANDED
CONTINUOUS
REDUNDANCY
VERIFICATION
0	 17.3 17.8	 24.8
TIME (HOURS)
8564'7-3
i	 i
1
Figure 62.0. ERS Operations Profile - Site A
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B2.2.1	 T , V. (Video)
When not in use, it is planned to disable the T.V, drive to the modulator. The
audio portion of T,V..transmissions will be through the Voice Channel.
B2.2.2	 Voice
The voice subcarrier will be present at all times. One voice circuit will be dedi-
cated to T.V.  use .
B2.2.3	 Emergency Channel
The emergency channel subcarrier will be present at all times. The channel shall
remain open for use at all times. The purpose of the emergency channel is to relay priority
messages, provide a reliable link during periods of solar flares and, as the name implies, trans-
mit emergency information.
B2.2.4	 PCM
The PCM carrier will remain present at all times. The number of active channels in
the bit stream will; however, vary on a diurnal basis as well as with the number of experiments
being performed. The utilization profile for this channel reflects the expected number of used
channels.
B3.0	 IMPLICATIONS OF REDUNDANCY WITH REPAIR,
The desire to repair redundant equipments immediately upon failure was expressed
in Section 2.0. This policy is especially applicable to equipments carrying the emergency chan-
nel . From the definition of failure,, it is highly desirable to employ automatic sense and switch
policies where the outputs/inputs of` redundant equipments cannot be connected to a common cone
ductor. The implication of this poliicy is that the status of each equipment must be identified.
Whether this policy is adhered to or not`, a failed equipment must have the capability of being
isolated during repair. A second best alternative is to indicate that a fault has occurred and
resort to manual identification of the fault--so long as time constraint (a) under the failure
definition is not exceeded.
B4.0	 ERS DESIGN DESCRIPTION
This section describes the general physical layout of the ERS as well as the functional
flow and signal characteristics
B4.1	 Location of Equipment
The parametric amplifiers and cryogenics will be located above the azimuth axis of
the antenna. Maintenance of these items during a mission is disallowed. Failure of the cryo-
genics is considered an ERS failure.
B-S
I P_ The line driver amplifier is located in the antenna pedestal. The remainder of the
equipment is housed in a facility 100 feet from the antenna. Maintenance during a mission is
permitted on these equipments,
	
B4.2	 Downlink Frequency Spectra and Modulation
The Downlink spectra and receiver bandpass are shown in Figure B4,2. A modula-
tion and bandwidth summary is shown in Table B4.2.
The T.V. Video, Voice Channel and Emergency Channel are combined to modulate
a 50-watt FM transmitter, with a carrier frequency of 2275 MHz. The TLM channel Bi-phase
modulates a 100-mi l iwatt transmitter with a carrier frequency of 2287 MHz. These two carriers
are combined and radiated from a 15-foot dish.
	
B4.3	 Link Budget and Receiver Noise Tem erature
The link budgets for the FM and Bi-phase carrier are shown in Figure B4.3 under
the case of an 85-foot antenna for the Earth Station* , A receiver noise temperature of 100
degree K is used with the following characteristics resulting.
Node Power
	
Signal Power
S/N (dB)	 dBm
	
dBm
2	 FM	 +26.0	 106.0	 -80.0
Bi-phase	 +11.6	 -118.6	 -107.0
	
B4.4	 Telemetry Format
The PCM telemetry is NRZ . The i-ormat is shown in Figure B4.4.
	
B4.5	 Emergency Channel Format
The emergency channel uses an. RZ26 'fit digital (two level) word for each character.
The word contains 18 data bits and 8 redundancy bits. There are 25 special characters reserved
for instructing the output device. During the transmission of a message, one of these special
characters, the line marker, will appear every 40 characters.
	B4.6	 ERS functional Block Diagram
The ERS functional block diagram is shown in Figure B4.6. The general flow of the
subsystem is as follows. The received signal enters the low noise paramp and is then fed immedi-
ately to the line driver before routing to the equipment facility 100 feet away. Immediately
*The  30-
 -foot aitenna case gives a comparison for T LM using a one-watt transmitter.
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Figure B4.2. Downlink Spectra and Bandpass
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z Table B4.2. Modulation Summary
Ch.
# Desc . Baseband Subcarrier
1 T.V. Freq. band - 0-4 MHz
Video BW ^ 4 MHz I v/A
Combined directly with
subcarrions in FM
Transmitter
2 TLM Modulation - PCM, NRZ
1 Mbs N/A
This channel is bi-phase
modulated on a 2287 MHz
carrier
3 , Voice 5 ckts + 1 pilot, AM -SSB,
Freq MUX carriers f4 ^ 3.90 MHz
BW = 20 kHz
Freq, band - 30 kHz-5OkHz Freq. bond - 3 .75M-4.05MHz
Pilot freq = 38 kHz BW = 300 kHz
FM Modulation
Combined wi(h video in FM
	
t
Transmitter
4 Fmerg . Modulation - PC M, RZ f  = 4.50 MHz
20 Kbs Freq. band - 4.44-4.56 MHz
BW = 60 kHz
Bi-Phase Modulation
combined with video in FM
w transmitter
Telemetry
30' Ant.
Telemetry
85' Ant.
FM
85' Ant.
Transmitter Power	 +30.0 +20.0 +47.0
Coupling Loss	 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0
Antenna Gain (15') 	 +38.0 +38.0 +38.0
FRP	 +65.0 +55.0 +82.0
Pointing Loss	 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
Space Loss
	
-21+2.0 -212.0 -212.0
Atmospheric Atten .
	
-2.0 -2.0 -2.0
Antenna Gain	 +44.0 +53.0 +53.0
Received Power	 -106.0 -107. k? -80.0
System kT n (1000K)	 -178.6 -178.6 -- 178.6
Bandwidth	 +60.02 +60.02 +72.6
Noise Power	 -118.6 -118.6 -106.0
S/N
	
+12.6 +11.6 +26.0
S/N required for Pe
	
= 10-5	+9.6 +9.6
S/N required for T.V. +34.0
(39 dB @ video, . = 1)
Margin	 +3.0 +2.0 -8.01 dB
dBm
dB
dB
dBm
d8
dB
dB
dB
dBm
dBm/Hz
dB -Hz
dBm
dB
dB
dB
i
This will result in an acceptable but somewhat snowy picture.
2 Bit rate bandpass.
Figure B4.3.
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	 ERS Functional Block Diagram
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upon entry to the equipment facility, the signal is down translated such that the center of the
total received band is approximately 80 MHz. Selection of this frequency was based on imple-
mentotion requirements of the two carrier filters and the telemetry bi-phase demodulator. The
carrier filters separate the carriers for individual processing by the subsystem*. The telemetrybi -phase signal is demodulated immediately, reshaped through the bit synchronizer and finally
arranged into words at the group synchronizer. This output is then routed to the distribution
busses and the data editor which strips specific channels for immediate processing at the receiver
site.
After the separation operation by the carrier filters, the FM signal is translated
upward to fc = 400 MHz. This translation is performed due to implementation requirements of
the FM demodulator. The output of the FM demodulator is the FM signal baseband.
Since the T .V. video is modulated directly onto the carrier (i .e., no subcarrier is involved),
the video is picked off at this point and fed to a video amplifier for distribution. The video
amplifier will perform sufficient filtering of the baseband.
The remainder of the baseband is routed to the subcarrier buffer amplifiers and
filters where the voice and emergency subcarriers are stripped off. The emergR^ncy channel sub-
carrier is then fed to a bi -phase demodulator and subsequently operated on similar to the telem-
etry signal .
The voice channel subcarrier is passed through an FM demodulator which reclaims
the original frequency multiplexed audio and the pilot signal. This signal is then fed to the
five buffer amplifiers and filters plus a pilot extractor circuit. Having separated the five multi-
plexed intercarriers, each is fed to a single sideband receiver for detection and routing of the
extracted audio signals. The pilot signal is used in the single sideband detection.
With this thumbnail sketch of the ERS functional impleme ntation as introduction, the
following sections will address some of the specific blocks.
B4.6.1	 TLM Bit and Group Synchroni zers
The Bit Synchronizer clocks, formats and reconstructs the serial bit stream received
from the Bi-phase Demodulators. The output to the Group Synchronizer is a "clean", serial
RZ bit stream at  Mbs with +5.O f0.5V as logic true and 0.0 to +0.5V as logic false.
The Group Synchronizer reconstructs the TLM words and adds an even parity bit.
The output of the Group Synchronizer is a ten bit word plus a parity bit at 100 kws with the
same format as the output of the Bit Synchronizer. The output is routed to the Editor and the
distribution bus
*The TLM Bi-p_iase demodulator would normally supply sufficient filtering due to the nature of
the circuitry, however a filter has been added to reduce noise during lock-up of the demodulator.
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B4.6.2	 T LM Ed i for
The TLM Editor selects seventeen operation-peculiar channels from the TLM infor-
mation stream for immediate processing at the ERS. The Editor is programmable such that it can
adapt to changes in TIM Channels assignment and can select from any seventeen of 42 possible
channels. Reprogramming is accomplished by paper tape reload. The Editor output tothe
Processor (not part of the ERS) is a fifteen bit word and operates on a contention basis with the
Processor. The output words consist of ten data bitso one parity bit and a four bit tag. The
format is the some as that of the output of the Bid Synchronizer. Since the Editor opearates on
a contention basis with the Processor, the output rate can be as high as 100 kws .
	
B4.6.3	 Em ergency Channel Bit and Group Synchronizers
The Bit and Group Synchronizers in the Emergency Channel are similar in function
to those of the TLM Channel except that the Group Synchronizer does not add a parity bit. The
output of the Group Synchronizer is routed to the distribution bus at a rate of 770 ws .
	
B4.6.4
	
Voice Channel
The Filter, Buffer Amplifier and FM Demodulator are straight forward functions.
The frequency spectrum at the output of the FM Demodulator is shown in F igure 4.6.4. The
five frequency multiplexed voice circuits and the pilot  tone are separated by fi ltering and the
audio is recovered by five single-sideband receivers. The pilot tone is fed to each of the
receivers for demodulation . The output of the five receivers is fed to a switchboard (not part
of the ERS) where routing and reconfiguration are accomplished. Functionally, each circuit is
identical and three of the five must be operational for the Voice Channel to be considered
operational.
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C1.0	 INTRODUCTION
This section will outline the philosophy followed in the case study. The time
constraints specified ir, the technical description of the ERS and the nature of the signals which
the system processes are the main factors in the philosophy of approach,
The 100 msec time limit for detecting a failure in the ERS was given primary con-
sideration in designing the verification system. This policy resulted in some rather extreme
measures in the design process which otherwise could have been avoided. Most of the signals
present in the system under mission conditions contain stochastic, nonstationary elements. This
factor eliminates some of the coincidence development techniques,
Finally, we should emphasize that our task was the design of redundancy verification.
equipment for the ERS. No attempt was made to change the design of the principal system to
improve its reliability, since the reliability was considered in the original design. Any changer*
we madf. in the principal system were made solely for the purposes of redundancy verification.
	C2.0
	 DESIGN INPUTS
The following paragraphs are a reiteration of pertinent facts about the ERS, as they
pertain to the verification design. This section categorizes the technical description into the
design input channels called out in the design process.
	
C2.1
	 Set i Group Identification
Figure C2.1-1 shows the ERS block diagram partitioned inro sets and groups with
numbers to identify each group and simple sets (SS).
The choice of this particular partitioning by no means excludes other divisions of the
system. For instance, the equipment contained in Group 1 and Group 2 could be combined into
one group. We chose to divide the group into that portion which could be maintained (the line
drivers) and that portion which is inac cess ible to maintenance.
The five voice channels form a difficult problem in identification, Each channel is
independent of the others so it would seem reasonable to classify them as five simple sets. On
the other hard, the commonality of purpose and the three-of-five success criterion suggests that
they all be identified as a single set or a group. To resolve this dilemma, we must carefully
examine the function of the voice channels. Their function is to conduct at least three conver-
sations from th moon to earth. The fai-lure of any one channel (or two) does not result in a
system failure. Hence, in a functional sense, the five channel's output is a single three-line
conversation, not five single-line conversations. We, therefore, identify the five channels as
one simple set.
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editor was intentionally excluded from the set/group identification process, because its opera-
tion is subject to programmed changes, Each configuration must be verified individually.
C,2.2	 Group Policy
The time constraints for failure detection which are given in the ERS technical
description necessitate using the tenant signals for verification wherever possible. Since
failures in the verification equipment must be shielded from the principal system, we use isola-
tion amplifiers at all tap points as shown in Figure C2.2-1.
;status reports from each group are routed to a central processor which will evaluate
system status, detect a failed element, and automatically switch in the redundant equipment,
if avai lablet.
C? .3	 T ime Profiles
Due to the 100 msec fault detection criterion, verification must be accomplished
continuously throughout the operating cyc le of the ERS.
The required system checkout 30 minutes prior to actual mission provides a high
confidence test of all the system functions. This test also permits assessment of internal system
parameters which may be useful in setting threshold levelsp	 Y	 r etc.
The channel utilization profiles in the ERS technical description indicate varied
demands on the various functions. (PCM, video, etc.) All functions have intervals of 100%
utilization during which idle signals could not be used for verification. in fact, only the voice
channels have significant periods of less than 100% utilization for a worst case 8-hour interval.
There will thus be a trade-off here between using a two-level technique or a single , worst case
technique for verifying the voice channels. Another trade-off will be encountered with verify-
ing the emergency channels. A very 'high confidence level verification can be achieved during
the premission test, but the expected channel usage is inadequate for verification purposes.
Hence, an idle signal may be needed during periods of nonusage .
C2.4
	 Signal Characteristics
In order to determine the type of verification technique (and thus the equipment) to
use, we must know the class of signal whose properties we wish to measure. Knowing this, and
knowing the redundancy class of the si mp! a set/group being verified, we can use the matrix in
Figure 6.2.2-5 (p6 59) of the Phase If Report to determine the techniques available.
Figure C2.4-1 is a table of the simple sets in the ERS, with the class of signal on
their inputs and outputs.
11,
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Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
Stochastic, ,Non-Stationary
with/random noise
Deterministic.
Output Signal ClassSimple Input Signal Class
Set
1.1 Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
1,2 -
1.3 Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
2.1 Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
2.2 Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
3.1 Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
4.1 Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
4.2 Stochastic, Stationary
5.1 Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
5.2 Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
6.1 Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
7.1 Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
7.2 Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
7.3 Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
8.1 Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
8.2 Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
Figure C2.4.`j
Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
Deterministic
Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
Stochastic, Stationary
Stochastic, Non-Stationary
with/random noise
Stochastic, Stationary
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	C2.5	 Properties Indicative of Operation and Their Status Relationship
Most of the signals available for verification are stochastic, non-stationary. This
fact, combined with the time allowed for verification, restricts us to a small group of verifica-
tion techniques. The time constraint eliminates some of the more thorough techniques which
could otherwise be used (especially those techniques requiring digital computation). Hence,
the properties indicative of operation must be those which lend themselves to verification by
the narrow set of techniques available.
Figure C2.5-1 summarizes the properties for each simple set by which we will judge
the operation.
	
C2.6	 Design Confidence and Number of Confidence Levels Desired
Due to the nature of the signals in the ERS, the verification techniques of spectral
analysis, signal form analysis, and inverse transform will be used extensively. Contributory
tolerances of verification equipment must be considered when employing these techniques,
since they are analog in nature, Generally, the verification equipment tolerances are inconse-
quential,, except for the case of threshold detectors. For these devices, the probability of
decision errors increases as the decision threshold level and the signal level approach a unity
ratio. Hence, it is beneficial to noise immunity to maximize this ratio, while maintaining
sufficient confidence in the status resolution.
In at least one portion of the ERS, the telemetry channels, there will be two
different confidence levels established. During the premission checkout prior to the actual
mission, known telemetry data can be used, whereas during the actual mission, most of the
received data is unknown. Hence, we can be more confident of the telemetry receiver when
every bit is checked. There may be other portions of the ERS which can be more fully verified
in the premission checkout than in the actual mission. These will be discussed in the tradeoffs.
	
C2.7
	 Redundancy Class
Having determined the types of signals being processed, the properties indicative of
operation and the time constraints, we can classify the redundancy features for simple sets with
regard to verification. The most prominent constraint is the 100 msec failure detection limit,
which necessitates continuous verification. Referring to the Matrix in Figure 6.2.2-6 (p.61)
of Phase il, we are left with classes A,_ B, E, and G. Since we are employing the symptomatic
approach to verification, we must be able to distinguish the output of an element (see Section
5.2 of Phase II). This eliminates Class G. Finally, the ERS is not a multiple-mode system.
All switching done in the system is solely for selection between redundant channels. Thus the
output of a set is inherently dependent upon the output of each element in the set. This property
eliminates Class B. Hence, all redundancy in the ERS falls into Classes A or E.
0
Simple Set Properties
1.1 1	 .3
si
I"
Gain & BW of parametric amplifiers at carrier frequency
J^
1.2 Temperature of Cyrogenics
2.1, 2.2 Gain & BW of parametric amplifiers at carrier frequency
3.1 Frequency of Local Oscillator carrier frequencies (87 MHz & 75
MHz) at mixer output
4.1 Gain & BW of buffer amplifier & filtor
4.2 10-5 bit error rate
5.1 Gain & BW of buffer amplifier & filter
5.2 Frequency of Local Oscillators; carrier frequencies at mixer out-
puts; emergency channel carrier at FM demodulator output
6.1 Gain and BW of video amps
7.1 Gain and BW of buffer amp 	 y ps; frequency spectrum at FM demodulator
output
7.2 Gain and BW of buffer amps and filters; frequency spectrum of
receiver outputs
7.3 Pilot tone frequency at 38 KHz
8.1 Gain and BW of buffer amp and filter
8.2 10-5 bit error rate
Figure C2.5-1
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C3.0	 HIGHER LEVEL GROUP PROBLEM
Having determined the design inputs, we now formulate the overall system verifica-
tion plan. The areas to be considered are: 1) the - policy for treating off- line elements, 2) the
isolation/independence plan, and 3) status resolution, reporting, and the relationship to a
central processor.
	
C3.1
	
Policy for Treating Off-Line Elements
All off-line elements in the ERS are symmetrically redundant branches of their on-
line counterparts. Since the tenant signal is used for verification in most cases, we are
naturally inclined to perform the same type of verification on the off-line equipment as we per-
form on the on-line equipment. This policy has the desirable feature of providing the same
confidence level in the off-line equipment as in the on-line equipment.
Input power in a ground system is not a constraint, so all the off-line elements may
be verified continuously. This means that all off-Line elements wi ll be active and operating,
with the outputs available through switching. This mode of operation also minimizes the time
delay encountered when a redundant branch must be switched into the principal system. The
time delay may be of considerable importance in the PCM telemetry channels. Group
synchronization requires a master frame marker, which rray mean the loss of up to 10 frames of
data after switching is completed.
During the premission checkout, all systems may be considered off--line. Since the
tenant signal will not be available, we instead use a simulative signal which duplicates the
nature of the tenant signal. This signal, which will be a composite S-band signal with the
subcarriers and baseband of the tenant signal, is injected at the front end cf the system at the
received power level, as called out in the ERS link budget (-106 dBm for a 30' dish, -107 dBm
for an 85' dish). Naturally, we may use known information in modulating the various sub
carriers which compose this signal, resulting in increased confidence in the principal system.
It will be necessary to use the test signal generator during the actual mission for verifying the
off-line paramp and line driver, since any splitting of the received signal would cause a 3 dB
signal loss in the on-line branch.
	
C3.2	 Isolation/Independence Plan
Most of the verification techniques used will necessarily involve sampling the tenant
signal,.so it is imperative that the sampling point be as free from verification system effects as
possible . To accomplish this, all taps onto the tenant signal must pass through isolation
amplifiers, with at least 60 dB isolation between input and output. Thus, a short circuit in the
measurement circuits will have little or no effect on the principal system. Of course, a short
circuit on the isolation amplifier input could have disastrous consequences, but these devices
may be designed so as to virtually eliminate the probability of this event.
C -10
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The breakdown of the ERS into simple sets, shown in Figure C2.1-1, virtually
eliminates the problem of verifying the operation of nonindependent simple sets, The simple
sets are in a series relationship, so that a failure in one branch will be isolated to that particular
branch, As a further contribution to the independence of the simple sets, we recommend
providing each set with its own power supply.
	
C3.3	 Status Resolution, Reporting and the Relationship to a Central Processor
Each of the four different data functions (PCM, Video, Voice, and Emergency) are
in a series configuration, with no looping or feedback. Effects of a failure in one element will
be passed on to all "downstream" elements in that series. Thus before failure can be attributed
to a particular element, the status of the prior element must be assessed . This is the function of
the central processor. An indication of element failure will cause the processor to work back-
wards, checking the outputs of preceding elements, until a good output is found. Then the
element next-in-line from the good one will be declared bad, and its status will be displayed on
a system block diagram board. The processor will also be responsible for switching to redundant
elements, whenever a failure occurs and redundancy is present.
	
C4.0	 THE SET PROBLEM
Considerations in the set problem fall into three (3) categories in the redundancy
verification design process:
1 . Selection of the coincidence development technique to be used on each set.
2. Formulation of the status vector (parameter estimation).
3. Mapping the status vector into conditional status.
C4.1
	 Coincidence Development
In selecting a coincidence development technique, we must give primary considera-
tion to the 100 msec fault-detection limit. As described earlier, all the simple sets in the
system are in redundancy classes A or E. It seems logical, therefore, that the same coincidence
development technique may be used on all of ,
 the elements of one type. For example, all of the
buffer amplifiers in the FRS might be verified using a bandpass filter and threshold detector.
This approach was used in considering each type of element.
The following pages will describe the coincidence development decisions and
selection of the technique used for each type of element in the ERS.
1 . Parametric Amplifiers - The paramps (and cryogenics) are located on the antenna,
and are inaccessible to maintenance. Since any tampering with the inputs of the
amplifiers would seriously degrade the quality of the received signal, we can only
A'	 t
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observe the outputs of the amplifiers. Even here, the signal level is very low,
so all verification equipment must be highly isolated. We decided to ascertain
that the power spectrum of the parramp output contained sufficient energy at the
two frequencies of interest (2275 and 2287 MHz) for the rest of the receiving
system to operate. This is accomplished by an isolation amplifier, two rarrcw-
band filters centered at 2275 and 2287 MHz, respectively, and two threshold
detectors. The threshold detectors are monitored continuously.
2. Cryogenics - The cryogenics may easily be verified by continuous value checks
of a thermal sensor.
3. Line Drivers - The line drivers may be verified in identical fashion to the
paramps by continuously checking the power spectrum of the output at the two
carrier frequencies.
4. Local Oscillators - The R, a^ea l ized power spectrum for a loca l oscillator is an
impulse at the frequency of the oscillator. Hence, to verify an oscillator we
must verify sufficient power at the desired frequency, and verify that spurious
power (a1 , other frequencies) is below an acceptable standard. A narrowband
filter centered at the oscillator frequency plus a power level detector will
suffice for the first consideration, and a notch filter and threshold detector will
satisfy the second.
5. Mixers Mixers are frequency translation devices whose output frequency is the
sum or difference of the frequencies of the input signal and the local oscillator.
Hence, they may be verified just like the paramps, by checking the power
spectrum of the output with a narrowband filter and threshold detector.
b. High Frequency - Buffer amplifiers (and filters) These devices are checked in
the same manner as the paramps - with a narrowband filter and level detector.
"High frequency" means those buffer amps and filters in the system with center
frequencies above 1 MHz.
7. High Bit Rate - PCM Demodulators and Syncs - A special problem exists here as
a result of the 100 msec fault detection requirement. In order to precisely
determine the bit error rate, we must have knowledge of the bits transmitted
from the moon. Since the 30-word PCM frame has 3 frame-marker words (with
known bit patterns), we have knowledge of 10` 5 bits/sec at the 1 megabit/sec
transmission rate. However, the desired bit error rate is 1 in 10-5 , cod exces-
sive rates must be detected in 100 msec . Thin presents an irreconcilable problem l
for the system in its present state, since it takes a full second to observe 10
known bits. A total failure could be detected within the time l imit, but an
intermittent failure might not register in 100 msec
C-12
cThe solution to this problem involves a significant addition to the system -
another b i -phose demodulator, bit sync, and group sync, in parallel with the
original redundant pair. Now we can employ majority voting between the three
channels to detect intermittent errors or failures in any one channel. Since we
are now examining every bit, we can count the number of errors in 10 bits
every 100 msec The probability of encountering more than 5 errors/10 5 bits
without an actual failure is 0,0001; the probability of encountering more than
10 errors/105 bits is negligible. Hence, if the error count exceeds 10 bits in
any 100 msec interval, the on-line channel can be switched to another branch,
The error count per 105 bits can be averaged continuously to provide a mean
bit error rate.
In addition to the majority voting scheme, we also monitor the frame markers to
detect any errors which occur in all three channels simultaneously, such as
those caused by EMI. Thus, any type of error in the channels will be detected.
8. Video Amplifiers - The video amps operate up to 3.6 MHz, and at this
frequency they can be tested by inverse transform techniques. The input to the
amplifier is fed into one input on a differential amplifier, and the output is
inverse transformed (phase & amplitude corrected) and fed into the other input.
The output of the differential amp can then be amplified and threshold detected.
The threshold detector can be calibrated to any desired degree of fidelity between
the compared signals.
9, emergency PCM Channels - The bit rate of the emergency channels is 20
Kilobits/sec. Due tothis reduced rate, the technique employed for the verifi-
cation of the high--speed channels will not work here. in fact, it is impossible
to provide continuous verification of the 1 in 105 bit error rate, since we only
receive 2000 bits in the 100 cosec fault-detection interval. Hence, even if we
knew the validity of every bit, it would be 50 seconds, on the average, for one
bit error to occur. Two alternatives exist 1) We can raise the bit-rate of tho
channel to a sufficient level whereby the channel can be verified continuously
every 100 msec, or 2) We can abandon the 100 cosec failure detection limit, in
the first case, the required channel bit rate would be 106
 bits/sec (the some as
the telemetry channels). This bit rate would make the emergency channel much
more susceptible to noise and EMI. The second alternative requires us to place
higher confidence in-the-reliability of the emergency channels. Since the
channels can be completely verified in the premission checkout, and since the
anticipated demand is only 7%, we are inclined to the second alternative.
10. Voice Channel FM Demodulators The output spectrum of the demodulators
contains the pilot tone at 38 kHz. We observe this output through a narrowband
filter centered at 38 kHz and a level detector.
C-13
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11. Voice Channels - Since the voice channels will have stochastic non-stationary
tenant signals, we roust inject symbiotic signals to achieve verification.
Figure C4.1-1 shows a typical voice spectrum for conversational English. Mote
that the 2400 Hz range is 25 dB down from the maximum. A symbiotic tone at
this frequency will not interfere with the conversation. Hence, we inject 5
symbiotic tones at 32.5, 36.5 1 40„5, 44.5, and 48.5 kHz into the input to the
buffer amps, and monitor the outputs for these tones. Additionally, we monitor
the receiver outputs at the 2.5 kHz frequency to establish continuity through the
system.
12. High Frequency FM Demodulators - These demodulate the video, voice, and
emergency channel carrier. Since the emergency carrier is always present at
4.5 MHz, the upper end of the band, we observe this carrier output through a
narrowband filter centered at 4.5 MHz and a level detector.
Figure C4.1 -2 shows the FRS with the verification equipment and system changes
added.
	C4.2	 Parameter Estimation
All the elements being verified in the ERS, with the exception of the telemetry
channels, use some form of threshold detection. in most cases, we determine that a sufficient
power level at some desired frequency exists. There are two main reasons for the relatively
crude estimate of performance that we obtain, The primary reason is the non-stationary
property of most of the signals in the ERS. There is little more that can be done to verify a
voice-modulated subcarrier, than to ascertain that the carrier plus modulation are present at a
sufficient power level. The other reason that we are restricted to crude estimation devices is
the verification time limit of 100 msec , as called out in the technical description. Throughout
the course of the case study, we have been reminded that it takes time to exercise control.
The PCM telemetry channels are verified by a more sophisticated parameter, bit
error rate. This parameter is an accepted figure of merit for telemetry. As explained
previously, we are able to compute this parameter within the time constraint. A running aver-
age of the bit error rate over many 100 msec interva ls would be a better check on the system.
	
C4.3	 Mapping
Conditional status will be a binary variable	 either good or bad. For those verifi-
cation equipments using threshold detectors, a crossing of the thresht.1id level will be interpreted
as a change of status. Excessive bat error rates in the PCM channels wi l l constitute bad
status. In this instance, we can be more specific by exami ng the bit error rate; and thus draw
conclusions about the type problem that exists. For example, a slightly high bit error rate
would probably be due to excessive noise, whereas a general fa; lure would produce a very high-.
error rate
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APPENDIX D
PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
SPECIFICATION FOR REDUNDANT EQUIPMENTS0
rrihr
i
i
i
i
i
ir
D1.0 SCOPE
This Specification puts forth criteria to be imposed on redundant equipments in
order to assure that the operational integrity of such equipments may be verified using automated r
procedures .
D2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
The following documents of the exact issue shown form a cart of this specification
to the extent specified herein.
	
In the event of conflict between documents referenced and the
content of this specification, this specification shall take precedence.
SPECIFICATI 0 N
Not applicable.
STA NDAR DS
Not applicable. f
DRAW NGS
Not applicable. i
BULLETINS
f:
Not applicable.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Final Report - Study of Techniques for the Verification of Redundancy without
Disrupting Systems 18 September 1970, Radiation Systems Division
Contract No. NAS10-7072
D3.0 REQUIREMENTS
D3.1 Performance
Not applicable.
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D3.2	 Program Design and Construction Standards
D3.2.1
	
General Requirements
Equipments shall comply with at least one of the following:
1 .	 The outputs from redundant items shall be distinguishable, one from the other.
2. The output from a set of redundant items shall vary according to the number
of operable items in the set
3. From each redundant item there shall be provided an output which is in
addition to and isolated from the signal throughput path.
Additionally, equipments shall comply with one of the following:
4. Access to the output of each redundant item shall be provided.
5. Access to the combined outputs of redundant items shall be provided.
Additionally, equipments shall comply with all of the following:
6. Access to such points as are determined to be necessary for the injection of
verification signal, s ►tall be provided.
7. Equipment shall be tolerant of the effects of verification equipment such as
electrical loading.
8. Accesses provided in compliance with criteria 4,5, or 6 shall be in a form
acceptable to verification equipment.
D3.3
	
Requirements for Program Elements
Not applicable .
D4.0
	
QUALITY ASSURANCE
Not appl i cable
Compliance with this requirement will not be sufficient in cases'where the status of
each redundant item is to be determined
II
D-3
D-4
	D5.0	 PREPARATION FOR DELIVERY
Not applicable.
	
D6.0	 NOTES
Not applicable.
c_}
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GLOSSARY
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Acknowledgment	 ( •)incidence development techniques whereby the receipt and
desired effect of a command is indicated through a separate return
signal .
Admissible Input	 -	 An input which is within the range or repertory of an equipment
such that its transfer function can validly operate upon it.
Analog Signal	 -	 Any signal that is not digital . In general, a physical property
(or properties) will be analogous to the information  (measure) to
be communicated .
Automated -	 A procedure whereby the presence (or absence) of redundancy can
Redundancy be verified without manual intervention at the redundant set. 	 This
Verification is not intended to imply that the verification procedure can not be
manually initiated, rather than manual reconfiguration (e.g.,
moving of cables) and checking (e.g ., manual voltage measure-
ments) at each redundant set is not required. 	 Implicit to this
requirement is that all elements in a set (both on-line and off-line)
must be considered.	 Depending can the equipment and operational
considerations, it may be necessary to identify the status of each
element or simply the status of the set (e.g ., 4 of 5 elements up) .
Coding Coincidence development techniques whereby the coincidence
variable is developed by determining the number of information
errors or the rate at which they occur.	 These techniques employ
the characteristics of error detecting codes to establish a statement
of status.
Compare Two -	 Coincidence development techniques whereby the outputs of two
elements are compared on the basis of their values.
Continuous -	 The automated verification of redundancy on a continuous basis
Verification (see Automated Redundancy Verification).	 Note that status
identification of just an on-line-element in a set is not redundancy
verification unless the reliability of the off-line element(s) is great
enough that it is reasonable to assume it is functioning (or capable
of functioning when called upon).
	
Continuous implies the
verification is performed over all time on a real -time basis.	 This
is not intended to exclude time sampling or "acceptable" delays
due to filtering, processing or averaging. 	 For digital systems,
verification at bit or word rate would be considered continuous
verification.
	 In general, if the verification is controlled by the
status identification equipment, it will be continuous and if it is
initiated by a user on demand it will not be continuous.
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Correlation
	
-
	
Coincidence development techniques whereby an inference to
operational integrity is drawn through correlating the input with
the output of the IBV.
Crosspower	 -	 Coincidence development techniques which involve the development
Spectral Analysis	 of a freque;icy spectrum which is the combination of the spectra of
two output signals.
Digital Signal	 -	 Any signal that is discrete in both time and signal space. During a
finite time, a digital signal can send only a finite (or at most
countably infinite) number of messages.
Element
	 -	 The lowest level at which automated verificotion is estoblished.
Each member or entity of a redundant set is an element. Identifiable
entities in the lowest level of Group are elements.
Error, Type I -	 The error which occurs when the status identification equipment
indicates a failure in the principal system when one has not
occurred .
Error, Type 11 -	 The error which occurs when the status identification equipment
does not indicate a failure in the principal system when one has
occurred.
Failure, Type I -	 A failure in the status identification equipment which causes Type I
errors .
ROIure, Type II -	 A failure in the status identification equipment which causes
Type 11 errors.
Group -	 Any collection of elements which do not constitute a simple set.
A group can be a redundant set which is not simple, a collection
of redundant sets or a defined collection of items comprising
interrelated redundancy.
	 In general, status identification of
groups involves system-related (as opposed to set-related) schemes.
BV -	 Acronym for item being verified .
Inverse Transform -	 Coincidence development techniques which perform on the signal
under observation, an operation which is the inverse of that
performed by the item being verified and compares the result to
BV input .
}
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Monitor Methods
Off-Line Element
On-Line Element
Principal System
Probability of
Type I (Type 11) Error
Probob i I i ty of
Type I (Type II)
Failure
Those coincidence dove lopment techniques which employ the
storage of reference information concerning signal values or signal
properties.
An element which is not communicating with successive functions.
Depending on the circumstances, the element may or may not be
performing its intended function, tenant signals may or may not be
flowing and the element may be inert or stressed. Note that if the
element is performing its intended function it will presumably be
stressed .
-	 An element through which a tenant signal(s) is (are) flowing; the
element is expected to perform its intended function and the output
is communicating with successive functions.
The system which contains elements whose status is to be identified.
The conditional probability that the status identification equipment
will commit a Type I (Type 11) error on a single trial.
The unconditional probability that the status identification equip-
ment will fail in such a way as to produce Type I (Type 11) error.
'Y
The capacity of having more than one way to accomplish the some
function where the alternative methods may assume the function
within a prescribed time. So long Cs the aifernote method is
acceptable (in some sense), there is no implication of equivalent
capability. Redundancy has been divided into two areas which
fundamentally describe independence. These are interrelated
redundancy and redundant sets.
The collection of functional entities (equipment, programs, etc.)
which together form the primary and backup (or alternate) capability
of performing a particular function. Each entity or member of the
set is termed an element of the set. Each element is considered to
be dedicated solely to the particular function and to be operating
independent of other sets, i.e.,  not shared with other sets. There
is no restriction placed on the physical size or complexity of the
set. A single nonredundant element would be a degenerate case of
a redundant set. This is redundancy of degree zero.
Redundancy
Redundant Set
IV
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Redundancy, ,.	Redundancy which cannot be described as a redundant set, Inter-
Interre lated	 related redundancy implies that redundancy of some segments of
equipment is contingent can the status of other segments.
Signal	 -	 The alteration of a physical property or properties (voltage,
frequency, pressure, etc.), via a prearranged convention, in order
to convey information. Whenever information is transferred, con-
veyed or related from c,(ie point to another, a signal is Involved.
For the purposes of this study, signals have been divided into three
functional (as opposed to statistical) groups - tenant r,ignals,
injected signals and supporting signals:
Signal Form	 Coincidence development techniques which measure signal prop-
Analysis
	
erties.. as opposed to signal values, and compare against reference
measures of these properties.
Signal, Idle	 -	 An injected signal which is used on-line in a real-time basis to
substitute for the tenant signal in cases where the tenant signal will
be absent for an appreciable length of time, idle signals are
primarily used for a continuous verification policy under the above
conditions. An idle signal should exercise elements of the principal
sysim to the extent that the tenant signal exercises these elements
and should not be the cause of any ambiguity with tenant signals.
idle signals will be primarily used in principal systems which
remain quiescent over the major portion of their mission such as
command destruct systems, sentinel alarms, infrequently used
communications, etc. The use of an idle signal does not interrupt
normal operation of the principal system.
Signal, Injected
	 -	 A signal which has been added into the principal system for the
purpose of status identification. This signal can be static or
dynamic. Injected signals can be further subdivided into idle
signals, symbiotic signals and simulative signals.
Signal	 -	 An injected signal which replaces the tenant signal during the
Simulative	 interruption of normal principal system operation for the purpose
of status identification. The simulative signal must exercise the
elements tlhraugh which it passes and is usually deterministic.
Simulative signals are often called stimulus signals.
Signal,	 -	 Those signals which are inherent to the status identification equip-
Supporting	 ment but are not injected signals. These signals consist of the
command, control and general communication signals within the
status identification equipment.
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Signal,	 An injected signal which is interlaced, multiplexed, mixed or in
Symbiotic	 some fashion comingled with the, tenant signal on a noninterfering
basis. Symbiotic signals are ustiolly injected on a continuous basis
and should Dxercise the elemwits through which they pass to she
extent that the tenant signal exercises these elements,
Simple Set	 -	 A redundant set whose elements all have the, some predecessors and
followers. For a simple set, conditional status, or the conditional
status of each element, can be deduced directly from knowledge of
the output and possibly additional state variables which are other-
wise unobservable. That is, if the output and any selected state
variables are all "satisfactory, "one can immediately conclude that
the element is conditionally "satisfactory," This is contrasted to
the situation where knowledge of the output and selected state
variables is not sufficient to deduce the conditional status of an
element without further logical operations or manipulations, An
additional requirement on a simp'e set is that it may be treated as
an entity from the standpoint of status identification, i.e., the
conditional status can be determined without recourse to the status
or operation of any other set,
Spectral Analysis 	 Coincidence development techniques which derive, by any means,
partial or complete spectral characteristics of the signal under
observation. These characteristics are compared against a reference
in orde to generate a coincidence variable.
Status	 -	 A qualitative, and usually broad, statement regarding the opera-
tional integrity of the item under contention, e.g,, good,
marginal, poor; go, no-go.
Status, Condi-	 -	 The status determined from the condition of elemW/set output
tional	 signal (s) without prior knowledge of the input signal status or
admissibility. The unconditional status of the element/set can only
be determined after the status of the input signal is known. For a
two level status, the following conclusions would be drawn from
indications of unconditional status.
Input acceptable, output acceptable - element acceptable
Input acceptable, output acceptable - element unacceptable
Input unacceptable, output acceptable - reserve
judgment
Input unacceptable, output unacceptable reserve
judgment
6
Value Check;
Nonsequentia l
Value Checks;
Sequential
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Status Variable -	 A variable, either continuous or discrete, which is identified as
providing a measure of the operability, quality, or goodness of a
set, element or function within an element. Status variables can
either be developed through the status identification equipment or
be identified as a state variable or output directly. The conditional
status of equipment (in the principal system) is then inferred from the
status vnriable onto a discrete status range The conditional status
wi I I become the equipment status only after the status of the input
is identified.
Tenant Signal
User Complaint
Voting
That signal which is inherent to the principal system -- as opposed
to any which are added for the purpose of status identification.
Tenant signals are those signals which exist in the principal system
before any consideration is given to status identification.
Coincidence development techniques whereby the status is directly
determined by the observation and judgment of the user,
Coincidence development techniques which employ comparison of
signal value (s) with reference; value (s) without regard to the order
in which the values occur.
-	 Coincidence development techniques which employ comparison of
signalv aiue in ,a sequential manner, deriving information both
from the values and their order of occurrence.
Coincidence development techniques whereby inference to
operational integrity is drawn from a logical polling of outputs or
combinations of outputs.
